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1 Incorporation of illegal
immigrants and ‘internal
migration control’
I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me.
(Invisible Man, Ralph Ellison 1965, orig. 1952: 7)
1.1 Setting of the scene
Governmental policies on irregular or illegal immigration are notorious
for their ambiguities, as even a superficial glance at public discussions on
the issue in the Netherlands can illustrate. Contentions that illegal or un-
documented immigrants1 are not entitled to medical care alternate with
messages that everybody who needs medical treatment of any kind
should receive it. Representatives of municipalities openly back local
initiatives to support illegal immigrants, while at the same time the
national government emphasises that illegal immigrants are utterly re-
sponsible for themselves. Public assertions that there will be no regulari-
sation schemes in the Netherlands are followed by a series of amnesties
for semi-integrated ‘white illegals’.2 These few out of many examples il-
lustrate that societal reactions to illegal immigration, and the presence of
unauthorised immigrants are anything but clear-cut. Officially, the po-
litical aim is to put an end to the issue by implementing a sound and co-
herent ‘discouragement policy’ or ontmoedigingsbeleid.3 Comparable sets
of policy measures are introduced all over the European Union, which is
frequently depicted as ‘fortress Europe’. Yet in the meantime, the pres-
ence of illegal immigrants has become a common feature of many ad-
vanced states, including those that did not perceive themselves as coun-
tries of immigration for a long time.
The presence of illegal immigrants is a corollary of large-scale move-
ments of people across national borders on the one hand and govern-
mental attempts to regulate immigration on the other. Without the co-
incidence of these two processes, and without the imperfection or the
9
imperfect application of regulations, there would be no illegal immi-
grants (Sassen 1999). These processes – and the driving forces commonly
subsumed under the label of internationalisation or globalisation – are
having a considerable impact on Dutch society, as they are in the sur-
rounding countries. Since the 1980s, it has finally begun to dawn on the
Netherlands that it has become a de facto country of immigration and
that many newcomers eventually will stay. In particular in the larger cit-
ies, immigrants from all walks of life are adding to the variety of the pop-
ulation and policies are increasingly oriented at encouraging their well-
being and their integration through intensive integration schemes. At
the same time, visa requirements, work permits and behind-the-border
checks aim at controlling unwanted immigration. As it becomes more
and more recognised that keeping people out is highly problematic in a
world of porous borders, the more traditional immigration policies are
increasingly supplemented with measures of ‘internal migration con-
trol’. A landmark piece of Dutch legislation in this respect has been the
Linking Act,4 which was introduced in 1998 in order to tie the use of ser-
vices such as health care and education explicitly to residence status (see
chapter 5).
Despite, and paradoxically also as a consequence of these govern-
mental efforts, there are still illegal immigrants. To a certain extent, they
have responded to the regulations and controls by behaving more unob-
trusively. In this sense they appear to become the ‘invisible men’ of con-
temporary societies (a parallel with the situation depicted by Ellison in
1952). At the same time, it must be noted that restrictive policies do not
make up the complete story. There are many actors within receiving so-
cieties who turn out to be not indifferent to the needs of illegal immi-
grants. Family members offer housing, information and moral support.
Employers welcome the cheap and flexible labour supply. And a wide
variety of individuals, networks and formal and informal organisations
offer some kind of support for a number of reasons. Although immigra-
tion policies are still very much a matter of national states, it is obvious
that these states are not able to steer their own course independently of
other countries (Favell 2000).5 Nor are they monolithic entities. It is
widely acknowledged that there are wide gaps between official policies
and implementation when it comes to illegal immigrants (cf. Hollifield
1992, Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 1994, Joppke 1998). Relatively lit-
tle attention, however, has gone to the concrete processes that take place
within these gaps, and the consequences of these processes both for ille-
gal immigrants and for the professionals who are supposed to act as
gatekeepers of welfare states.
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The present study aims at investigating the sociological question of
how illegal immigrants, who are legally excluded, manage to be incorpo-
rated into Dutch society and how their opportunities are related to the
implementation of the ‘discouragement policy’. It departs from the
viewpoint that illegal immigrants are not only passive recipients of pol-
icy measures. They can create their own opportunities and exploit the
loopholes that arise from the inevitable ambivalence of policies that try
to deal with illegal immigration. Moreover, although they are legally
non-existent, they do not live in a social vacuum. Other parties help
shape the ‘grey’ areas or loopholes that illegal immigrants are dependent
on, or point to them. In this respect, attention goes primarily to actors
within public and semi-public welfare state organisations.
Theoretically, this study is located at the crossroads of several schol-
arly debates and fields of literature. It attempts to combine insights with
regard to informal incorporation of immigrants (drawing on sociologi-
cal, economic-sociological and criminological literature) on the one
hand, and literature on immigration policies (as studied by policy ana-
lysts and political scientists) on the other.6 It differs, however, from the
majority of studies in the field of migration policy studies in the sense
that the focus will not so much be on formal documents and regulations,
but rather on practices and rules-of-the-game at the lower level. This can
be seen as a strategic level of analysis (Lipsky 1980, Hasenfeld 1983,
Bakker and Van Waarden 1999) as it is the level where representatives of
the state encounter real people instead of rather abstract administrative
categories (cf. Bauman 1989). Local actors are often the first to look for
pragmatic answers to concrete situations and dilemmas (cf. Rath, Pen-
ninx, Groenendijk and Meijer 1996). Moreover, it is the level where the
immigrants in question encounter representatives of the state that offi-
cially defines them as non-members (Bauböck 1996). As the research
was conducted in the highly regulated setting of the Dutch welfare state,
it can also be read as a case study of the implementation of internal mi-
gration control.
Given the broad and multidisciplinary perspective, no single disci-
plinary theoretical approach can suffice. For this reason, the choice has
been made to deal with the more specific literature in the separate chap-
ters and present the general framework and the contextual background
in this first chapter. Section 1.2 deals briefly with international migration
to the Netherlands, including illegal immigration against the backdrop
of migration policies. In section 1.3, basic definitions of illegality are pre-
sented. Section 1.4 subsequently introduces the central theories of immi-
grant incorporation which have guided the study. More specifically, sec-
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tion 1.5 takes up theoretical discussions with regard to undocumented
labour, while 1.6 focuses on the literature on policy implementation.
These discussions of the literature lead to the central research questions,
which are presented in 1.7. A short note on the methodology and the
sources, in section 1.8, explains the different empirical studies on which
the present study builds, and gives a general outline of the study.
1.2 Immigration to the Netherlands
Currently, roughly nine per cent of the Dutch population is from an im-
migrant background, meaning that they or at least one of their parents
were born abroad (SCP 1998). Table 1.1 provides official statistics on eth-
nic minorities for the whole country.7
Table 1.1 Ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, 1971-1997 (*1000)
Country or region of origin 1971a 1975a 1980a 1985a 1990b 1997b
Turkey
Morocco




Other Third World/ Eastern Europec
Total Ethnic minorities























































a: Antilleans and Surinamese by country of birth, others by nationality.
b: 'New definition' based on country of birth of the person or at least of one of the parents,
c: Excluding people from Indonesia and former Yugoslavia. c: People from the Moluccas are no lon-
ger recognisable in the formal statistics. Source: SCP 1998: 241.
Although recently younger generations appear to be moving out of the
largest cities, immigrants are still highly concentrated in the four largest
cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht (SCP 1998). On
average, thirty per cent of the population of these cities is from a non-
Dutch origin. And of the largest immigrant groups, Turks, Moroccans,
Surinamese and Antilleans, about forty percent reside in the four large
cities.
On the whole, the Netherlands can be characterised as what Corne-
lius, Martin and Hollifield (1994) have aptly called a ‘reluctant country
of immigration’. Despite the fact that in the post-war period immigrants
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from former colonies started to settle in the Netherlands, later followed
by recruited ‘guest workers’ from Mediterranean countries, the country
has long been perceived primarily as a country of emigration (Van
Amersfoort 1974, WRR 1979, 1989, Entzinger 1984). First, because the to-
tal figures of emigrants, often fleeing the high population density and
the lack of space, outnumbered those of immigrants. Second, because
immigrants were considered to be staying in the country temporarily.
They were seen as workers who would return to their families after some
years of (hard) labour, and in many cases this was what they themselves
expected as well. During the oil crises of the 1970s, the first attempts were
undertaken to put an end to large-scale international immigration, by
proclaiming a formal stop to labour immigration. Just as in the sur-
rounding countries, however, many former guest workers started to set-
tle here more permanently, which also meant that they brought over
family members and began to form families. So, although labour migra-
tion was slowed down, immigration continued, be it in different forms.
Very slowly, it began to dawn on the Netherlands that immigration
could no longer be considered a temporary phenomenon (Entzinger
1985, Lucassen and Penninx 1994).
By 2002, about one-fifth of the newcomers originate from Turkey,
Morocco, Surinam and the Antilles or Aruba. They come mainly under
the label of (secondary) family reunification. Another major factor ex-
plaining the migration surplus, by now, is the influx of asylum seekers
from Third World countries such as Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Iran
and Iraq. Claims for asylum rose sharply between 1988 and 1994 (from
less than 10,000 to over 50,000) and after a short period of decrease, they
appear to be rising again. In 2000 around 45,000 applicants were regis-
tered. Furthermore, the dramatic political changes in Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union, in combination with rapid developments
in communication and transportation, have resulted in more immi-
grants from a larger number of ‘new sending countries’ all over the
world.
Between 1990 and 1997, the number of immigrants from other than
the traditional countries (primarily Third World countries, Central and
Eastern European countries) rose sharply from seven to thirty per cent
(SCP 1998: 241, CBS 1998). In addition, labour immigration still exists,
although it is now restricted mainly to people at the higher end of the
skills hierarchy. The number of working permits has even started to rise
again due to positive economic prospects and a growing demand for la-
bour (Muus 1998, OECD 1999). Finally, new means of communication
and the development of immigrant communities all over the world lead
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to the emergence of ‘transnational networks’, which in turn lead to more
flexible forms of migration whereby some of the immigrants travel back
and forth without settling in one country permanently (Portes 1997,
Faist 1997, Staring 2001).
The above-mentioned developments are reflected in the changing
profile of newcomers and immigrants. Family members of former ‘guest
workers’ are now joined by asylum seekers, temporary immigrants,
highly skilled professionals and ‘footloose’ EU-citizens enjoying free
movement within the European Union. As the movements of people
have become less predictable and as people are constantly adjusting to
immigration regulations, it is obvious that neatly defined statistical cate-
gories can cover only part of the actual developments. The proportion of
immigration movements that escape regulation and registration is com-
monly labelled illegal, irregular, clandestine, undocumented or un-
authorised immigration (ICG 1995, Delaunay and Tapinos 1998a, 1998b,
Tapinos 1999).
Despite the invisibility in migration statistics, there is a wide held con-
sensus that large and increasing numbers of unregistered immigrants
are present in all European countries (Castles and Miller 1993, ICG
1995). First, because the ‘fortification’ of Europe has to a large extent
closed the door to primary immigrants and pushed them toward illegal
and clandestine channels. Secondly, because European countries reject
more asylum seekers than they grant refugee status (Doornbos and
Groenendijk 2000), while most of the unrecognised asylum seekers are
never returned to their home countries. Thirdly, because an unknown
number of tourists who enter the country legally overstay their rights
and become illegal immigrants in the course of time (Burgers and
Engbersen 1999).
In 1991, the total number of undocumented immigrants in Western
Europe was estimated at 2.6 million (Castles and Miller, 1993: 79-82). In
1995, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development in Vi-
enna estimated that the annual influx (or flow) of illegal immigrants into
the European Union would amount to 400,000 in 1998 and 500,000 in
1999 (Widgren 1999). Others, such as the International Organisation for
Migration, suggest that this is mere the number of women from Central
Europe brought into the EU to work as prostitutes and that the total fig-
ure must be significantly higher (The Economist, 16 October 1999). As-
sessments for the Netherlands vary from approximately 50,000 to
200,000 illegal immigrants and are highly speculative.
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The controversy surrounding the ‘numbers game’ stems from the
political sensitivity of the issue in combination with a lack of reliable
data.8 There has been no official population census in the Netherlands
since the 1970s. Moreover, whereas countries like Italy, France, Spain
and Greece have data at their disposal as a side effect of large-scale am-
nesties (Ruspini 2000), in most countries comparable data are scarce
(Delaunay and Tapinos 1998a, 1998b). The last general regularisation
schemes in the Netherlands – which were relatively limited in scope –
date back to 1975 and 1979 (Groenendael 1986). The data from this oper-
ation are never used to estimate total number of illegal immigrants. Fig-
ures that circulate in the press in the Netherlands are typically claims
made by police officers or municipal representatives who have a certain
interest in stressing the scope of the issue. ‘Conventional numbers’9 are
popular (Larson and Sullivan 1987, see also Stone 1998: 163-187).
Böcker and Groenendijk have maintained that it is preferable to re-
frain from trying to set the record. They argue, among other things, that
data are inevitably poor and that reliable methods are lacking (Groenen-
dijk and Böcker 1995, Böcker and Groenendijk 1996). Yet, poor and
biased data are a problem in many fields of social research (Burgers
1996a). Moreover, there is a steady research tradition in the field of esti-
mating unknown or ‘dark number’ populations (e.g. Bean, Edmonston
and Passel 1990, Van der Heijden 1994, Massey and Singer 1994, Espen-
shade 1995, Fix and Passel 1995, Delaunay and Tapinos 1998a, 1998b).
Starting from the viewpoint that it is important to have at least an edu-
cated guess about the scope of the issue, we made an attempt to estimate
the stock of undocumented immigrants in the four large cities in 1995
(Van der Leun, Engbersen and Van der Heijden 1998). This calculation
was based on the capture-recapture method, which originates in biolog-
ical research and which has been adapted for criminological and socio-
logical applications (Van der Heijden 1994, Smit, Van der Heijden and
Van Gils 1994). The actual calculation was based on apprehension data
of the police (see chapter 3), which for the time being are the most reli-
able data in this respect.10 We analysed 7,000 files pertaining to all illegal
immigrants who had been apprehended in 1995 within the boundaries of
the four cities.
This conservative estimate sets the minimal total number of undocu-
mented migrants in the four largest cities at about 40,000, of whom
18,000 in Amsterdam, 11,000 in Rotterdam, 8,400 in The Hague and
2,600 in Utrecht. These numbers involve people staying in the four cities
for at least one full year, and would make up about seven per cent of the
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registered migrant population (Van der Leun, Engbersen and Van der
Heijden 1998).11
Immigrants from Eastern and Western European countries, many of
whom are taken to be ‘cross-border commuters’, are not included. Nor
are people who live a life completely in the shadows taken into account.
Therefore, the actual number of undocumented immigrants is likely to
be higher than the estimated 40,000. As some of the undocumented im-
migrants go back and forth, whereas others plan to stay in the country
permanently and still others plan to transmigrate, the estimate can only
roughly value the stock of people and not the flow. Despite the inherent
problems with estimates of ‘dark-number’ phenomena and the deficien-
cies of the data, the above-mentioned estimate makes clear that a sub-
stantial population of undocumented migrants is residing in the four
main cities in the Netherlands. The police data also suggest that larger
cities attract considerably more illegal immigrants, and that within these
cities, they tend to flock to certain neighbourhoods (see chapter 3).
From the 1960s onwards, the issue of illegal immigrants has gradually
moved onto the national policy agenda. Between 1960 and the present,
three phases can be differentiated in the ways in which the Dutch State
reacted to the presence of immigrants who came of their own means
(Engbersen 1999a: 15-20). In the first phase (1960-1969), there was con-
siderable leniency in admitting ‘spontaneous migrants’ who came pri-
marily from the Mediterranean region, just like their legal counterparts
who were often actively recruited by employers. This leniency was close-
ly related to the great demand for low-skilled labourers in the expanding
Dutch economy. Labour migrants could travel to the Netherlands and
try their luck in the mining, shipbuilding, metal or textile industries. If
they found a job, they could get a work permit and subsequently a resi-
dence permit (Tinnemans 1994). The initiative of the immigrants was
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Table 1.2 Estimated number of illegal immigrants as a proportion of
the total legal immigrant population in 1995, by city
Amsterdam Rotterdam The Hague Utrecht TOTAL
Estimated number of illegal
immigrants (A)
Total legal immigrant popu-
lation (B)*
















Source: Van der Leun, Engbersen and Van der Heijden 1998, based on police data and municipal
statistics (COS 1996).
seen as a sign of motivation rather than an unlawful act, and their ‘ille-
gal’ status was often only a matter of time.
In the second phase (1969-1991), there was still considerable leniency,
although less in terms of a liberal admission policy and more towards the
presence and work of illegal immigrants. The 1980s were the years of tol-
erance par excellence. Although at the same time the need was stressed to
curtail immigration (Entzinger 1985: 64) and to develop restrictive legis-
lation, there was still a large gap between legislation and its implementa-
tion when it came to effectively combating illegal residence. Illegal im-
migrants could register in the municipal register, they could acquire the
crucial social-fiscal number and their employment was checked and
fined only to a limited extent. The actual toleration practices seem to
have been partly based on economic considerations, as finding workers
within certain economic sectors (e.g. agriculture and market gardening)
proved difficult despite high unemployment.
From the beginning of the 1990s a policy turnaround became appar-
ent, leading to the third phase (1991 up to now). In this third phase, a
number of legislative and other measures have been taken to combat il-
legality more effectively. The advice of the government committee in
1989 (named after its chairman, a former Minister of State for the left-
wing liberals Zeevalking) was the official starting point of the focus on a
policy of internal migration control. The need for co-operation between
separate departments and services was stressed, as was an effective ex-
pulsion policy (Commissie Zeevalking 1991: 4). This stricter stance vis-à-
vis illegal immigrants is partly a reaction to the perceived ‘asylum crisis’
and the idea that the country is ‘full’. In part, it also fits into a more gen-
eral policy trend in the public policy field, in which a lenient stand to-
wards benefit recipients is gradually being replaced by a tougher stand
and a more activating approach (cf. Visser and Hemerijck 1997). Little
by little, the famous Dutch custom of gedogen or ‘condoning’ – once
translated by The Economist as ‘looking the other side when you must’ –
appears to be losing its positive connotation (Engbersen and Van der
Leun 1999).
Step by step, this policy turnaround has led to an ongoing process of
fine-tuning the regulations, at least on paper. Within a single decade an
extensive set of measures were taken to combat illegal residence, the
most comprehensive of which, the ‘Linking Act’, came into force in July
1998. This law was preceded by several other measures that affected the
position of undocumented immigrants, such as tying social-fiscal num-
bers to a valid residence status (1991); the Marriages of Convenience Act
of 1994, the Compulsory Identification Act of 1994; and the Employment
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of Aliens Act in 1994. In the closely related field of asylum policy, the
Ministry of Justice announced a number of measures to control asylum
seeking since 1994. These include closer co-operation with other EU
members, increased use of fingerprinting as a means of checking iden-
tity, intensification of controls just behind the borders and the setting up
of a special taskforce to deal with illegal trafficking (Muus 1998). More-
over, a new law on re-migration was enacted in 1998, and in 2001 the re-
vised Aliens Act came into force with the main aim of speeding up asy-
lum procedures.
These legislative changes were parallelled by major administrative
operations. Since 1995 there is a central computerised database contain-
ing data on all foreigners residing in the Netherlands. Every police unit
now has access to this database and keeps its own record of foreigners
(the VAS or Foreigner Administration System) which is directly linked
to a central database. In addition, other government services – like wel-
fare departments – can also check the central database in order to see
whether their clients are lawfully residents and hence entitled to certain
services or benefits. The whole set of legal and administrative measures
is meant to minimise openings for other than the formally permitted
immigrants by enhancing the administrative transparency of the welfare
state12 (Bernini and Engbersen 1999). In the terminology of James Scott
this can be seen as one of many attempts in the history of national states
to make societies ‘legible’ (Scott 1998).
1.3 Definitions of illegality
As the concept of one uniform national citizenship evolved over time,
states began to rely more and more on what Scott calls ‘state simplifica-
tions’. This holds true especially for the administration and the classifi-
cation of their inhabitants (Scott 1998: 30-32). With respect to immi-
grants in advanced societies, this classification process continues. In all
Western countries, including the USA and Japan, attempts are being
made to classify immigrants into increasingly refined categories
(Bauböck 1996). Yet it is widely recognised that a side effect of this classi-
fication process is that immigrants increasingly try to bend the rules or
look for loopholes. Immigrants who do so, fall into the category of illegal
or undocumented immigrants, which is not so much a predefined cate-
gory, but rather a residual category. In other words, the possibility of be-
coming an illegal immigrant is strongly dependent on the legal frame-
work of a specific country.
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In the case of migration there are three basic sources of illegality: (1)
entry, (2) residence and (3) employment. The three can coincide, but this
is not necessary (ICG 1995: 17-18). Illegal immigrants often enter the coun-
try legally with a visa. On the other hand, asylum seekers who stay in the
country legally can nonetheless work illegally when they do not have a
working permit. A second point of complication is that the legal statuses
of a person can change over time as a result of changing circumstances in
the personal sphere, or as a consequence of a change in legislation
(Groenendijk and Böcker 2000: 83-84). An amnesty can transform for-
merly illegal immigrants into legal immigrants almost overnight. Con-
versely, a divorce within the first three years of a marriage can turn a legal
immigrant into an illegal immigrant. A third point of complication is that,
in many cases, immigrants do not live as isolated individuals. They may
have family members, spouses and children and they may live in house-
holds together with people of different status (Gächter, Waldrauch and
Çinar 2000: 9-28). This all leads to a complicated picture, which is some-
what simplified in the figure below.13 The figure focuses on individual im-
migrants who do not have official permission to stay in the country ac-
cording to the Aliens Act. Natives and legal immigrants who do not
engage in any illegal activity are not included in the figure.
Figure 1.1 Types of illegality
Entry Residence Employment Example
A Illegal Illegal Illegal /— Illegal immigrants, either working or not
economically active
B Illegal Illegal Quasi-legal1 Illegal immigrants, legally employed (mainly
the case before 1991)
C Illegal/Legal Legal Illegal Legal immigrants, illegally employed (i.e.
asylum seekers or students who work
without a permit)
D Legal Illegal Illegal /— Visa overstayers, illegally employed or not
economically active
E  — Illegal Illegal /— Child of illegal parents, born in the Nether-
lands, either working or not economically
active
1. Although an immigrant who has a social-fiscal number can pay taxes and premiums, employment is
still technically illegal, because he or she does not have a working permit. These permits have to be
applied for by the employer before the immigrant enters the country.
In the present study, the emphasis lies on people who stay in the country
without official permission to do so14 at the time of the research. This holds
regardless of whether they have entered the country legally and regard-
less of whether they are economically active or not. So the focus is on the
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categories A, B, D, and E in figure 1.1. The attention, furthermore, does
not so much go to individuals who are in transit or only stay for a short
period of time, but rather to those who stay for months or years in the
country. The research is not confined to people from outside the Euro-
pean Union. EU citizens do have free movement within the European
Union, but they also have to meet certain conditions, such as having
means of support and not being involved in serious criminal activities.
When they do not meet these criteria according to the police, these EU
citizens are often registered as apprehended illegal immigrants15 (see
chapter 3 and 4). In fact, they comprise a category not mentioned in fig-
ure 1.1: Their residence is legal by EU law, but the police treat them as il-
legal immigrants.
A last note has to be made regarding the distinction between illegality
and criminality. There is a tendency both in the Netherlands and in the
surrounding countries to blame crime on immigrants and particularly
on illegal immigrants (Koser 1998, Quassoli 1999, Engbersen and Van
der Leun 2001). Media coverage of the smuggling of human beings and a
tightening up of anti-immigration policies reinforce this symbolic link.
Yet, in practice, the link is anything but clear, as will be shown in chapter
3. Most illegal immigrants do not engage in crime. And, even in a period
in which official policies increasingly criminalise illegality, it must be
noted that crime and illegal residence should not be confused.
The foregoing makes clear that the national regulatory framework of
a country – and its enforcement – defines who may become an illegal im-
migrant. In the remainder of the study it will become clear that the con-
sequences of being an illegal immigrant depend heavily on the impor-
tance attached to this legal framework in day-to-day life, or in other
words the level of enforcement. After all, illegal immigrants are living
proof of the imperfections of the regulatory framework. Before we can
formulate the research question, the next sections deal with the theoreti-
cal framework of the study.
1.4 Theories on migration and incorporation
From a neo-classical economic point of view, immigration is the out-
come of wage differentials between the region of origin and the region of
settlement. Immigrants are on the move in order to better themselves
and their actions are purely motivated by economic considerations. Mi-
gration laws and controls – and other types of internal regulation – affect
the costs and benefits and result in higher or lower levels of illegal immi-
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gration (Borjas 1990, Chiswick 2000, Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci,
Pellegrino and Taylor 1993). In the case of illegal immigration – which in
principle takes place in a black market – costs like punishments, fines
and deportations affect the cost-benefit calculation both for the immi-
grants concerned and for their employers. As long as the benefits out-
weigh the costs, illegal immigration will continue (Borjas 1990, Jahn and
Straubhaar 1999). The virtue of these explanations is that they identify a
clear ‘principle of action’ in human behaviour (Coleman 1994). After all,
the wish to improve their situation is often found to be an important
motive behind immigration. Some argue that if these models can ex-
plain one type of immigration, it would probably be illegal immigration,
because illegal immigrants are primarily seen as workers (Collinson
1994).
Yet, in the past two decades, the narrowly defined homo economicus
has proven to be unable to account for many aspects of the network-
driven and network-generating processes of international migration
(Massey and Espinosa 1997). To name a few problems, it is usually not
the poorest people who migrate, but rather those with a slightly better
perspective. Further, the dispersion of immigrants over the receiving
countries shows highly contingent and path-dependent patterns that
cannot be accounted for by labour-market characteristics solely (Böcker
1994). Once set in motion, immigration flows are often found to be cu-
mulative and self-sustaining and they cannot easily be reversed by legis-
lative measures (Portes and Rumbaut 1990).
The revival of economic sociology and of the sociology of immigra-
tion, which puts the emphasis on the wider context of social behaviour,
can be seen as a response to these conceptual shortcomings (Portes
1995). Social aspects have become more central to the study of migration
and in particular to the study of incorporation (once people are in the
country of settlement). In this respect, there is a parallel with the interest
in the ‘new institutional economics’ for institutions and ‘practices’ in
the broadest sense of the term (North 1991, March and Olsen 1989). This
approach, which has influenced several disciplines outside economics,
has stimulated migration scholars to pay more attention to the formal
and informal institutions that influence the relative position of immi-
grants and immigrant groups (Freeman 1998, Freeman and Ögelman
2000).
Key concepts in the recent sociology of immigration are modes of incor-
poration (Portes and Rumbaut 1990) and forms of embeddedness (Gra-
novetter 1985, 1995, Portes 1995) which pertain to the insertion of human
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action in wider social structures. There is a close kinship between the
two concepts. The central argument made by Granovetter is that con-
crete personal relations and embeddedness within personal networks
shape the structures, which influence the functioning of societies and
economies (Engbersen et al. 1999). Building on Granovetter’s work,
Portes distinguishes two types of embeddedness. First, structural
embeddedness, which refers to the insertion in the wider society – includ-
ing the labour market – which is heavily influenced by formal (migra-
tion) policies, and secondly, relational embeddedness, which refers to mi-
grant communities as potential sources of social capital (cf. Coleman
1994). Both forms of embeddedness exert influence on a person’s behav-
iour in direct and indirect ways (cf. Kloosterman, Van der Leun and
Rath 1999, Engbersen et al. 1999). These more social approaches are im-
portant when studying processes of incorporation rather than migration
per se.
Over the years, the sociology of migration has shown that opportunities
for the incorporation of immigrants are influenced by a number of fac-
tors in the receiving social environment. Portes and Rumbaut (1990)
distinguish three quintessential dimensions of what they call modes of
incorporation:
– Government Policies;
– Labour market characteristics;
– Ethnic communities.
The first dimension points to governmental policies which affect the le-
gal framework in which immigration may be permitted and in which in-
corporation may take place. These policies can, in principal, range from
passive acceptance to active support and they vary across different types
of states (see also section 1.6). Labour market characteristics represent
the second dimension in contexts of reception. This dimension refers to
variables such as the demand for labour and wage differentials, the per-
ception of immigrant groups by employers and the accessibility of the
labour market for immigrants. Theories of economic restructuring and
the growth of the informal economic sectors in advanced urban econo-
mies have suggested that opportunities for immigrants evolve at the
lower end of the labour market (Tapinos 2000). Outsourcing by enter-
prises and by their highly-educated employees fuel the demand for flexi-
ble and low-paid services jobs (see section 1.5). Ethnic communities rep-
resent the third dimension. Many new immigrants arrive in a host
society where an ethnic community already exists in one form or an-
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other. Networks within these communities tend to offer information
about employment possibilities and to facilitate access to the labour
market, and this depends largely on the positions which the more estab-
lished immigrants occupy. Bounded solidarity and high levels of trust
foster the creation of immigrant niches that are to a certain extent shel-
tered (Portes and Zhou 1992, Portes 1995).16 Yet the extent to which illegal
immigrants can fall back on immigrant networks as sources of social
capital (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993, Coleman 1994, cf. Bourdieu
1989) differs significantly among groups. On the one hand, illegal immi-
grants are strongly dependent on these networks because of the high
level of trust that they generate; on the other hand, they do not always
have full access to these networks. Even within migrant communities
they may find themselves in a vulnerable position as a consequence of an
unequal balance of reciprocity (Engbersen, Van der Leun, Staring and
Kehla 1999, Staring 2001). Under harsh conditions, immigrant solidarity
may even turn into exploitation (Mahler 1995, Kwong 1997).
As for integration or incorporation of immigrants more in general, a
distinction is commonly made between the expressional or subjective
dimension (feeling part of a community or society) and a functional di-
mension of incorporation (of which participating in the labour market
is often seen as central). Engbersen and Gabriëls (1995) present a more
differentiated view on integration. Following Walzer (1983), they point
to the fact that people can be more or less integrated in several spheres at
the same time, including the spheres of law, religion, housing and edu-
cation. Integration in one sphere does not necessarily have to coincide
with integration in the other sphere.
Much of the literature on incorporation of immigrants focuses – ex-
plicitly or implicitly – on the position of legal immigrants. In the Nether-
lands, their incorporation is stimulated by a wide array of measures,
rights and public services.17 The present study, however, deals with pro-
cesses of incorporation of illegal immigrants. At first sight this seems to
be a contradiction in terms, as hampering the incorporation of illegal
immigrants is one of the main objectives of the ‘discouragement policy’
(Van der Leun 2000b). Still, it is obvious that when illegal immigrants do
reside in a territory, they commonly develop ties to their new environ-
ment, which eventually results in them being incorporated nonetheless
(Chavez 1994). Jacobson (1996) speaks of ‘quasi-legal’ ties because they
can only develop despite policies and regulations.
It can be maintained that despite many similarities the situation of il-
legal immigrants is fundamentally different in comparison to legal im-
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migrants. As a consequence of restrictive policies, illegal immigrants
have to rely on informal activities much more than their legal counter-
parts do. This holds for earning a living, as they cannot make use of the
formal channels to meet this goal without difficulties and they cannot
fall back on the safety net of the welfare state as legal citizens can. More-
over, in other domains – such as education, health care and housing –
they also have to rely at least partly on informal markets (Chavez 1994,
Mahler 1995).
The question of how (and to what extent) illegal immigrants manage
to gain access to these domains in practice has not received much atten-
tion so far. A complicating factor in this respect is that the literature on
illegal immigration draws heavily on the situation in the United States.
In the American literature the boundaries between legal and illegal im-
migrants are often depicted as blurred. Many illegal immigrants im-
prove their position over time (in terms of job mobility and income) and
eventually legalise their stay (Chavez 1991, 1994, Massey and Espinosa
1997). As long as they are newcomers at the lowest rungs of society, they
are more or less in the same unfavourable position as many legal immi-
grants are18 (Mahler 1995, see chapter 2). Strong welfare states – such as
the Netherlands – tend to rely more on a protected labour market, a high
level of internal migration control and other types of regulation that can
put up barriers for the incorporation of illegal immigrants (Esping-
Andersen 1990, Faist 1997, Jordan and Vogel 1997).
Incorporation, therefore, is here explicitly approached as a multilevel
process in which not only the individual immigrant plays a part, but in
which the influence of the wider context – in terms of the institutional
environment – is also taken into account (cf. Soysal 1994). The general
underlying assumption of the present study is that both the shadow di-
mension of the labour market and formal or informal implementation
practices of formal policies can shape and limit the possibilities for in-
corporation of illegal immigrants. Because the emphasis is on the inter-
action between restrictive policies-in-practice and opportunities for in-
corporation of illegal immigrants,19 attention will primarily go to two of
the three dimensions that Portes and Rumbaut (1990) distinguish: (1) la-
bour market insertion and (2) the influence of regulations and policies.
There exists a considerable body of literature on each of these two di-
mensions, which will be addressed in the next two sections. For reasons
of limitation, inclusion in and exclusion from immigrant networks and
immigrant communities will only be dealt with indirectly (see also
Engbersen et al. 1999, Staring 2001).
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1.5 The labour market dimension
The search for a better income on the part of the immigrant and the de-
mand for low-paid and unattractive work in the receiving society are of-
ten seen as the driving forces behind illegal migration. Illegal immi-
grants are even equated with illegal workers. Illegal labour – especially as
supplied by Mexican immigrants – has attracted the widespread atten-
tion of economists, sociologists and anthropologists in the United
States. Broadly speaking, two types of theories have been introduced to
explain the issue of illegal labour. First, macro-level theories of eco-
nomic restructuring and globalisation. These influential theories aim at
explaining where to find a demand for cheap and informal labour as well
as where to find a supply of people willing to do the unattractive jobs
(e.g. Sassen 1991, Waldinger 1996, Massey et al. 1997). Secondly, meso-
and micro-level approaches focus on the embeddedness of immigrants
in the specific urban economies (e.g. Portes and Rumbaut 1990) and on
the relative position of illegal immigrants in concrete labour markets
once they are present within receiving societies (i.e. Bean, Telles and
Lindsay Lowell 1987, Massey 1987).
Both approaches bring up several themes that are relevant for the
analysis of the labour market position of illegal immigrants in Rotter-
dam. The macro-level theories indicate where to expect opportunities
for illegal workers. In broad terms, opportunities are expected as a result
of the job growth that is linked to forces of globalisation. This job growth
takes place mainly in certain sections of industrial activities that have not
been relocated to the low-wage countries, like customised products
made in sweatshops (Dicken 1992, Raes 2000). Secondly, it is supposed
to take place in the services sector, which grows as a result of outsourcing
by private households and by businesses (Sassen 1991). A third factor
which may give rise to openings for informal economic activities, is the
growing entrepreneurship among the immigrant population of the large
cities (Light and Rosenstein 1995). Within the Dutch cities, including
Rotterdam, the process of economic restructuring has also manifested
itself clearly (Burgers 1996b, Kloosterman 1996), suggesting that oppor-
tunities for illegal immigrants could be found in the Dutch cities. These
opportunities can be expected wherever employers compete on the basis
of price, and wherever regulations (such as the legal minimum wage or
tax regulations) have restricted the demand for legal labour. The latter is
particularly the case in the field of personal services, although this sector
is underdeveloped in the Netherlands in comparison to many other
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countries because of relatively high minimum wages and the high degree
of part-time work.
Meso-level theories are more attentive to the embeddedness of illegal
immigrants in their direct social environment (Granovetter 1995). Sub-
sequently, they pay attention to the type of jobs illegal immigrants get
access to and to how demand and supply are matched. Strong social net-
works can facilitate entry to the labour market because they enable im-
migrants to obtain labour, capital, information and other resources on
an informal basis. High levels of trust are crucial in this respect (Portes
1995). Trust is more easily obtained when the networks are dense, such as
is said to be the case in ‘ethnic enclaves’ (Waldinger 1996). In the case of
Rotterdam, it goes too far to speak of ethnic enclaves.20 Even so, recent
studies point to a marked growth in the number of self-employed in re-
tailing, wholesale, restaurants and personal services in Rotterdam since
1990. Immigrants markedly contribute to this growth (Kloosterman and
Van der Leun 1999). For entrepreneurs, illegal employment can be one
way to cut the high cost of labour. For illegal immigrants the small firms
run by immigrants may provide opportunities for ‘safe’ employment, al-
though this may also go hand in hand with dependency (Mahler 1995,
Kwong 1997).
As to the relative position of illegal immigrants on the labour market,
several studies show that human capital in terms of education, language
ability and working experience is of greater significance than one’s status
as an undocumented immigrant. This means that years of experience
translate into higher wages and better positions regardless of the legal
status (see Bailey 1987, Borjas 1990, Massey 1987, Tienda 1995). It must be
noted, however, that studies employing aggregate statistics tend to re-
port similar outcomes, while ethnographic studies – also conducted in
the US – put more emphasis on the dependent nature of the relationship
between legal and illegal immigrants and the dead-end nature of the jobs
(Mahler 1995, Kwong 1997).
When applying these general notions to Rotterdam, two points have
to be made. First, most studies focus rather one-sidedly on monetarised
labour and neglect other types of economic activities (cf. Tilly and Tilly
1994). In the next chapters, the scope will be widened to all economic ac-
tivities of illegal immigrants in the broadest sense, both in and outside
the labour market, including non-monetary and criminal activities (Van
der Leun and Kloosterman 1999). The second point is that the theories
were developed with the United States as a point of departure. A funda-
mental difference between the labour market in the US and Europe is
that income from labour is taxed more heavily in extensive European
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welfare states. Tax deduction and social security deductions can reach
up to more than half of the gross salary, which can be an extra incentive
for illegal work. At the same time, this is an incentive for controlling
agencies to combat both illegal labour and tax evasion more strictly than
is the case in the United States (Lowell and Jing 1983), which brings us
back to the issue of the internal migration control.
1.6 The policy dimension
In 1985, Tomas Hammar introduced the influential distinction between
‘immigration policy’ which attempts to regulate entry and control of im-
migrants, and ‘immigrant policy’ which aims at speeding up the integra-
tion or incorporation of the immigrants present and improving their
standard of living (Hammar 1985: 7-12). In the first post-war period, mi-
gration policies or integration policies became central in most advanced
economies (Collinson 1993). Since then, however, migration policies
have increasingly become oriented toward a dual goal: on the one hand
stimulating the integration of legal immigrants and their offspring and
on the other hand discouraging unwanted or illegal immigrants.21 The lat-
ter objective has spurred a major shift toward internal migration control
(Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 1994: 5), a term which refers to an ar-
ray of measures such as employer sanctions, amnesties, exclusion from
public services and surveillance by the police. These measures are meant
to discourage or deter illegal immigrants. In particular throughout the
1980s and 1990s, most European countries have rapidly accelerated the
pace of new legislative and administrative measures in order to fine-tune
these internal controls. Because ever more parties become involved in
immigration policy, Zolberg has coined the term remote migration con-
trol (Zolberg 1999, Guiraudon and Lahav 2000).
At the same time, it is widely noticed that migration policies con-
stantly misfire and backfire (Sassen 1996, Freeman 1998, Joppke 1998).
Qualifications like ‘non-policy as a policy’ or ‘symbolic policy’ evidently
refer to this gap between rules and outcomes (Cornelius et al. 1994,
Suárez-Orozco 1994, Jahn en Straubhaar 1999). The large gap between
these policies and the observed outcomes has led to a heated debate
around the question of whether states are (still) able to control migra-
tion.22 Some argue that primarily external pressures – such as transnatio-
nalisation, globalisation, human rights discourses and supranational
policies – undermine the sovereignty of the state in this respect
(Hollifield 1992, Soysal 1994, Jacobson 1996, Sassen 1999). Others ques-
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tion the empirical validity of the claims made and argue that states are
still very much in power and that domestic laws and policies rather than
forces from outside the national states lead to limits of migration poli-
cies (Brubaker 1994, Freeman 1998, Joppke 1998, Lahav 1998). This
(highly unsolved) debate focuses on the extent to which states are willing
and able to control unsolicited migration flows.
In a careful analysis of the developments in the field of migration
control in the last decade, Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) argue that West-
ern European states are not losing control, but that they are rapidly
adapting to internal and external pressures by adopting a specific mix-
ture of remote control measures. According to them, European states
are now shifting up, shifting out and shifting down their responsibilities
in the field of migration. Shifting up refers to forms of international or
supranational co-operation, such as within the EU framework. Shifting
out refers to the role of private parties like airline carriers who face sanc-
tions when they transport people without documents (Guiraudon
2001). And thirdly, the delegation of control-based tasks to public and
semi-public workers is a clear example of shifting down. The latter is
particularly relevant for the present study. Where the central dilemma of
advanced welfare states that are confronted with migration is drawing
the line between members and non-members (Faist 1996), it is obvious
that the responsibility to do so is increasingly being shifted down to
‘gatekeepers’ of the welfare state.
Studies in this field focus primarily on laws, on explicit regulations,
on policy documents and on political decision-making processes. In do-
ing so, they fail to take into account implicit matters of implementation
and enforcement (cf. Brochmann 1998, Collinson 1993) as well as the re-
silience of lower-level counterforces. Since the classic study by Pressman
and Wildavsky (1984, originally published in 1973), a large body of policy
literature has warned against straightforward ideas about the process of
implementation of public policies (Lipsky 1980, Lane 1993). Among
other things, these studies show that implementation practices are influ-
enced by deeply rooted national (or even local) regulatory styles and tra-
ditions (Van Waarden 1995,1999). Within one national context, factors
such as the organisation, the character of the regulations, the discretion-
ary freedom of lower-level workers and the nature of the ‘clients’ all in-
fluence implementation practices (Van der Veen 1990). The political sci-
entist Lipsky (1980) was one of the first to recognise the central position
of lower echelon workers in this respect and he goes as far as to state that
‘policy is actually made in the crowded offices of street-level bureau-
crats’ (Lipsky 1980). Lipsky put emphasis on the ways in which street-
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level bureaucrats bend the rules according to their own objectives rather
than the formal goals of policymakers. Moreover, informal practices or
rules-of-the-game are often found to be much more persistent than
newly imposed policy changes (North 1991).
The bottom-up approach of policy matters that fits into this perspec-
tive was so far mainly applied in empirical studies on social service allo-
cation (Knegt 1986, Engbersen 1990, Van der Veen 1990). These studies
have painted a picture of a large discretion of lower-level workers, al-
though they did not necessarily use this discretion to the disadvantage of
their clients, as Lipsky seemed to suggest. In the field of migration poli-
cies, the study of the degree of discretion and the question how enforcers
use their discretionary freedom is still in its infancy, with the exception
of studies in the field of the sociology of law (cf. Minderhoud 1993,
Clermonts 1994, Böcker and Clermonts 1995, Van den Brink 1999).
Subsequently, systematic knowledge about actual enforcement or im-
plementation practices of internal migration control is limited. For a
number of reasons (such as difficulties in reaching them, and the vulner-
ability of the immigrants in question) sound empirically based studies in
this field are still scarce. Another reason for this apparent lack of insight
is the result of state bodies not being very open about their activities and
the outcomes of these activities. This is even more complicated because
there is a lack of knowledge on the (relatively invisible) group that is ad-
dressed by these policies: the illegal immigrants.
Although Guiraudon and Lahav (2000: 177) seem to assume that the
interests of ‘new actors’ in remote migration control coincide with those
of the central state, it is still unclear whether and how the delegation of
responsibilities has affected the discretionary freedom of the workers
concerned. More specifically, we can ask to what extent agents in the
fields of health care, housing or education (so-called Human Service Or-
ganisations, see chapter 5) are willing and able to engage in control-
based activities that do not necessarily coincide with their professional
opinions and considerations (see Hasenfeld 1983). This question is cru-
cial for the understanding of migration policies in an era of internal mi-
gration control. Yet, it is also relevant for understanding how illegal im-
migrants find their place in societies despite an adverse ‘mode of




The original starting point – the wish to understand processes of incor-
poration of undocumented immigrants into Dutch society – can now be
translated into the following more concrete central research questions
(which will be refined in the following chapters). The first question
reads: How do undocumented immigrants find ways of making their living
in the receiving society? Analytically, three ways of generating an income
for undocumented migrants can be distinguished, apart from support
within the family sphere. One of the ways for immigrants to bypass legal
obstacles and other restrictions is starting one’s own business (Mahler
1995). Nevertheless, within a strong welfare state with a concomitantly
regulated labour market, self-employment is only possible for illegal im-
migrants by bypassing both administrative procedures and tax and la-
bour regulations. Secondly, undocumented immigrants can try to gain
access to the formal or informal labour market as employees. While
common ways of obtaining a job such as formally applying or respond-
ing to an advertised vacancy, are in most cases out of question, illegal im-
migrants need information on where opportunities are to be found and
on how to diminish the chance of being detected. These more traditional
informal economic activities are dealt with in chapter 2. The third possi-
bility is to act completely outside the general regulatory framework by
being active within the criminal sphere where no tax and labour regula-
tions apply, but which falls under the criminal laws. Although it can be
argued that there is a gradual transition from informal economic activi-
ties to criminal activities (Letkemann 1973, Ruggiero en South 1997),
criminal activities are dealt with separately here (in chapter 3), because
the consequences for undocumented migrants are supposed to differ
significantly. Once they are viewed as ‘criminals’ they belong to the pub-
licly most feared category of migrants and formal policies on the undoc-
umented ones give priority to the expulsion of criminal illegal migrants.
The additional question then becomes: To what extent does crime func-
tion as an alternative to informal labour? It is often assumed that illegal
immigrants are dependent more than others on illegal ways of making a
living. At the same time, this contention is to some extent difficult to rec-
oncile with their attempts to remain unseen and their fear of being ex-
pelled. These two contradictory statements have served as the point of
departure for the study of illegality and criminality in chapter 3. In this
respect, it is not only relevant to know whether illegal immigrants are
more or less involved in crime than others, but also, if any, in what types
of crime they engage and how they become criminally active.
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The second set of questions refers to the other side of the coin: the re-
ceiving society: How do lower-level public and semi-public institutions of
the welfare state implement the official policies on illegal migration? To
what extent do lower-level workers have discretionary freedom and, if so,
how do they use this freedom? In what ways are opportunities for illegal im-
migrants influenced by these implementation practices? This set of ques-
tions relates to the less visible dimension of governmental policies, the
implementation practices, whether formal of informal. It can be as-
sumed that illegal immigrants do not easily turn to representatives of the
government. Still, they cannot always avoid it. Undocumented immi-
grants have to turn to formal institutions under specific conditions, that
is when they have needs that migrant communities cannot meet or if
they cannot fall back on well-established communities. These encoun-
ters can either occur on the initiative of the undocumented immigrants
(if, for example, their children attend school) or in case of emergencies
(e.g. when they are brought to a hospital). A second possible ground for
encounters between undocumented immigrants and official representa-
tives of the host society is when the police detect them. This happens ob-
viously not on the immigrants’ initiative, but on account of the formal
attempts to combat illegality. Contrary to professionals in Human Ser-
vice Organisations such as schools or hospitals who only come into con-
tact with illegal migrants passively, policemen – especially those working
for the Aliens Department – are supposed to take an active part in the
search for undocumented migrants (see chapter 5). To gain insight in
the practice of policies on undocumented immigrants, we conducted in-
terviews with police officers in the four cities (see chapter 4).
Police officers are not the only professionals who face a task in the in-
ternal migration control. In particular, as a consequence of the Linking
Act, these responsibilities are now being shifted down to street-level
professionals or semi-professionals who are supposed to act as gatekeep-
ers of the welfare state. To gain insight into their practices and the dilem-
mas resulting from the new regulations, we interviewed workers in
health care, housing and education (see chapter 5). Together with police
surveillance, these three sectors are seen as the crucial sectors for illegal
immigrants who try to get incorporated.23 Because the Linking Act is of-
ten seen as a crucial step in excluding illegal immigrants from Dutch so-
ciety and as a landmark piece of regulation, the interviews were held
both before and after the enactment, in order to enable comparison.
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1.8 Methods and sources
This book is the outcome of my participation between 1994 and 1999 in
the Unknown City research project. This large-scale and multi-
disciplinary project aimed at providing insight into the social position of
undocumented immigrants in Dutch cities, until recently not a well
known category in European sociological literature.24 Illegal immigrants
constitute a difficult subject for empirical research (Cornelius 1982, Ro-
driguez 1987). This also holds, albeit to a lesser extent, for (informal) en-
forcement practices (Van der Veen 1990). At least at first sight, these
subjects do not lend themselves to surveys or to the study of official sta-
tistics. Instead, they call for intensive research strategies, such as
ethnographic fieldwork or face-to-face interviews. This was the way in
which the project began. At a later stage, it became clear that quantitative
data should not necessarily be ruled out when studying ‘hidden’ phe-
nomena (cf. Komter 1983). The process of inquiry is inspired by Robert
Putnam who states, in Making Democracy Work, that ‘The prudent so-
cial scientist, like the wise investor, must rely on a diversification to mag-
nify the strengths, and to offset the weaknesses of any single instrument’
(Putnam 1993: 12).
The first stage of the Unknown City project consisted of ethno-
graphic fieldwork, including intensive semi-structured interviews with
170 illegal immigrants,25 conducted in the city of Rotterdam between 1993
and 1995 by a team of researchers (see Burgers and Engbersen 1999,
Engbersen 1996, Engbersen et al. 1999, Staring 2001). A variety of con-
tacts with individuals and organisations – such as churches, migrant or-
ganisations, brothel owners and police officers – were used to get in
touch with illegal immigrants (see appendix 1). Although we did not ad-
here to statistical notions of representatives in this part of the research,
we attempted to include a wide range of ‘categories’ of immigrants in
our research and therefore did not rely on snowball sampling too much.
The absence of systematic random sampling in this part of the study im-
plies that the reader should approach the statistical outcomes cautiously.
All the same, the interviews provide valuable information, which cannot
be obtained in another way (Cornelius 1982).
In order to obtain more systematic information on illegal immi-
grants’ involvement in crime,26 the fieldwork was extended to police data
in the second stage of the project (see appendix 2). With the permission
of the Ministry of Justice, three samples were taken from anonymous
police files in Rotterdam: a sample of 330 apprehended illegal immi-
grants and two control samples pertaining to legal residents. These data
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were gathered in 1994 and pertained to 1989-1994 and they provided in-
sights into patterns of apprehensions and criminal activities of illegal
immigrants (Engbersen, Van der Leun and Willems 1995). This under-
taking was later repeated in the four largest cities on a larger scale. At this
stage, all apprehensions of illegal immigrants (almost 7,000) within the
period of one year (1995) were analysed. They were used to estimate the
illegal population and, again, to look at patterns of apprehensions (Van
der Leun, Engbersen and Van der Heijden 1998).
With a special regard for policies in practice, the third part of the
study focused on day-to-day implementation practices in the field of in-
ternal migration control. These practices were studied on the basis on
semi-structured face-to-face interviews (see appendix 3 and 4). Although
participant observation within organisations was considered, this turned
out to be problematic because most professionals deal with illegal immi-
grants only occasionally. Therefore, face-to-face interviews appeared to
be more suitable. Interviews were held with police officers and profes-
sionals working in other sectors. The aim was to gain an understanding of
their daily practices. The interviews with police officers (N=40) were held
in 1997 (Van der Leun et al. 1998). These interviews were supplemented
with 30 interviews with professionals in three other sectors education,
health care and housing, in 1996 and 1997, before the introduction of the
Linking Act (see chapter 9 in Engbersen et al. 1999). Roughly one year af-
ter the introduction of the Linking Act, in 1999, another 60 interviews
were conducted in the same sectors with an extension to welfare depart-
ments (Van der Leun and Botman 1999). The research was conducted in
the four largest cities with the emphasis on Rotterdam. These are the cit-
ies were legal immigrants are highly concentrated and police data suggest
that this also holds for illegal immigrants (Van der Leun et al. 1998). The
data sources are summarised in the table below.
Figure 1.2 Data collection and period of time
Subject Chapter Data Time scope
Labour 2 170 interviews with illegal immigrants 1993-1995








Public services 5 30 interviews with (semi-)professionals
60 interviews with (semi-)professionals
1996-1997
1998-1999
1 The data pertain to 1989-1994 and were gathered in 1994.
2 The data pertain to 1995 and were gathered in 1996.
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Every type of data has its specific shortcomings, which will be discussed
in the separate chapters. Together, however, they provided me an insight
into the interplay between strategies of immigrants and policies-in-
practice. Data from different sources have been combined whenever
possible and useful. Using different methods to study one phenomenon
is often labelled triangulation. Triangulation, however, was not the pri-
mary aim. Instead, I wanted to increase the internal validity of the infor-
mation by studying different aspects of the issue in combination. In do-
ing so, findings that arose from one source informed my later analysis of
findings from another source (for example when the apprehension data
were compared to the outcomes of the interviews with police officers).
Sometimes, they enabled or facilitated further inquiry (it was much eas-
ier to conduct the interviews with police officers after I had spent some
time in the Aliens Police offices when gathering quantitative data).
Finally, the fact that the different parts of the research were conducted in
consecutive years enabled me to dwell on the time dimension and to
build in a dynamic component.
In order to bring some clarity into this complexity and as a conse-
quence of the specific history of the research project, the book is organ-
ised in a thematic way. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with strategies of illegal im-
migrants: Chapter 2 pays attention to the labour market insertion of
illegal immigrants and chapter 3 deals with the involvement of illegal im-
migrants in crime. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on enforcement practices and
depart from the perspective of policy implementers. Chapter 4 deals
with internal surveillance by the police. Chapter 5 focuses on practices in
the health care, housing and education sectors before and after the intro-
duction of the Linking Act.
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2 Loopholes in the labour
market: informal
employment
The promise of informality is therefore the promise of choices – choices
made more available but by no means universally available by the infor-
mal economy.
(J. C. Cross 1998: 250)
2.1 Introduction: informalisation
Employment is the backbone of many theories on illegal immigration.
Illegal immigrants are first and foremost seen as economically motivated
individuals who exploit informal economic opportunities in prosperous
countries. Studies on the informal economy indicate that these opportu-
nities exist in one form or another, not just in Third World countries,
but also in advanced economies (Castells and Portes 1989, Portes 1994).
Economies need a certain degree of activity on the fringes to function
smoothly (Jahn and Straubhaar 1999) and governments commonly tol-
erate at least some forms of informality. Globalisation theory, moreover,
suggests that informal economic activities are recently gaining impor-
tance in advanced economies, as a result of far-reaching socio-economic
transformations. Sassen has pointed out that immigrants play a crucial
role in global cities where job growth takes place both at the top and the
bottom end of the labour market (Sassen 1991). New immigrants are
most likely to benefit from the opportunities at the lower end of the
spectrum, where competition is fierce and informality is one of the ways
to cut prices. Sassen attaches crucial importance to illegal immigrants in
this respect, as they comprise the flexible and less-demanding workforce
that restructuring economies need in particular.
Many European cities, even when they are strictly speaking not
‘global cities’, show similar tendencies of a ‘conjoining of informali-
sation and immigration’ (Mingione 1999: 209). In the Journal of Eco-
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nomic Literature, Schneider and Enste (2000) maintain that ‘shadow or
underground economic activity is a fact of life around the world and that
there are strong indications that it is increasing’ (ibid: 70). According to
them, the size of the informal economy in the Netherlands ranks some-
where in the middle of the OECD countries. They estimate that the
shadow economy covers between thirteen and sixteen per cent of GNP,
which is similar to countries like Ireland, France, Germany and Great
Britain (ibid: 81) and which is significantly less than in countries like Bel-
gium, Spain, Portugal and Greece.27 In nearly all countries under study,
there are indications that the informal economy is gaining ground. Esti-
mates of the size of the informal economy – and especially internation-
ally comparative ones – should be treated carefully, as definitions are
slippery and measurement problems obvious. Even so, the work of
Schneider and Enste and others makes it plausible that the informal
economy in the Netherlands is not among the largest in the OECD
countries, but still of a considerable size. This does not automatically
imply a sheer endless demand for illegal workers. Many legal inhabitants
engage in social security fraud, unreported labour, unreported self-em-
ployment, barter and do-it-yourself work activities. The labour market
participation of illegal immigrants (‘illegal labour’)28 is one of the many
components of the informal economy (Renooy 1990, Kloosterman, Van
der Leun and Rath 1998, Rath 1999).
The essence of informal economic activities is that they escape regu-
lation. This does not imply that the activities are criminal. Criminal ac-
tivities can be distinguished by the illegal nature of the product, regard-
less of how they are produced or distributed (Light and Rosenstein 1995,
Kloosterman et al. 1998). Income-generating criminal activities such as
theft or drug dealing are treated in this chapter as special variants of in-
formal economic activities. The same holds for semi-criminal activities
like prostitution (see also chapter 3). In this chapter, the attention goes
specifically to informal economic activities that involve illegal immi-
grants.
The present chapter is based on interviews with illegal immigrants in
Rotterdam that were conducted between 1993 and 1995 (see appendix 1).
The main questions addressed in this chapter are: where, to what extent
and how do illegal immigrants find employment? In what sectors do
they find openings? How do they get access to jobs? And to what extent
are they able to secure an income and to better themselves? In section 2.2
this is placed against the background of policy measures in this respect.
In section 2.3 empirical data on the labour market position of illegal im-
migrants in Rotterdam are presented. Reference is made to how illegal
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immigrants find their jobs and to the role of social networks. Section 2.4
deals with the more dynamic perspective, focusing on labour market ca-
reers and issues of mobility, while section 2.5 provides the central con-
clusions with regard to informal employment in a highly regulated envi-
ronment.
2.2 State regulation and opportunities
According to Barros and Garson of the OECD (2000) all national gov-
ernments in European countries currently adopt a mixture of the types
of measures that aim at combating illegal employment: (a) sanctions on
foreigners working without due authorisation, (b) sanctions on employ-
ers, and (c) preventive measures. Preventive measures are still an
exception29, but the other measures are apparent in the Netherlands. Due
to the coincidence of increasing immigration and rising unemployment
in the 1970s, labour market protection has become an important aim of
immigration legislation. In the official ‘discouragement policy’ of the
Ministry of Justice, curtailing illegal labour and detection of employers
who hire illegal workers are important components. The Law of Em-
ployment of Foreigners (WAV) and its forerunners prescribe that an
employer who wants to hire a non-EU worker must get permission. A
working permit is only provided when there is no alternative supply of
labour within the European Union. As it became clear that illegal em-
ployment was still flourishing, a number of new laws and administrative
measures were introduced in the 1990s (see chapter 1). Since 1991, illegal
immigrants cannot register at the population registrar and can no longer
obtain a social-fiscal number. Finally, in 1994 the Compulsory Identifi-
cation Act was introduced, obliging employees to be able to identify
themselves in the workplace. Sanctions on immigrants can consist of ap-
prehension and expulsion. When awaiting expulsion, furthermore, they
can be held in detention. It is not a criminal offence, however, to work il-
legally. Illegal employees risk apprehension when they work in firms,
but activities like street vending also require permission.
Employers face penalties when they employ illegal immigrants and in
extreme cases even imprisonment or, in theory, withdrawal of their
trading licenses (in the case of repeated offences). The Law on the Chain
Liability (Wet op de Ketenaansprakelijkheid) also renders indirect em-
ployment (i.e. via an intermediary) of a foreign worker without a work
permit a criminal offence. This means that the actual offender can be
prosecuted in such cases as staff swapping or lending. Moreover, labour
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regulations apply to illegally employed foreigners, who can in principle
force a civil action for payment of sums due.30
In enforcing the struggle against illegal labour, the Netherlands as-
signs a central role to the aliens police and to agencies enforcing labour
and employment regulations that fall under the Ministry of Social Af-
fairs and Employment. The Aliens police and the Labour Inspectorate
have powers to inspect and to conduct investigations when they have in-
dications that an employer hires persons without valid working permits.
Part of the on-site inspections are carried out by specialised teams con-
sisting of the police, the Labour Inspectorate, tax authorities and other
bodies who take joint actions. These teams focus specifically on alleged
high-risk sectors, such as (until now) the restaurant sector, taxi services,
the confection industry and greenhouses. Increasingly, the search for il-
legal labour is based on administrative checks of the files of tax authori-
ties. Empirical information on practices of enforcement in the sphere of
the labour market is scarce.
Research among the Aliens police (chapter 4) demonstrated that the
priority given to combating illegal labour varies locally. In Amsterdam
and Rotterdam, where the Aliens police is more oriented towards com-
bating crime, less importance is attached to it than in the smaller cities of
The Hague and Utrecht (see chapter 4). On the whole, spot checks com-
monly focus on well-known risk sectors such as the restaurant sector.
These checks are usually based on information of the tax authorities and
sometimes on tip-offs. When the police find illegal employees, they aim
at expelling them, but this policy often reaches its limits because not ev-
erybody can be expelled and because expulsion does not always prevent
people from coming back (see chapter 4). The National Government
Audit recently evaluated the inspections carried out by the Labour In-
spectorate (Algemene Rekenkamer 1999). The Audit concludes that
manpower is limited, and that resources invested in these checks differ
between cities. The available legal sanctions, furthermore, are not always
put into effect. In only a quarter of the cases, the judge imposed a fine on
the employer, and the fines were significantly lower than the law allows.31
Regarding the economic sectors targeted, the Audit concluded that the
same sectors are checked over and over again, while others are largely left
aside. One of the sectors which is notorious for its employment of illegal
workers is horticulture. A recent report by the ‘greenhouse intervention
team’ shows that in the region around The Hague, about five per cent of
the employers in horticulture were checked in a period of six months,
implying that one in ten employers (in this particular area) may be
checked on a yearly basis.32
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These sources indicate that enforcement of labour market measures
is often more relaxed than the official policy suggests. Moreover, en-
forcement is highly selective. This is not to say that illegal labour as such
is tolerated. A clear example of intensive intervention took place in the
(mainly Turkish) garment industry in Amsterdam, where a so-called
‘confection intervention team’ was established in 1994. As a result of
these actions, together with relocation of production to other countries,
the number of contract-clothing firms in Amsterdam plummeted be-
tween 1992 and 1997 from an estimated 1,000 to an estimated 40 to 50. A
large number of illegal workers were apprehended and sent back to their
home country (Raes 2000: 73, Rath 1999). At the same time, the much
smaller and less visible clothing firms in the other cities were apparently
largely left alone.
In short, the risk of being caught employing illegal workers (or doing
illegal work) is far from stable. The risk of being checked is influenced by
a number of factors including priorities of (local) law enforcers, political
negotiations and compromises and the structure and location of the
production (cf. Raes 2000). It must be added that in many instances it is
not so much the deliberate policy on illegal employment that restricts
the opportunities for illegal immigrants, but other factors such as gen-
eral regulations and requirements (Faist 1996). Both the level of regula-
tion and the extent to which general and specific rules are enforced, re-
strict the potential openings for illegal immigrants. Figure 2.1 depicts the
‘economic resources’ in the broadest sense that are theoretically avail-
able to inhabitants of the Netherlands within levels of government regu-
lation (cf. Tilly and Tilly 1994). The most heavily regulated resources are
put on the left, the least regulated on the right.









Cf. Van der Leun and Kloosterman 1999: 121
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Illegal immigrants are largely confined to the less regulated spheres on
the left side of the figure. As controls and checks tend to concentrate on
identifying illegal employment within the formal sector, it is likely that
illegal immigrants are pushed to the informal economy and to the do-
mestic or family sphere where controls are less strict or non-existent. Il-
legal immigrants will, therefore, be pushed to those domains to the left
of the line. In the case of criminal and semi-criminal activities, the situa-
tion is more complicated. On the one hand, these activities escape most
kinds of regulation, whereas on the other hand they fall under the crimi-
nal code and thereby increase the probability of being detected by the
police (see also chapter 3). The line is shown as dotted rather than con-
tinuous because there are exceptions – loopholes – whereby it can be
crossed. These loopholes may occur in the case of 1) legalisation of sta-
tus; 2) use of fraudulent or forged documents or 3) tolerant enforcement
practices. In the first case, undocumented immigrants succeed in be-
coming ‘documented’ by obtaining a legal residency permit. They cease
to be ‘illegal’ and hence fall outside the scope of this study.33 The second
case involves strategies employed by undocumented immigrants to cir-
cumvent the existing legislation. Through manipulation of their identity
and/or the use of borrowed or forged documents, undocumented immi-
grants can gain access to the ‘formal’ labour market. The third instance
relies on the manner in which the rules and regulations are enforced. If
officials charged with excluding those without entitlement to residency
fail to do their work properly (or choose not to do so), the legislation
loses its effect and undocumented immigrants may become active in the
domain to the right of the figure. Undocumented immigrants’ access to
government welfare provisions is extremely limited (see chapter 5).
Consequently, only the less-regulated informal part is within reach for
undocumented immigrants. In this case, there are basically three possi-
bilities: 1) to work for monetary reward; 2) to work for non-monetary re-
ward and 3) not to work at all. In the latter case, the undocumented im-
migrant has to rely on relatives or on charity. In the case of monetary
work, we can distinguish between ‘formal’ tax-paid jobs, ‘informal’ non-
tax-paid employment and semi-criminal or criminal employment.
These types of work correspond to the positions in the figure when mov-
ing to the left. In the following sections, the position of undocumented
immigrants in Rotterdam will be studied against the background of fig-
ure 2.1.
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2.3 Employment of illegal immigrants in
Rotterdam
The interviews with illegal immigrants in Rotterdam focused on the ac-
tual labour market position of the respondents and on their work his-
tory. In this section their background characteristics, in terms of educa-
tion, country of origin, age and length of stay, will be presented. Next,
attention will go to the extent to which the respondents participate in the
labour market and the types of jobs they occupy. Subsequently, the
questions of how and where (in which sectors) respondents find their
jobs will be addressed.
Background characteristics. Although they have in common a lack of for-
mal permission to stay in the country of residence, the respondents form
a heterogeneous group in many respects. Some came as sojourners ex-
pecting to return home after saving a certain amount of money, others
were determined to settle. Some came to improve their economic posi-
tion, others came for safety and still others for family reasons. Some ar-
rived in the Netherlands directly on tourist visas, while others arrived af-
ter years of wandering through a range of different countries. In table 2.1,
the central background characteristics of the respondents are presented.
The respondents come from 21 countries. The largest groups come from
countries where many legal immigrants also originate from, such as
Turkey, Morocco, Suriname and Cape Verde. There are also Eastern Eu-
ropeans and smaller groups from a number of countries with which the
Netherlands never had special relationships. The majority of the respon-
dents are men between 20 and 40 years of age, which is characteristic for
the ‘first stage’ of migration. The women are predominantly in the same
age group. The majority of the respondents have resided in the Nether-
lands between 1 and 5 years.
Despite their relatively young age, three quarters of the research group
report working experience in their home country. Many respondents
have done ‘elementary work’ before, such as assisting self-employed
family members or doing odd jobs in their country of origin. Further-
more, many respondents have been employed in technical and agrarian
work or trade activities. The interviews make clear that many respon-
dents have learned their work ‘on the job’, implying that the skills are
not automatically useful in another setting.
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Table 2.2 Type of work in country of origin (N=120)


























Table 2.1 Background characteristics of the respondents (N=169)1






















































1 The total number of respondents is 169. The total numbers (N) in the tables vary because only
valid cases were included.
Regarding formal education, half of the respondents have at best fin-
ished their primary education. About one quarter are semi-skilled and
another quarter are highly skilled. When compared to legal immigrants
from Turkey and Morocco who reside in the Netherlands, the illegal im-
migrants are in general slightly better educated. It must be noted, how-
ever, that the group of illegal immigrants is rather heterogeneous in this
respect as well.
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Many respondents have mastered several languages. Apart from the lan-
guage of their home country, sixty-five respondents speak English and
fifty of them speak French. However, half of them do not speak Dutch
and only a few are fluent in Dutch, which is certainly a drawback on the
labour market. Although many respondents have left their country of
origin because of poor perspectives, this is not the case for all of them. A
Moroccan man, for example, had good qualifications and good pros-
pects, but he nevertheless felt he should try his luck somewhere else:
My position was very good. I had everything I wanted. My father [who is
a high civil servant in Marrakech, JvdL] was busy arranging a good job
for me there. But I was stubborn. I had heard so much about the Nether-
lands, both good and bad. ( . . . ) So I went, even though my uncle told
me I would be better off in Morocco. (127)
Despite their different backgrounds, the respondents all face the task of
finding their way into the host society. In most cases, they have to find
ways of generating significant income for their own living and some-
times even more when they have the moral obligation to send money to
their family members or when they are indebted for the journey.
Labour market participation. One of the ways for an immigrant to make a
living may be starting one’s own business (Cross 1998). In Sarah Mah-
ler’s account of the migration experience of Salvadoran migrants in sub-
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urban New York, self-employment plays a major role, although she does
not fail to stress the marginal character of many of these businesses
(Mahler 1995). In the Dutch case, petty forms of self-employment and
street vending are also tied to (local) regulations and requirements. Sec-
ondly, undocumented immigrants can try to gain access to the formal or
the informal segments of the labour market as employees. Common
ways of obtaining a job, such as applying formally or responding to an
advertised vacancy, are usually out of question, as some (even highly ed-
ucated) respondents have experienced. As soon as it became clear that
they did not have the necessary documents they were refused. This im-
plies that respondents need strategic information on where opportuni-
ties are to be found and on how to diminish the chance of being either
refused or detected. After all, they can only be employed by employers
who are willing (and able) to violate labour regulations. The third possi-
bility is to act outside the general regulatory framework by being active
within the criminal or semi-criminal sphere where no tax and labour
regulations apply, but where penal laws are violated. This specific type of
informal employment is dealt with more systematically in the next chap-
ter.
The interviews with illegal immigrants demonstrate that access to the
highly regulated labour market in the Netherlands is rather problematic.
Even if we define ‘work’ in a very broad sense as all income-generating
activities, one third of the respondents was without employment at the
time of the interview. The other two thirds were working but mostly did
not succeed in finding stable and durable employment. They mostly
shifted in and out of employment. According to some respondents, em-
ployers seem to fear detection and they are not willing to hire illegal im-
migrants anymore:
A Moroccan man (27) is without work at the moment of interviewing.
Despite his work experience, he is not able to find a new job. He tells in
detail how he visited a company that had a sign on the door saying: ‘We
do not need employees. We have a dangerous dog.’ It was written in six
languages, including Turkish and Arabic. (101)
Many respondents put emphasis on the need for documents. They com-
monly borrow or ‘lease’ these documents.34 A 22-year old woman from
Cameroon complains that even when she borrows documents, she still
has very little choice:
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To begin with, I cannot work unless I use somebody’s papers. And when
I borrow someone’s papers, the only jobs available are cleaning jobs and
child care. Here I am forced to do things that I never ever would have
considered in Cameroon. On the other hand, you learn fast. For
instance, being a cleaning woman does not make you less than who you
are. (615)
This respondent borrows the documents from a girl she knows well.
Still, she pays fifteen per cent of all her earnings in exchange for the use
of these papers.
In order to gain as much information as possible about the position of
undocumented immigrants on the labour market, those respondents
not working at the time of the study were asked about their last place of
employment. The table below shows the type of work conducted at the
moment of research or before.














1 Regardless of the question whether this concerns official tax-paid employment or unofficial 'cash
in hand' employment, illegal immigrants do not have the permission to stay and work in the Neth-
erlands. Therefore, both types of labour fall under the definition of illegal labour.
Most of the respondents are active in the informal sector; they work ‘in-
formally’ which means that no taxes and/or other deductions are paid.
They are usually employed in small businesses (with less than ten em-
ployees) and they are commonly paid in cash and off-the-books. Formal
(tax-paid) jobs are mostly occupied by illegal immigrants who have en-
tered the Netherlands before 1991. They possess a social-fiscal number
which enables them to be occupied formally, e.g. in greenhouses and
textile factories. Although getting tax-paid jobs is now rendered in prin-
ciple impossible since social-fiscal numbers are linked to residence sta-
tus, there are still undocumented immigrants working ‘formally’. Oth-
ers have been sent off by the employer after having served for years. This
happened to a Moroccan respondent:
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A 31-year old man from Morocco has worked as a manual labourer in a
textile factory. Two months ago the boss told him either to get a resi-
dence permit or leave. He has worked for the same boss for five years.
The boss had already informed the Employment Office that they were
going to fire him. They had a large number of illegal immigrants working
for them and they were laying them all off. (126)
Several respondents ‘rent’ social-fiscal numbers or possess forged num-
bers. They commonly pay for the use of other people’s documents. The
third category consists of non-monetary activities, mostly within the
family sphere. These activities do not require any documents and are
usually part of a more comprehensive support pattern based on reci-
procity (cf. Komter 1996). The domestic nature of the work makes it safe
for the illegal immigrants, as they do not have to fear a raid by the labour
inspection or the police. The fourth category consists of criminal activi-
ties and prostitution, the latter being labelled as ‘semi-criminal’ because
under Dutch law it is not forbidden.
As was expected, formal barriers do block opportunities for self-em-
ployment. Only seven out of 170 respondents in Rotterdam succeeded in
creating their own employment by starting a ‘business’. They are mostly
active within the sheltered sphere of strongly rooted ethnic communi-
ties. The most successful businessmen are the hairdressers, who work
within mosques or teahouses:
A Turkish man works as a hairdresser within the Turkish community.
He runs his business in a teahouse where he finds his customers, and
sometimes in the mosque. He brought his tools with him when he mi-
grated and he did not need to invest any money in the business. He
sends I 250 home every month, which is enough to support his family
and which is more than he would ever earn in Turkey. (220)
Another example of a successfully self-employed illegal immigrant is a
Polish man who is interviewed in the police station where he was de-
tained. Apart from working illegally in the Netherlands on an irregular
basis, he is also involved in car trade. By not formally establishing him-
self in the Netherlands, he is able to dodge the prevailing regulations:
A Polish man travels between Poland and the Netherlands on a regular
basis. He sells about fifteen second-hand cars a year, mostly to Rus-
sians. When he stays in the Netherlands he lives on a camping site and
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leads a sober life. He is not planning to settle, his objective is to make
some money to start a legal business in the future. (514)
Both respondents keep their business low profile. Because they have to
invest only small amounts of money, it can be profitable even when the
business remains relatively marginal. Running a front-store business is
not considered a possibility by our respondents, aside from the fact that
it would require more capital than they would usually possess. Because
of the need for a permit, even street vending is considered too risky by
many. The only option is to pool resources with a legal immigrant and
run a business together. On the whole, even when illegal immigrants are
able to find a job, their work is mainly non-standard employment. Re-
spondents often work irregular hours and on a temporarily and unse-
cured basis, and they tend to combine different occupations or go from
one assignment to another.
Sectoral distribution. The sectors where respondents find employment
(table 2.5) are partly consistent with the globalisation literature (cf. Bur-
gers and Engbersen 1996). This holds for activities in the harbour, indus-
try and construction and – on a larger scale – in horticulture. Some
twenty per cent of the respondents have found work in horticulture
(vegetable, fruit and flower production). These respondents work
mostly in the glasshouses in the Rotterdam region and are employed on
a seasonal basis. The Dutch horticultural businesses (as found in and
around the western conurbation known as the ‘Randstad’) form an ex-
port industry of global proportions. The sector’s international competi-
tive edge is thus based in part on evasion of the law (Van der Leun and
Kloosterman 1999). Horticulture is one of the economic sectors that ap-
pears not only to use illegal labour and other forms of informal labour,
but to be dependent on it. In the recent past employers hired undocu-
mented immigrants on a seasonal basis. Often they paid them ‘formally’,
also implying that they deducted taxes and premiums. Some of our re-
spondents, who came to the Netherlands before 1991, have experienced
this. After the controls were intensified and it became difficult to employ
illegal immigrants ‘formally’ the practices in this sector changed. Now
people are typically employed indirectly with the intervention of an em-
ployment agency or subcontractor, which can be seen as a side effect of
more strict implementation.
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Table 2.5 further suggests that job openings in the lower-level personal
service are limited. Only fourteen per cent of the respondents work in
personal services, and they mostly work within small businesses. Al-
though private citizens in the Netherlands frequently seek help with
babysitting, child care and odd jobs around the house within the infor-
mal circuit, nothing suggests that undocumented immigrants in Rotter-
dam are particularly active in this sphere. This may have to do with the
fact that such arrangements rely on a basis of trust, and it clearly points
to the limitation of networks. The one respondent who works for a pri-
vate household has met her employers through the church. In business
services we mainly find illegal immigrants in the cleaning sector, which
is an important sector for certain groups of documented immigrants
(such as the Cape Verdeans) as well. The legal immigrants who work in
this sector help their illegal co-nationals to get access to these jobs.
Subsequently, table 2.5 shows that part of the opportunities fall out-
side the regular sectors. Besides activities connected with the trade in
drugs, which are the subject of the next chapter, the main area involved
is prostitution. In the Netherlands prostitution is not in itself illegal, but
illegal prostitutes run the risk of being arrested because of their undocu-
mented status. The prostitution circuit is notable for its high degree of
informality. Tax evasion and ‘creative’ accountancy are commonplace,
but there is also considerable disregard for immigration laws as well as
violence, extortion and links with various forms of criminality (Altink
1998). Furthermore, it is an ‘industry’ which is going through a process
of rapid internationalisation. Prostitution in the Netherlands currently
involves mainly immigrants, not only as workers but also as owners of
the businesses. Among the respondents we found two men (from Mo-
rocco and Romania) and six women (from Poland, Slovakia and Camer-
oon) whose primary source of income is prostitution. The men work as
street prostitutes for homosexual clients in the area around Rotterdam’s
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central train station. Both are addicted to hard drugs and lead an ex-
tremely marginal existence. For these respondents, we can hardly speak
of a ‘career choice’: prostitution is more of a way of survival criminality
(cf. Jankowski 1995). The situation is different in the case of the women.
They arrived in the Netherlands already with the intention of becoming
involved in prostitution, having had previous relevant experience in
their countries of origin or elsewhere. The women involved in prostitu-
tion work in ‘private houses’ or clubs in Rotterdam. Of all the respon-
dents, they earn the highest incomes. Unlike the male respondents in-
volved in street prostitution, the female prostitutes are able to exploit
their ‘social capital’ with some success, despite the duress under which
they are sometimes placed and the clear disadvantages of their ‘calling’.
Some try to improve their position through prostitution, either by
means of the high income or by seeking a suitable marriage partner
among their clients.
It must be noted that a significant number of the respondents who
would initially be regarded as not working at all, in fact perform work for
which they receive other than financial rewards. Non-monetary work
such as decorating houses, bringing children to school or cooking din-
ner, is performed in exchange for board and lodging. There are others
who are sometimes temporarily unemployed and who rely on family,
friends, the ethnic community or charitable institutions. Here too, it
may well be that certain unpaid work is performed. Often, a person will
receive ‘pocket money’ from someone concerned about their position.
Twenty-five of the respondents work within the family or ethnic com-
munity, and a further eight receive support from formal or informal net-
works, often in exchange for various odd jobs. Although it is easy to as-
sume that this sort of ‘hidden existence’ would mainly involve women,
the study revealed no significantly greater number of women than men
in this category. A 26-year old Surinamese man can serve as an example:
The man came to the Netherlands six months ago. He has not been
able to find employment. The only time he was offered a job, it con-
cerned tanker cleaning, which his sisters considered to be too danger-
ous. He is now fully supported by his two sisters. In order to earn some
pocket money he does odd jobs, such as decorating, and painting for
family members and acquaintances. (625)
In these instances, a network of contacts in the host country is of crucial
importance. This network is usually based on family and ethnic connec-
tions. This does not apply to the (limited number of) asylum-seekers
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whose applications have been refused but who have chosen to remain in
the country illegally. They built up their contacts during the period they
were actually involved in the asylum procedure. Churches and refugee
organisations sometimes continue to provide support when all other
possibilities are exhausted. Non-monetary work differs from the forms
of work described above in many ways. It is usually embedded in a pat-
tern of extensive mutual assistance (Engbersen et al. 1999). In most cases
those performing the work live in the homes of those for whom they
work, and receive full board and lodging. There is thus little direct com-
petition with others on the employment market. However, there are also
respondents who do nothing in return for such board and lodging. They
are entirely reliant on friends and family for assistance.
How work is found. As it turns out to be problematic to find stable and
durable employment, the question arises how illegal immigrants find
their jobs. The table below summarises the way in which they found
their most recent occupation. Not surprisingly, the majority of occupa-
tions is found with the help of family and acquaintances. Almost with-
out an exception these acquaintances are immigrants themselves. La-
bour subcontractors are also active within migrant communities. The
other ways of finding a job, which look more ‘formal’ at first sight, are
only possible with the help of strategies to bypass restrictions and regula-
tions. Respondents who, for example, work through employment agen-
cies ‘borrow’ or ‘lease’ the identity of legal migrants.




















Access to jobs – albeit informal and often marginal – depends heavily on
migrant networks. It must be added that the networks do not always
solely consist of co-ethnics. There are also many examples of illegal im-
migrants who work together and exchange information with migrants
from many different countries. They seem to be brought together by the
fact that they are confined to the same segments of the labour market,
rather than by ‘ethnic solidarity’. The table below shows the relationship
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between the nationality of the employer or direct ‘boss’ and the nation-
ality of the worker, which is another indicator of the role of migrant net-
works.





















































A significant number of the employers are Dutch. A closer look reveals
that they mostly employ illegal immigrants who were already in the
country before 1991. Illegal immigrants who came later are more often
hired by employers who have an immigrant background. This suggests
that Dutch employers, who often hired illegal immigrants with social-
fiscal numbers, now turn to other categories that can supply cheap la-
bour or they make use of strategies that obscure their responsibility or
mask the illegal employment. This frequently happens in the green-
houses, where many Moroccan respondents work indirectly for a Dutch
boss, through an informal employment agency or subcontractor.
A Turkish man works casually in the construction sector. Every morn-
ing he visits his favourite teahouse and waits until he is contacted. One
of his friends always carries a mobile phone with him and can be easily
summoned by his contact person. Their jobs vary from three hours up
to three days in a row and they are dependent on the subcontractor in
this respect. The other man usually works at a construction site. He
works under a Dutch man who allegedly does not know he is an illegal
worker. Every now and then, the subcontractor pays his salary cash in
hand. He never knows how much he will get. (228)
On the whole, the interviews suggest that a side effect of the increasing
attempts to curtail illegal employment is the shifting to informal non-
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tax-paid work and to immigrant circuits. The Turkish community in
Rotterdam is apparently well established enough to provide relevant re-
sources to undocumented immigrants on a substantial scale.35 Only
among the Turkish respondents does the majority work for an employer
of the same background. The interviews also show that they tend to
work together with their co-ethnics and are able to speak Turkish in the
workplace. Here, more institutionalised strategies of employees and
employers together create opportunities for illegal immigrants. Local
coffeehouses function as informal employment agencies and nodes of
information where labour subcontractors recruit personnel.36 These
practices take place in the relatively sheltered domain of ethnic enter-
prises. The phenomenon of recruiting personnel in the streets, described
in the international literature (cf. Rodriguez 1987, Valenzuela 2001), is an
exception in the Dutch case, as it would attract too much attention of
controlling agencies. As long as recruitment stays in the sphere of the
coffeehouses, it can go unnoticed.37
2.4 Making a living and moving up the ladder
The preceding section offered a cross-section of the employment of ille-
gal immigrants in Rotterdam. The present section focuses on the extent
to which the respondents are able to make a living on the basis of this
employment and subsequently on their chances for upward mobility
over time.
Earning a living. Apart from two children and a minority of respondents
who depend totally on their family, all respondents must earn their own
living. Despite the fact that stable employment is not easy to obtain, ap-
proximately two thirds manage to derive a sufficient income. They do so
by living frugally and combining various jobs. In addition, approxi-
mately half of the respondents enjoy some form of income from other
sources. Some respondents are supported by friends or family members
and others have savings on which to fall back. A small number of re-
spondents receive social security. These recipients belong to the category
of illegal immigrants who migrated to the Netherlands before 1991 and
who are, although undocumented, in possession of a social-fiscal num-
ber. They are entitled to such payments on the basis of insurance premi-
ums paid during previous legal employment. These additional sources
of income are depicted in table 2.8.
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The table refers only to monetary income. In many cases there is also
some form of non-monetary income, or payment in kind. Here we can
allude not only to free board and lodging with family, but also to support
provided by employers in the form of free meals or accommodation.
Such income has not been included here.
Although the income of the respondents fluctuates, we have estimated
the amounts the respondents have at their disposal. The monthly wage
has been calculated by multiplying the hourly wage by the number of
hours worked in one month. Without taking periods of inactivity into
account, this calculation suggests a net wage of around I 770 per month.
Given steady all-round employment at the same number of hours per
week, just over forty per cent of the respondents would earn more than
I 635 per month, which is comparable to the net minimum wage of an
adult in the same period. If we leave out income from prostitution in the
equation, the average monthly wage falls to I 530, which is less than the
official social minimum. There are two factors which suggest that this
estimate is somewhat higher than the actual monthly income. First,
many respondents have no form of paid employment for much of the
year, and in most cases are not entitled to any form of welfare payment.
Second, those respondents who have not succeeded in obtaining a rea-
sonable income level have probably chosen not to answer the question at
all. Nevertheless, there are many respondents who enjoy a reasonable –
or even good – standard of living. When asked about their subjective
perception of their income level, the majority of respondents said that
they were able to save money. Apparently, their preferences are more
oriented towards their country of origin than to the standards of the re-
ceiving country (cf. Waldinger 1996). The sober lifestyle of many re-
spondents enables them to survive on a low income. Their accommoda-
tion costs (rent) are often very low (Burgers 1999a) and they make
further cuts wherever possible.
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Job mobility. The literature on illegal immigrants in the United States has
repeatedly produced the finding that ‘human capital’ in terms of educa-
tion, experience and command of language translates into a better la-
bour market position, even for undocumented immigrants (see Bailey
1987, Borjas 1990, Massey 1987, Tienda 1995). Moreover, a longer stay
usually translates into higher wages (Massey et al. 1993, Chiswick 2000).
In Rotterdam we were unable to find any undocumented immigrants
who had made clear advancement. In our research group, the undocu-
mented status outweighs any other factor, such as work experience, level
of education or command of the Dutch language. This indicates that
possibilities for improvement are severely lacking. Almost without ex-
ception our respondents are active on the lowest rung of the economic
ladder. This also holds for people who are better off in terms of the com-
mon human capital variables such as educational level and language
ability. Neither does the length of stay lead to an improvement in their
situation.
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Even those respondents who have been in the Netherlands for some
years have made little or no progress within the labour market. The du-
ration of only around half of the jobs exceeds one year. Short-term em-
ployment consists of casual jobs lasting from only a few hours to sea-
sonal jobs for a few months. Accordingly, the likelihood of obtaining
official documents by working is extremely small. Further, there appears
to be no correlation whatsoever between the time someone has been in
the Netherlands and the hourly wage he or she is able to negotiate. Re-
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spondents have not been successful in translating their work experience
into higher wages, because they have not been able to obtain work at a
higher level. Only in a very few cases have respondents in work been of-
fered any form of training or advancement. However, one of the respon-
dents who works in the garment industry has been able to progress
slowly from messenger to a higher position. Even such a ‘career path’ of-
fers no guarantee for the future, as the following example can illustrate:
A 23-year old man from Turkey had been unemployed for months. Af-
ter a while he had no choice but to accept a job as a messenger boy in a
garment atelier. He earned I 1,35 per hour. After three months he
could switch to another enterprise, where he could earn I 2,25 an
hour. After he followed some on-the-job training, he was able to better
himself gradually until he made I 3,65 an hour. When the business relo-
cated to Turkey, however, he lost his job and had to start over again. At
the time of the interview he worked casually as a shoe shiner. (223)
The lack of opportunities for mobility is also reflected in working condi-
tions. Most respondents are aware that they find themselves in a subor-
dinate position and that they can easily be replaced by others. They do
not dare to ask for more money or a better position. They often work
long hours and never report ill. Besides, they risk being abused by the in-
termediaries. Several cases have been reported in which the illegal em-
ployee worked without ever being paid.
At the beginning of the chapter, it was reasoned on the basis of figure
2.1 that illegal immigrants would have to resort to less-regulated eco-
nomic activities. This general assumption was largely confirmed in the
empirical analysis. It was also shown that these informal opportunities
have their specific limitations, which will be addressed in the last section.
2.5 Conclusions
Urban labour markets in the United States and in Western Europe are
increasingly seen as sites of informal and illegal labour. Explanations for
the resurgence of informal economies in First World countries have
been particularly attentive to the demand for cheap and docile labour
from abroad. The centrality of the role of labour in theories on illegal
migration is reflected in the fact that illegal immigrants are not uncom-
monly designated as illegal workers, assuming that they all work. The
present chapter modifies this perspective somewhat. Employment is in-
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deed very important for illegal immigrants, but not as easily available as
suggested. A major difference in comparison with the situation as de-
scribed for the United States is that labour is taxed more heavily in the
Netherlands. Subsequently, the protection of the labour market is a cen-
tral component of the ‘discouragement policy’ with respect to illegal im-
migrants. In addition, it can be assumed that general labour market and
tax regulations also hamper illegal employment. The question of how
these regulations affect the labour market position of illegal immigrants
has not received much attention in the literature so far. As far as studies
exist in the Netherlands, they have usually focused on the demand side
or the employers who are the ones that profit directly from the cheap
and willing workforce from abroad (Zandvliet and Gravesteijn-Ligt-
helm 1994, Visser and Van Zevenbergen 2001).
The present chapter has departed from the supply side, in casu the il-
legal immigrants. The underlying question was to what extent illegal or
informal employment offers opportunities for their incorporation in the
receiving society. Employment is understood in the broadest sense of
the term, including tax-paid and non-tax-paid jobs, non-monetary jobs
and criminal or semi-criminal activities. Building on interviews with 170
illegal immigrants in the city of Rotterdam, it has been shown that op-
portunities for illegal immigrants are limited in at least three strongly in-
terconnected respects.
First, as illegal immigrants are confined to a narrow range of sectors
and, more importantly, to the lowest segments of the labour market,
their opportunities are limited in scope. This leads to a significant un-
deremployment of the respondents. At the time of the research about
one third of the research group was unemployed. Those who were em-
ployed reported insecure jobs, regular periods of inactivity and frag-
mented work careers. Those who do find work in the monetary sphere
do so in low-skill and low-paid sectors. They often work below their
qualification level and conduct tasks that legal inhabitants shun. They
typically move from one assignment to another and the ‘jobs’ they oc-
cupy commonly last between half a day and a few months. Self-employ-
ment, which may be a solution for immigrants who face formal block-
ades in the receiving society, offers little opportunity to undocumented
immigrants. The few who have managed to ‘create their own work’ are
active within their own ethnic community. Such completely informal
enterprises must by their very nature remain small in order to prevent
being noticed by the authorities. The high share of untapped labour is
clearly at odds with theories that attach primary importance to the pull
factor of demand for cheap and unattractive labour. For the immigrants
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concerned it means that they spend a considerable amount of time look-
ing for work. The interviews do suggest that the situation has deterio-
rated in this respect, as the respondents who have been longer in the
country point out that it used to be easier in the recent past (in particular
before 1991 when they could obtain a social-fiscal number). More or less
stable jobs with (autochthonous) employers are increasingly being re-
placed by flexible arrangements through an intermediary or subcontrac-
tor. A second trend that can be observed is that illegal labour shifts to
immigrant circuits, where a high level of trust generates openings. This
implies that immigrants who can fall back on an established ethnic com-
munity (such as the Turkish) are better off than those who cannot.
Secondly, the financial rewards for labour are limited. The study in-
dicates that the disposable income of the respondents is relatively low.
On average, the estimated monthly income is comparable to the mini-
mum wage of an adult, but when we leave out the sector with the highest
earnings, i.e. prostitution, the average income drops to below the social
minimum. It has to be taken into account that the income is far from
stable, as a result of the fragmented careers. The assertion of the majority
of the respondents that they can live off their earnings and sometimes
even make savings has to be explained by the fact that they lead a frugal
life. Also, they economise on costs by living together with family mem-
bers or others. Moreover, besides monetary work, there are cases re-
ported of non-monetary work. Mostly this entails doing odd jobs
around the house of family members, in exchange for board and lodg-
ing. The respondents’ accounts do not indicate heavy involvement in the
domestic sphere outside of the family. Apparently, the respondents lack
the ties that could link illegal immigrants to this (growing) demand,
which takes place outside the sphere of government regulation.
Thirdly, the opportunities are limited in the sense that they offer few
chances for upward mobility. As to the type of work, the data show that
respondents are confined to a small segment of the labour market, re-
gardless of the time they have spent in the Netherlands. They are hardly
able to better themselves over time, and neither work experience nor
formal education translates into better jobs or higher wages. The high
‘search costs’ (in terms of time) for illegal immigrants are mirrored in
the fragmented careers of the respondents. In most instances, they do
not specialise in one type of job, but go from one sector to another with-
out being able to climb the ladder.
In sum, the highly regulated Dutch labour market certainly has its
loopholes. These loopholes exist in certain well-known sectors of the la-
bour market, such as horticulture and construction, where the advan-
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tages of dodging the rules are high for employers who are willing to take
the risk. The dotted line as shown in figure 2.1 is indeed permeable
within these sectors. In most cases this also requires the use of false or
borrowed documents. Increasingly, the employment of illegal workers
entails an intermediary who arranges the process of hiring illegal immi-
grants and masking the informality. The refinement of the ‘discourage-
ment policy’ in this respect has not only curbed illegal labour, but also
spurred illegal enterprise that profits directly from the presence of illegal
immigrants. In addition, the sheltered spheres of immigrant communi-
ties and of private households appear to offer loopholes. The latter sug-
gests that the dependency of illegal immigrants on established immi-
grant communities and on social networks has increased. In these
spheres illegal immigrants do not necessarily work for monetary reward,
but rather for board and lodging. On the whole, illegal employment
seems to be more a mechanism for survival than a means of incorpora-
tion. All the evidence points to the fact that illegal immigrants are se-
verely limited by a legal ceiling. This raises the question as to what extent
the criminal sphere can be seen as an alternative ‘labour market’ for ille-
gal immigrants. The interviews brought to light that a minority of the
respondents were active in drug trade and prostitution. In order to pro-
vide a more systematic picture of criminal activities of illegal immi-
grants, the next chapter focuses on these sectors.
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3 Crime as alternative option:
illicit employment
The drug economy is in many ways a parallel, or a parody, of the service
economy.
(Elijah Anderson 1990: 244)
3.1 Crime
Illegal immigrants are, as a rule, not able to build up a stable career on
the Dutch labour market. The ‘legal ceiling’ not only seriously hampers
upward mobility, but also leads to unemployment and underemploy-
ment. At the same time, individuals without a legal status are not enti-
tled to income-replacing public services (see chapter 5). It is likely,
therefore, that they will look for alternative options. One option is to fall
back on their family members, another – on which the focus is here – is
to act outside the regulatory framework. The previous chapters showed
that, in addition to formal and informal work, some of the illegal immi-
grants engage in criminal or semi-criminal activities. These activities in-
clude prostitution and street-level drug trading, which were so far
treated as variants of informal economic activities. The present chapter
more systematically addresses the question whether – under these cir-
cumstances – being active in the criminal sphere is a viable alternative
for illegal immigrants. Are they able to evade or by-pass the legal ceiling,
or does this threaten their position even more? The chapter is based pri-
marily on quantitative police data, as collected in the city of Rotterdam,
combined with information derived from the interviews with 170 illegal
immigrants. The following questions are addressed: To what extent are
illegality and criminality intertwined? Are certain groups of illegal im-
migrants more often involved in criminal activities than others? If so, in
what type of activities are they involved and how can these differences be
explained?
The chapter reads as follows: section 3.2 summarises the existing lit-
erature on (illegal) immigrants and crime. Section 3.3 concentrates on
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the conceptual framework, which draws on the concept of a ‘differential
opportunity structure’. Section 3.4 discusses the caveats attached to the
use of police statistics and how they are dealt with. Section 3.5 provides
an overview of the findings with regard to criminal activities, which is
based primarily on apprehensions as registered by the police. The cen-
tral assumption is that unequal access to formal and informal opportu-
nity structures influences the extent to which groups of illegal immi-
grants are involved in criminal activities. On the basis of information on
the involvement of North African immigrants in the drug economy, it is
subsequently maintained (in section 3.6) that the access to criminal op-
portunities also depends on certain skills and contacts.
3.2 The illegality – criminality nexus
The relatively high crime rates of (certain groups of) immigrants within
European societies have attracted considerable attention in recent years.
In many countries, the number of migrants responsible for certain
forms of crime exceeds their share in the total population. According to
detention statistics, ‘migrants’, ‘minorities’ or ‘foreigners’ are over-rep-
resented in prisons.38 Their absolute and relative numbers have been in-
creasing during the last decade and imprisonment rates are well above
those of the general population (Tonry 1997).39 Despite the growing atten-
tion, the link between immigration and crime is anything but new. It is
one of the classical topics addressed by social scientists and criminolo-
gists, in particular in countries with a longstanding immigration history.
A traditional question in this field is whether or not certain groups of
migrants are more involved in crime than indigenous people and, if so,
how these differences can be explained (Savona and Goglio 1996). This
also spurred interest in the bias of police data and in particular the likeli-
hood of being apprehended because of ‘foreign’ appearances.
After a period of silence surrounding these issues, they have become
widely discussed in the Netherlands, predominantly since the 1990s. A
number of studies since then recognise a significant overrepresentation
of Moroccan and Antillean youngsters in recorded crime statistics
(Junger and Zeilstra 1989, Junger 1990, Bovenkerk 1992, Van Hulst and
Bos 1993, Werdmölder 1991, Werdmölder and Meel 1993, Leuw 1997,
Junger-Tas 1997, Van San 1998, Van Gemert 1998). More recently, atten-
tion has started to shift to other groups such as Africans, Eastern Euro-
peans and Cape Verdeans. At first sight, the general findings are in line
with the conventional wisdom of the law-abiding ‘first generation’ and
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the more crime-prone ‘second generation’. As in many countries, how-
ever, this does not apply to all groups of immigrants. An exception that
has attracted considerable attention, is the relatively low level of arrests
of Turkish youngsters in crime statistics, who grow up under circum-
stances that are to a large extent similar to those of Moroccan young-
sters.40 More generally, the available studies show differential patterns of
arrest: certain groups have below-average offender rates, while other
groups have rates that are between two and four times those observed for
‘autochthonous’ inhabitants. The outcomes of victim surveys and quali-
tative studies suggest that these patterns cannot be solely accounted for
on the basis of law enforcement bias (see chapter 4).
With the growing attention on illegal migration, a new dimension
has been added to the immigrant-crime debates. At the crossroads of
processes of international migration (legal and illegal) and globalisation
of organised crime, there is a growing tendency among the public and
among policymakers to assume a direct link between illegal immigration
and crime.41 It is often held that the lack of established routes to incorpo-
ration more or less pushes illegal immigrants toward crime, in particular
when they are forced to pay back large sums to the organisation that
helped them cross the border. In the most extreme cases reported on,
people are ‘enslaved’ by their smugglers (Kwong 1997). Phenomena like
migrant trafficking and smuggling42 and cross-border crime are increas-
ingly associated with ‘uncontrollable’ immigration. The perception of
these issues influences the symbolic link between foreigners’ crime in
general and illegal foreigners’ crime in particular (Albrecht 1997,
Quassoli 1999, Engbersen and Van der Leun 2001). It is obvious, how-
ever, that although they are often lumped together, the potential rela-
tionships between illegal immigration and crime are manifold. Within
the framework of this study, the attention goes to the involvement of il-
legal immigrants in (income-generating) criminal activities that take
place in the receiving country.43
Despite the tenacity of the rhetoric of the ‘criminal illegal’, there is
very little systematic and convincing empirical support for this equa-
tion. The two broad assumptions that circulate – both in the public de-
bate and in the limited number of studies conducted so far – are contra-
dictory (Engbersen and Van der Leun 1995, 1998). The first assumption –
which can be called the ‘deterrence thesis’ – is that undocumented im-
migrants tend to refrain from committing crimes for fear of being traced
and expelled by the police. In other words, their illegal status encourages
law-abiding behaviour (Werdmölder 1991, McDonald 1997). The second
assumption – which can be dubbed the ‘marginalisation thesis’ – is that
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undocumented immigrants are more likely than others to commit
crimes in order to survive, especially when they are excluded from pub-
lic services and the formal labour market. In other words, the poverty
and marginalisation linked to their illegal status forces them to break the
law. The latter view is expressed, for example, by the Italian scholars
Jamieson and Silj (1998) who maintain that: ‘As for micro-criminality, it
seems likely that for Albanians, as for most other immigrant groups, ille-
gal status contributes significantly to the likelihood of committing
crimes, even though these are mostly “survival crimes”.’
The first assumption finds some support in the work of Aalberts and
Dijkhoff (1993), who have analysed a large number of police records of
apprehended immigrants (mostly legal residents). They argue that un-
documented immigrants are less involved in criminal activities than
their legal counterparts. Moreover, they find that undocumented immi-
grants from EU-member states (mainly France and Germany) are more
likely to commit crimes than undocumented immigrants who come
from Third-World countries. The second assumption finds partial sup-
port in a study on street robberies, conducted by the criminologist De
Haan in the city centres of Utrecht and Amsterdam. He finds that almost
one quarter of the cases of street robbery in his sample were committed
by people who were not residing in the country legally. De Haan con-
cludes that in most cases this concerns ‘survival criminality’. Most of the
suspects he interviewed had no other means of making a livelihood and
many of them were drug addicts (De Haan 1993). More recently, the
Amsterdam police force concluded in a similar vein that almost one fifth
of six ‘priority crimes’ (such as robberies, burglaries and theft) are com-
mitted by illegal immigrants. They appear to score high on robberies and
pickpocketing (VRIS 1999: 24) and are held responsible by the police for
a significant share of the inner-city crime. As to illegal immigrants in
general, the evidence is far from conclusive. De Haan (and the Amster-
dam police) focused on specific types of felonies as conducted in the city
centre of Amsterdam. These figures cannot be easily generalised. The
wide availability of ‘targets’ in inner city areas typically attracts offenders
from far off. Remarkably, De Haan found significantly different out-
comes in a follow-up study in the Bijlmermeer (De Haan 1994), an area
of Amsterdam which has a reputation for hosting large numbers of ille-
gal immigrants. Aalberts and Dijkhoff (1993), in turn, have provided a
broad overview, which modified certain stereotypes. Yet, it only allows
for conclusions on the aggregate level. The present study aims at provid-
ing a more systematic analysis of the possible links between illegality and
crime.
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3.3 Differential opportunity structures
Illegal immigrants are first and foremost associated with survival crimes,
or crimes committed in order to make a living (De Haan 1993). The cen-
tral question of this chapter is therefore whether criminal activities may
be an alternative option for illegal immigrants. The tradition of viewing
crime as an ‘innovative strategy’ is inextricably bound up with the semi-
nal work of Robert K. Merton. According to Merton, people in the lower
strata of society in general tend to experience tension or ‘strain’ as a re-
sult of the discrepancy between culturally induced goals on the one hand
and the accessible means on the other hand (Merton 1957, chapter VI).
The strain does not result from a lack of opportunities as such, but from
the combination of unequal access and an ideology that denies the fact
that opportunities for mobility are not the same for every group. One
way to reduce the tension is by looking for alternative or innovative
means for achieving success. Merton’s analysis can also be applied to the
situation of newcomers or immigrants who often share the ‘American
dream’ (or the European equivalent) and at the same time are unable to
achieve the so strongly desired goals, because they lack access to the le-
gitimate means. Merton identifies five types of adaptations to this ‘new-
comers dilemma’: conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and re-
bellion. The innovative adaptation pattern occurs when immigrants
accept the ‘culture goals’, but look for alternative means of achieving
them. Crime or deviancy (as a reaction to strain) is one of them. Merton
argues that: ‘It is only when a system of cultural values extols, virtually
above all else, certain common goals for the population at large, while the
social structure rigorously restricts or completely closes access to ap-
proved modes of reaching these goals for a considerable part of the same
population that deviant behaviour ensued on a large scale.’ (Merton
1957:146, his italics)
Merton’s analysis points to the different pressures that social groups
face in their pursue of success. Even when we define success loosely in
the case of illegal immigrants and focus on the ability to make a living, it
becomes clear that these pressures can differ significantly among groups
of illegal immigrants, depending on their access to accepted and less ac-
cepted means. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) have specified this perspective
further in their work on the differential opportunity structure. They take
Merton’s analysis a step further by emphasising that inequality not only
exists in the availability of accepted means, but also in the access to ille-
gitimate and criminal opportunities. Cloward and Ohlin think of indi-
viduals as being located in different opportunity structures at the same
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time and stress that a person who does not ‘make it’ legitimately, cannot
simply choose from an array of illegitimate means all equally available to
him (ibid: 145). In explaining why some youngsters have better access to
illicit means than others, Cloward and Ohlin attach prominent impor-
tance to the spatial context, i.e. the neighbourhood in which they grow
up and where certain subcultures arise.
In the case of illegal immigrants, the concept should be explained in a
broader and more institutional way (Engbersen and Van der Leun 1998).
We have argued that the opportunity structure of undocumented immi-
grants can be divided alongside three institutional axes. The first is the
degree of accessibility to the formal institutions of the welfare state, such
as the labour market, education, housing and health care. The second is
the degree of accessibility to informal institutions, such as the informal
networks of family, friends, acquaintances and relatives in the Nether-
lands, but also ‘informal practices’ of public and semi-public workers.
The third is the differential access to criminal circuits (Engbersen and
Van der Leun 1995, 1998). Explained in this way, it can be assumed that
the means available to different groups of illegal immigrants account for
divergent patterns in involvement in informal economic behaviour.
This would imply that immigrants who cannot fall back on a commu-
nity well established enough to provide jobs – see chapter 2 – face stron-
ger pressures to turn to illicit means. The same could hold for illegal im-
migrants who came to the Netherlands roughly after 1991, when a series
of restrictive measures were put into effect. At the same time, Cloward
and Ohlin make it clear that crime is no default option. The availability
of informal and illicit opportunities also differs between groups. It must
be noted, however, that the line between informal and criminal is not as
clear-cut as suggested here. Illegal immigrants – like other people who
live on the fringe of society – can be active in formal and informal activi-
ties at the same time or interchangeably (cf. Ruggiero and South 1997).
Moreover, the delineation between criminal and informal activities var-
ies over time (Kloosterman et al. 1998). Finally, it is obvious that the di-
mensions often overlap or influence each other.
3.4 Data and definitions
The interviews held with illegal immigrants offer a first insight in the
criminal activities of illegal immigrants.44 In order to find more substan-
tial empirical evidence, they have been supplemented with an analysis of
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three samples drawn from the files of the Rotterdam police. In the regu-
lar registrations of offences and suspects, the police do not record infor-
mation on the legal status of an individual. The Aliens police, however,
keep a separate record on all apprehended of illegal immigrants, from
which the basic sample was taken. In addition, two control samples were
taken: a sample of legal immigrants and a sample of legally residing
crime suspects in Rotterdam (see appendix 2). The three samples used in
this chapter pertain to the years 1989 until 199445 and consist of:
1. A systematic sample of 328 apprehended illegal immigrants46, regis-
tered in the Foreigner Registration System (VRS) as ‘illegal’, meant to
acquire insight into the reasons for apprehension of illegal immi-
grants;
2. A sample of 666 immigrants registered in the Foreigner Registration
System (VRS). A cross-check with the files of the Aliens Police
brought to light that 76 of these immigrants were not legally residing
in the country. The other 590 were used as a control sample of legal
residents;
3. A sample of 655 ‘known suspects’ apprehended for offences, of whom
639 were legal immigrants47 as registered in the identification System
(Herkennings Systeem, HKS).48 The aim of this sample was to provide
an overview of legal suspects in order to enable comparison with
sample 2.49
The widespread use of police data has produced a flow of comments on
problems of validity and selectivity. A central theme is how well these
data measure ‘actual’ crime rates. There is an unknown and probably
massive amount of crime that never shows up in police files: the so-
called ‘dark number’ (Beirne and Messerschmidt 1991, Felson 1994). For
a number of reasons many crimes never come to the notice of the police,
or are not considered important enough to register. Methodologically,
this dark number can, according to some commentators, be reduced by
using self-report studies. These studies are regularly conducted among
juveniles. Yet, apart from the problems attached to this alternative
source of data (Junger 1990, Rovers 1999), undocumented immigrants
do not comprise a category that can be approached with a self-report
survey. In the literature on crime data, three sources of bias can be dis-
tinguished:
a. The willingness of the public to report a crime to the police depends
on the type of crime. Generally, the more serious a crime, the higher
the likelihood of being reported to the police. Regular police data are
more adequate when dealing with so-called ‘communal crimes’ than
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with, for example, organised crime, environmental or white-collar
crimes.
b. The likeliness of being stopped by the police varies across space and
time. Police data inevitably mirror patterns of police surveillance. At-
tention of law enforcers commonly concentrates on strategic sites,
such as train stations or crime-ridden areas, which increases the like-
lihood of being apprehended for people who are present in these
places. Moreover, suspects encountered in lower-status neighbour-
hoods are likely to run a higher risk of being apprehended than sus-
pects in other parts of the city (Smith 1986).
c. Police apprehensions are largely discretionary and are often sus-
pected to be selective with respect to migrants (Bovenkerk, De Haan
and Yesilgöz 1991). So far, in the Netherlands, little evidence has been
mustered for the proposition that the police differentially arrest ac-
cording to ‘foreign appearance’ (Aalberts 1990, Rovers 1999). It
would then be hard to explain why Moroccans and Antilleans have
such high apprehension rates as opposed to Surinamese and Turks
only on the basis of discriminatory practices. The finding that dis-
criminatory practices are limited can be ascribed to explicit attempts
of the police to avoid discrimination (partly established by law) and
secondly to the desire to keep good relationships with local immi-
grant communities (Junger 1990, Junger-Tas 1997). Selectivity,
moreover, does not necessarily have to be the result of discrimination
(Punch 1979, Bovenkerk et al. 1991). When looking at studies in other
fields such as the labour market (Van Beek 1993) it cannot be ruled
out that more or less subtle forms of selectivity take place, especially
when we know that attempts to employ more police officers with an
immigrant background encounter persistent problems. It is likely
that to some extent police stereotypes and typologies interact with
the behaviour and appearances of commonly targeted groups, lead-
ing to a self-fulfilling prophecy. This can result in inflated numbers of
apprehensions for members of certain groups (see chapter 4).
In sum, police data have to be handled with care. Nonetheless, in many
instances, they are still the most suitable data to study patterns of crimi-
nal activity, in particular when problems of selectivity and bias are taken
into account (cf. Hagan and Peterson 1995, Tonry 1997). Rather than
deny the validity of these data per se, the procedure followed here is to
study the statistics as a useful source of information, in particular when
combined with other sources of information such as the interviews with
illegal immigrants. A second strategy is to combine them with a study of
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police practices and ‘smart rules’ that have – to a certain extent – shaped
the data (see chapter 4).
3.5 Apprehensions of illegal immigrants
The Aliens Department (a specific branch of the Rotterdam police force)
is responsible for the surveillance of illegal immigrants (see chapter 4).
In addition, all police officers are, in principle, supposed to contribute to
the surveillance of undocumented immigrants by checking the legal sta-
tus of suspects they encounter during the course of their work. In many
instances, police officers are confronted with illegal immigrants either
when doing routine checks, or when there is a concrete reason to appre-
hend a person (for instance when they are suspected of having commit-
ted a crime). These are so-called ‘reactive’ apprehensions (which made
up 60 per cent of the sample). When the police officer in charge has
doubts about the legal status of an immigrant, the suspect has to be
handed over to the Aliens Police. Another scenario is that officers who
work for the Aliens Department directly apprehend illegal immigrants
(sixteen per cent of the cases). This can take place in the course of a ‘reac-
tive’ policy, but in most cases it concerns pro-active strategies such as
spot checks in the workplace or address checks in case of rejected asylum
seekers. These checks are explicitly bound by legal precautions and
working rules in order to prevent discrimination of all foreign looking
employees. The remainder of the apprehended illegal immigrants is
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Source: Police Rotterdam Rijnmond, VRS sample 1989-1994 and unpublished police data
handled by other forces such as the Railway Police, the Military Police or
by detention centres (e.g. after having served a sentence).
On a yearly basis, the Rotterdam police register a few thousand ap-
prehensions of illegal immigrants.50 Between 1989 and 1994 there was a
steady rise in apprehensions, reaching over 5,000 in 1994, which can be
ascribed to a temporary increase in manpower and to the VICTOR anti-
drug operation. After 1994 the total number of apprehensions of illegal
immigrants slowed down and appears to be stabilising again at some-
what above 2,000 a year.51 It is obvious that these figures depend heavily
on the budget and the manpower available.52
As a standard procedure, officers of the Aliens Department take fin-
gerprints and pictures of the suspects and handle the case either under
the criminal law or under the Aliens law. These two procedures cannot
be followed at the same time. All apprehensions of illegal immigrants are
in principle recorded in the Foreigner Registration System (VRS), from
which the main sample (N=328) was taken.53 Before looking at the reasons
for arrest, we will briefly note the social composition of the registered
groups.
Social composition. In certain respects, the apprehended illegal immi-
grants comprise a relatively homogeneous group, consisting mainly of
men between 20 and 30 years of age, which is known to be a crime-prone
category in general. The under-representation of women is not just an
artefact of police data; other sources (hospitals for example) also report
that more than half of the illegal immigrants they encounter are men.
Yet, the distribution is more extreme when we look at police data and is
comparable to what is found in other police data.


















Source: Police data 1989-1994
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With regard to country of origin (table 3.3), the apprehended illegal im-
migrants make up a more heterogeneous group. They originate from
more than eighty countries. More than one third originates from Mo-
rocco and Algeria. Other large groups are Western European tourists
who have overstayed their lawful period and got involved in criminal ac-
tivities, and people from other African countries. A considerable part
comes from a large number of countries the Netherlands never had spe-
cial ties with, which is in line with the thesis of an increasing diversifica-
tion and fragmentation of immigration (Koser and Lutz 1998). In addi-
tion, it is often maintained that the number of asylum-overstayers is
rapidly growing. So far, however, this is not reflected in the apprehen-
sions of the Aliens police.54 Apart from four per cent of people from for-
mer Yugoslavia, a limited number of apprehended illegal immigrants
originate from ‘asylum seeker countries’ such as Somalia, Afghanistan
or Iraq. It is unclear whether this means that rejected asylum seekers are
less involved in crime, or that they are more likely to reside outside the
larger cities.55
Table 3.3 Country/region of origin (classified) of apprehended illegal



















Source: Police data 1989-1994
It is not easy to determine how long the immigrants have been in the
country before their arrest. Many apprehended illegal immigrants tell
the police that they have just arrived in the Netherlands, thereby trying
to play down the illegal nature of their stay (Van der Leun 1999). Based
on the files of the six preceding years, however, it can be assumed that
three quarters of the apprehended illegal immigrants have resided in
Rotterdam for over three years.56 This largely corresponds to the length of
stay of the 170 respondents, of whom around eighty per cent had resided
in the Netherlands for more than three years at the time of the research.
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When comparing the social composition of the apprehended illegal im-
migrants with the sample of registered legal immigrants (sample 2), we
find that among the apprehended undocumented immigrants, there are
forty per cent fewer Turks, almost three times as many Moroccans and
almost seventy-five per cent fewer Surinamese compared with the legal
group. The most significant difference is found among the Algerians:
they are almost absent among the legal population, whereas a consider-
able number of them can be found in the undocumented population.
These differences can in part be explained by enforcement practices, for
example in the case of Surinamese immigrants. The police commonly
presume they must be legal residents and do not check their documents
(for police practices, see chapter 4). A central explanation, however, lies
in the activities and behaviour of the illegal immigrants. We therefore
turn to data on apprehensions.
Apprehensions. Most undocumented immigrants are apprehended in
neighbourhoods where large communities of immigrants exist. Al-
though the addresses mentioned in the files57 are not always reliable, they
do give an indication of the spatial dimension of the activities of illegal
immigrants. They clearly point to the spatial concentration of illegal im-
migrants in some of the less well-off neighbourhoods of Rotterdam, es-
pecially in the western part of the city (table 3.4).58 One explanation is that
illegal immigrants often live with their legal family members (Burgers
1998). The western parts of Rotterdam are typically a port of entry for
newcomers. The other explanation lies in the opportunities of economic
activities within these neighbourhoods, where a concentration can be
found of immigrant businesses and immigrant organisations that func-
tion as employers and as sources of information. Furthermore, most of
the apprehensions by the police for drug-related offences take place in
these neighbourhoods.
At first sight, it seems obvious that illegal immigrants come into con-
tact with the police because of criminal activities. Figures of appre-
hended illegal immigrants are often equated with ‘criminal illegal immi-
grants’. The registrations of the Aliens Police, however, are not based on
criminal law (as police files commonly are) but primarily on the Aliens
legislation. As a consequence, the files of apprehended illegal immi-
grants also contain information on ‘less severe’ reasons for apprehen-
sion, such as illegal residence or illegal labour.59 These kinds of violations
are not defined as criminal activities, even though it cannot be denied
that undocumented migrants violate laws and regulations simply by be-
ing in the country. Conceptually, the most adequate definition of crime
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is one that bears as much resemblance to what is considered to be a
crime for legally residing persons. For this purpose, the reasons for ap-
prehension are broken down into five categories: (1) illegal residence; (2)
misdemeanours like fare dodging, prostitution or informal employ-
ment; (3) minor offences, e.g. shoplifting, theft from cars and houses
and vandalism; (4) serious offences including violence and robbery and,
finally; (5) drug-related crimes, which mostly refer to the possession of
relatively small quantities of hard drugs (see appendix 2). The last three
categories are labelled as ‘criminal activities’ as they fall under the crimi-
nal law. In principle, this holds regardless of the legal status of the appre-
hended person.
Table 3.5 shows that, in contrast to the prevailing image, most illegal im-
migrants are not apprehended for criminal activities. When we limit
ourselves to the most recent reason for arrest, nearly half of the regis-
tered undocumented immigrants in Rotterdam were apprehended for
illegal residence (47 per cent) and an additional 13 per cent for misde-
meanours like illegal labour or fare dodging. Another 26 per cent were
apprehended for minor offences like shoplifting and theft from cars, 5
per cent for serious offences (robbery, murder, and possession of fire-
arms) and 9 per cent for offences against the Opium Act (table 3.5).
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Table 3.4 Spatial concentration of apprehensions of illegal immi-
grants in Rotterdam in 1995 (N=738)



































Source: Police data 1995
Table 3.5 Reasons for arrest, all apprehensions (N=328)











Source: Police data 1989-1994
The high share of apprehensions for illegal stay (in almost half of the
cases) is paradoxical when we take into account that the police are not
very active in this area (see chapter 4). A more detailed look at the files
reveals that this concerns people who are arrested during spot checks in
the working place or during general checks, e.g. in the public transport.
Others are apprehended during checks that are directed at other people
(they are simply around) or because of rather vague reasons such as ‘dis-
playing suspicious behaviour’. Furthermore, when police officers sus-
pect an individual of violating the law, but are unable to find proof, they
can hand the person over to the Aliens police with the notification that
the person is suspected of staying in the country illegally. According to
police officers this happens often with illegal prostitutes.60 The finding
that only a small part of the illegal immigrants engage in criminal activi-
ties is corroborated in the qualitative part of the research (see chapter 2).
Eight respondents (out of 170) are active in prostitution, which is not a
criminal offence in itself under the present legislation, and sixteen are or
have been involved in activities that fall under the criminal law, apart
from the mere use of false papers.
Table 3.6 focuses on illegal immigrants who have been apprehended be-
cause of criminal activities. The reasons for apprehension are broken
down into more detailed categories.
The types of offences that dominate are primarily drug-related of-
fences and different categories of theft. Traffic offences, which are one of
the main reasons of apprehension for legal suspects, are negligible. The
share of apprehension for false documents is fourteen per cent and is
slowly increasing. Still, it is likely to be underreported. Many of the re-
spondents in the qualitative part of the research make use of false docu-
ments. This varies from borrowing a health-service card from a relative
to buying a forged passport on the black market. In the most extreme
case, people lead their life completely as a legal immigrant on the basis of
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false documents. The respondents do not consider the use of false docu-
ments a crime. They feel forced to use them because life in Western Eu-
rope is impossible without false documents.61 As long as they are not ap-
prehended for another reason, they usually do not come into trouble
with the police for this reason.
Besides the reason for the most recent arrest we have also included
information on the ‘history’ of apprehensions. The files go back six
years. Within these six years, two thirds have been apprehended once.
One third has been apprehended more than once. Multiple apprehen-
sions are more common among those who are involved in criminal ac-
tivities. A small segment of the sample (31 out of 328) are regular visitors
of the police station (see section 3.6 and chapter 4).
So far, we have seen that a small part of the illegal immigrants are appre-
hended for criminal activities. Taking into account that criminal activi-
ties significantly enhance the risk of getting caught by the police, these
figures indicate that the majority of the illegal immigrants in general do
not resort to illicit means, as the ‘deterrence thesis’ predicted. This is in
line with the experiences of the respondents in Rotterdam. Apart from
the use of false documents, a minority engage in crime. Most respon-
dents also stress that being illegally in the country, it is extremely impor-
tant not to attract the attention of the police. Moreover, they draw a firm
line between illegal labour on the one hand and crime on the other. They
are often annoyed by the equation of illegal immigrants with crime and
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Table 3.6 Apprehensions for criminal offences (N=130)

























Source: Police data 1989-1994
stress the fact that they do not cause any harm by being in the country.
As the total population of illegal immigrants (including people who
never come to the notice of the police) remains a matter of estimation, it
is difficult to evaluate the above-mentioned figures. How seriously must
we take the fact that less than half of the apprehended illegal immigrants
are apprehended for criminal offences, when we do not know how this
relates to the total group? This problem can be bypassed by drawing a
comparison between the apprehensions of illegal immigrants and those
of legally residing suspects. The two samples pertain to the same area
and the same time frame. The comparison must be based on the as-
sumption that the likelihood of being arrested for criminal activities is
comparable for illegal and legal immigrants. This is not unrealistic, con-
sidering that the police are more oriented toward crime than toward ille-
gality, as will be shown in chapter 4. Furthermore, we have to limit our-
selves to criminal offences, as legal suspects cannot be apprehended
because of illegality or illegal labour.
Table 3.7 Comparison of crime levels, percentages
Illegal immigrants apprehen-
ded for offences (N=142)
Legal inhabitants apprehen-










Source: Police data 1989-1994
Table 3.7 shows that, across the board, illegal immigrants are less in-
volved in minor offences and serious offences than a comparable group
of legally residing persons. This is not the case as regards drug-related
crimes, where illegal immigrants score higher.
A next step in the analysis is the differential involvement of groups of il-
legal immigrants. We find that there is no significant correlation be-
tween age of the suspect and the reason for apprehension, neither be-
tween length of stay nor reason for apprehension. A breakdown by
country (or region) of origin, however, underscores that involvement in
criminal activities does vary significantly across different groups of im-
migrants, as the differential opportunity structure theory predicted.
Table 3.8 shows an overrepresentation of undocumented immigrants
from specific countries when it comes to apprehensions for certain of-
fences.62 In short, we find the following patterns: undocumented immi-
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grants from Turkey and Eastern European countries are mainly appre-
hended for illegal residence and misdemeanours. Moroccans, Algerians
and Eastern Europeans are arrested more frequently for criminal offences
(theft, false documents). Western Europeans (mainly French), Moroc-
cans and Algerians have high numbers of apprehensions and are most
frequently arrested for drug-related crimes. Turkish illegal immigrants
are rarely involved in (registered) criminality. Across the board, crimi-
nal activities appear to be most common among undocumented Moroc-
cans, Algerians and Western Europeans (especially French drug tourists,
see section 3.6).
Similar group disparities have been documented in many countries, at
least for legal immigrants (Tonry 1997). This also holds for the Nether-
lands. When we relate the patterns found among illegal immigrants to
apprehension patterns of legal suspects in the same locality, there are
some notable parallels. Both legal and illegal Moroccans have relatively
high crime rates and are often arrested for drug-related crimes and mi-
nor offences, and in both groups Cape Verdeans are clearly under-
represented in registered crime. Yet, legally residing Turks are arrested
relatively often for minor offences, whereas undocumented Turks are
hardly ever arrested for criminal offences. They are most frequently ap-
prehended for misdemeanours such as illegal labour. Legal Surinamese
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Table 3.8 Apprehension patterns in Rotterdam (N=323)



































Total 100 29 100 108 100 24



































Total 100 57 100 28 100 77
Source: Police data 1989-1994
have relatively high crime rates in contrast with undocumented
Surinamese (who are hardly represented in the files of the Aliens Police)63.
The overall conclusion must be that neither the position as an immi-
grant nor legal status has a uniform influence on arrest or apprehension
rates. This explains why neither the ‘deterrence thesis’ nor the ‘margin-
alisation thesis’ fully applies. These findings can be understood in rela-
tion to the differential opportunity structure that illegal immigrants
face. The availability of formal means is the first factor in the explana-
tion. Illegal immigrants who came to the Netherlands before 1991 were
not as rigorously excluded from formal means, in particular formal em-
ployment, as those who came after 1991 (see chapter 2). The second fac-
tor is embeddedness in strongly rooted communities, which is assumed
to result in less pressure toward crime (Engbersen et al.1999). It is clear
that Turkish illegal immigrants, for example, who can fall back on a rela-
tively well-established community, are rarely apprehended for criminal
offences (see chapter 2). The same holds, albeit to a somewhat lesser ex-
tent, for Cape Verdeans and Surinamese immigrants without a legal sta-
tus. Moroccans face more difficulties in finding employment and in be-
ing supported in other ways, and they are often arrested for drug-related
offences and other minor offences. Nevertheless, it must be noted that
not all groups that cannot fall back on strongly rooted communities are
active in crime on a considerable scale. Some respondents, for instance,
find support within churches and charitable organisations. Also not all
Moroccans engage in drug trade. In the qualitative part of the research
we also find Moroccan respondents who do relatively well and do not
engage in criminal behaviour. But looking at general patterns, it be-
comes clear that illegal immigrants from North African countries oc-
cupy a special position in the drug economy. In order to investigate the
third factor, the differential access to criminal means, the next section
focuses on these drug-related activities.
3.6 North African immigrants in the drug economy
Drug-related offences are the most frequent reason for arrest of illegal
immigrants. Immigrants from North African countries, in particular
Morocco, clearly occupy a special position as suspects. According to the
Rotterdam police statistics presented before, two thirds of the apprehen-
sions for drug-related offences and one third of the minor offences are
committed by illegal immigrants from North African descent.64 These
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files show that they typically work as drug runners, guiding drug tourists
to places where they can purchase hard drugs. Drug runners contact
(French, Belgian and German) tourists on the motorways and at the
central train station and escort them to drug outlets, which are usually
located in the older neighbourhoods in the western parts of the city.65 The
question arises as to why illegal immigrants from Morocco or Algeria66 are
much more involved in these activities than others.
First, several sources indicate that the lower-level street trade in hard
drugs in the older parts of Rotterdam is for a significant part in the hands
of migrants from a Moroccan background (Helsdinge 1994, Van der
Torre and Gerz 1996, Van der Torre 1999, Van Gemert 1998). Clients are
predominantly international drug tourists. This can be illustrated by
data from the Criminal Investigation Service (Recherche Informatie
Dienst) in Rotterdam67 that have been collected during special sweeps and
during regular police surveillance.




















Closer inspection shows that about ninety per cent of the apprehended
drug runners are of Moroccan descent. The apprehended drug runners
are on average between twenty-five and thirty years of age and about half
of them have criminal records for other criminal activities as well. Re-
markably, information on the legal status of the runners is lacking in
these data sources. According to Van der Torre and Gerz (1996) only a
minority resided illegally in the country. More recent police data dem-
onstrate that between 14 and 30 per cent of the drug runners arrested
Rotterdam in 1998, were illegal immigrants (VRIS 1999: 24).68 The lack of
legal status is not confined to the ‘supply side’ or the intermediaries. The
clients who frequent the drug outlets are mainly tourists who come by
train or by car from neighbouring countries – in particular France – to
obtain hard drugs. When they are arrested by the police they are also reg-
istered as ‘illegal immigrants’, although they comprise a special category
because they do not aim at residency in the Netherlands and often travel
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back and forth during the weekend.69 The above-mentioned findings sug-
gest that the lower-level trade in hard drugs in these older parts of Rot-
terdam may even be called a Moroccan ‘niche’. As Waldinger has shown,
ethnic niches have strong path-dependent effects. Once in place, em-
ployers tend to protect and favour insiders (Waldinger 1996). This can
be an advantage for illegal immigrants from Morocco, who may have
easier access to the niche than others.
The interviews can provide more in-depth information on the role of il-
legal immigrants in the drug trade and about the processes that brought
them to these activities. Thirteen respondents are active in the drug
trade in Rotterdam, ten of whom come from Morocco or Algeria. The
three others claim to be Turkish, Palestinian and Jamaican. They all oc-
cupy what can be called ‘intermediary functions’ between suppliers and
clients. Some of them mediate between drug tourists and dealers, either
in the streets or in drug outlets, others deliver small quantities of drugs
to local addicts in and around places for the homeless.
A man from Casablanca works as a doorkeeper in a drug outlet in the
western part of Rotterdam. Together with a friend he was approached
in France by an acquaintance who offered them a job. They were
brought into contact with a drug dealer who sub-rents the house. Both
men spend most of their days on the premises. When they receive a
phone call from the dealer, who drives around by car, they know that
they can expect a client. After an agreed signal, they deliver the mer-
chandise to the client. The payment of the merchandise is taken care of
by the dealer. Both men are illegal immigrants. One functions as ‘door-
keeper’, the other covers for him. They both earn I 340 per month plus
board and lodging. They are not allowed to leave the house during the
day. (106)
The interviews reveal that these respondents have been introduced to
the trade by Moroccan immigrants they vaguely knew. In some cases,
they got in touch in Rotterdam, while in other cases the contact was
made before the respondents came to the Netherlands. In the first case,
respondents have tried licit ways of making a livelihood before. They
have shifted in and out of employment. After a while they feel they are
pushed into crime by the absence of other – more respectable – opportu-
nities.
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A 22-year old man emigrated from Morocco because he could not find
a job. He went to Germany on a visa and looked around for some days.
After a few days he headed for the Netherlands where he had planned
to build up his future. The first month he worked for a Moroccan sub-
contractor. From time to time he helped renovate houses on an irregu-
lar basis. He earned an hourly wage below the legal minimum. He could
not find more stable employment and got angry with his boss, who ap-
peared to favour his family members at the expense of other employ-
ees. When he was approached by a co-national to sell heroin in the
streets he accepted the offer. He says he is making ‘unclean money’, but
he sees no alternatives. (144)
In the following case, the respondents came to the Netherlands after
hearing about opportunities in the drug trade during their journey. One
respondent was given an address of a drug outlet in Rotterdam while
staying in France.
A 31-year old man works as a drug runner. He looks unhealthy and is
obviously on drugs himself. He says that he was told about the opportu-
nities in Rotterdam while he was selling drugs in France. His friends told
him that the Netherlands was an ‘open country’. When he opted for
the Netherlands, his hope was to kick the habit and recover. He spent
six months in a clinic, but after that he needed money and got involved
in selling heroin to tourists. He regrets the day that he left Morocco,
where he used to have a stable job as a civil servant. All his life he longed
to be in ‘Europe’ but eventually his adventure turned out to be a disillu-
sion. He does not want to return to Morocco because ‘no one is wait-
ing for him’ there. (103)
It is not only their countrymen who introduce the respondents to the
drug trade. The interviews also show that three respondents in the busi-
ness are dependent on a direct ‘boss’ who comes from their home coun-
try and most of them have contacts with other fellow-countrymen who
work as drug runners. At first sight this seems to imply that the respon-
dents are well-rooted in the Moroccan community. The Moroccan
community, however, is depicted by them as divided and the interviews
demonstrate that the contacts of respondents with co-ethnics are largely
confined to other people in the drug circuit. In most cases, they cannot
fall back on family or friends in Rotterdam. They have typically travelled
to the Netherlands through other countries – often Spain and France –
without a tourist visa, often without family in the Netherlands, and lack
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access to networks that can ensure them a way to make a more accept-
able living (see Staring 1999, Engbersen et al. 1999).
The lack of a more encompassing embeddedness within the Moroccan
community is also reflected in the subordinate position that the respon-
dents occupy. They occupy the lowest positions in the drug circuit and
run the highest risks. In case of a police sweep, they are the ones who get
caught, often with (small quantities of) drugs in their possession. They
run a relatively high risk of getting stopped because of ‘suspicious be-
haviour’, especially because the Rotterdam police specifically targets the
drug problem in the old neighbourhoods. Moreover, as the supply of
drug runners outstrips the demand, they are dependent on the goodwill
of their bosses and always run the risk of being replaced by new and less
demanding illegal immigrants. This is echoed in the declining average
age of arrested runners through the years in the CRI data (Helsdinge
1994), which also point to a high turnover. It is unclear whether others
leave the business or move up the ladder. From these data, it also re-
mains unclear why dealers hire undocumented immigrants as runners.
One plausible explanation is that they underbid other supply categories,
as Van der Torre and Gerz (1996) suggest. Our interviews show that ille-
gal drug runners earn an income of between 10 and 70 guilders a day,
which is roughly comparable to what they would earn with other low
value jobs (see chapter 2). Most of them lead a frugal life and fall back on
charity or institutes for the homeless. Accepting low payment and high
risks, however, is not confined to Moroccan immigrants. A more spe-
cific reason – in addition to the contact with people who hire them – why
they are preferred within this niche is their language ability. Moroccan
drug runners often come from the larger cities in Morocco and speak
both Arabic and French. This gives them a competitive advantage, as
most of the drug tourists in Rotterdam come from France and to a lesser
extent from Belgium. Another reason why they have some advantage
over other illegal immigrants, is that they are relatively immune to police
action, because they have learned how to prevent being expelled. They
make use of the fact that countries like Morocco and Algeria are reluc-
tant to take them back and they successfully hide their identity. This is
one of the reasons why many Moroccans claim to be Algerian. In the
sample of apprehended illegal immigrants, there are 43 people (13 per
cent of the sample) who have a history of apprehensions for drug-related
offences and who manage to continue their activities despite the fact that
they are apprehended by the police. Half of them have also been appre-
hended for other offences such as theft or robbery in the preceding years.
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Because of the difficulties in expelling them the police either let them go
or do not even waste their energy on apprehending ‘helpless cases’ (see
chapter 4). In contrast to many other respondents, one of the drug run-
ners emphasised that he had nothing to fear from the police as he had al-
ready been arrested four times. In this particular case strategies of the
immigrants and limitations of formal policies directly interact and cre-
ate some space for a specific category of illegal immigrants who do en-
gage in crime.
3.7 Conclusions
Both the chapter on labour and the present chapter underscored that the
line between illegal labour and criminal activities is not as clear-cut as of-
ten suggested. People can be active in different spheres of the economy
and there is a certain amount of overlap. This holds even more for illegal
immigrants, who almost by definition have to move in less-regulated
spheres. From this point of view it is not surprising that there are many
similarities between the position of illegal immigrants in the informal
economy and in the criminal economy (as far as they can be distin-
guished). In both economies they can find ways of making a livelihood
and in both economies they occupy insecure positions and have few op-
portunities to better themselves. Moreover, in both economies they find
themselves mainly in subordinate positions. Some illegal immigrants
move to the criminal economy after they have looked for opportunities
in the informal economy for a while, some who have ‘regular’ jobs en-
gage from time to time in activities that can be labelled as criminal. Yet,
although there is a vague zone between illegal labour and some forms of
(petty) crime, most illegal immigrants draw a clear line between a law-
abiding life and an existence that is based on crime. They stress the fact
that they do not want to cause any harm to the receiving society and they
do not want to attract the attention of the police (which is largely in line
with the ‘deterrence thesis’). An exception has to be made for the – ap-
parently widespread – use of false or forged documents, which is seen by
many illegal immigrants as a way of avoiding the pitfalls of an illegal ex-
istence and not as something ‘criminal’. Paradoxically, it even enables
them to refrain from crime and to participate in the labour market, al-
beit the black market.
Both the analysis of police data and the fieldwork show that the ma-
jority of illegal immigrants succeed in avoiding criminal activities.
About half of the illegal immigrants who have come into contact with
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the police are not apprehended for criminal activities (defined as viola-
tions of the criminal law). They are apprehended because of illegal la-
bour, misdemeanours and other ‘less severe’ reasons. A systematic com-
parison of samples taken from police files shows that across the board,
illegal immigrants are less criminally involved than legal inhabitants of
Rotterdam are. This implies that the ‘deterrence thesis’ is applicable to
the majority of illegal immigrants in Rotterdam. There is one type of of-
fence for which illegal immigrants are more often apprehended than le-
gal inhabitants of Rotterdam and that is drug-related offences. These ap-
prehensions pertain primarily – but not solely – to North African
(mostly Moroccan) immigrants who are involved in the international
hard drug trade. The activities of illegal drug runners appear to be em-
bedded – albeit loosely – in existing (ethnic) networks. Although the
numbers are much smaller, this is mirrored in the qualitative part of the
research. Thirteen respondents are involved in drug-related activities,
ten of whom come from North African countries. They work as drug
runners in the internationally oriented drug circuit in Rotterdam. They
occupy subordinate positions and are dependent on their ‘bosses’. At
first sight, one of the motivations to engage in these activities could be
that the lack of a legal status does not make any difference in criminal
subcultures, but as we have seen, illegal immigrants find themselves
mainly in the same low segment as on the labour market. They carry out
the risky parts of the job and are the ones who risk being caught by the
police.
The analysis of police data shows differential patterns of arrest
among illegal immigrants from different countries. Although these pat-
terns are to a certain extent shaped by police priorities, they cannot be
explained primarily by selective enforcement. The group disparities also
have to be partly ascribed to the embeddedness within immigrant com-
munities. Well-rooted communities can provide jobs, marriage partners
and several other types of support (see Engbersen et al. 1999). Yet we can
also conclude – in line with Cloward and Ohlin’s classic analysis – that
even access to criminal circuits requires the right contacts and skills. The
drug-related activities of North African illegal immigrants take place in
the context of existing (immigrant) networks in Rotterdam. The lower
ranks of the drug trade are for a significant part in the hands of Moroc-
cans. Illegal drug runners, however, often lack access to more encom-
passing support networks and have to rely on relatively loose contacts
with people whom they met in Rotterdam or somewhere on their jour-
ney to the Netherlands. These contacts enable them to engage in the
drug trade, but they do not give them access to higher levels of the busi-
82
ness. They are mostly used as ‘messenger boys’ who can easily replaced
by others.
The findings presented in this chapter do not paint a picture of a
smooth road to incorporation by illicit means. The criminal activities
some illegal immigrants engage in can offer an alternative source of in-
come, especially for those immigrants who succeed in thwarting expul-
sion, but in most cases it leaves the illegal immigrants worse off than oth-
ers who engage in illegal labour. Moreover, having been into contact
with the police blocks the already very limited opportunities for legalisa-
tion or amnesty. Classical criminological and sociological studies (cf.
Bell 1953, O’Kane 1992) that refer to immigrants who successfully climb
the ladder by illicit activities often allude to later generations. When the
first generation is able to make money and to invest it, the second or
third generation can be better off and might be able to turn to more re-
spected positions outside the criminal sphere. For illegal immigrants
this move is hard to make. They are at best able to circumvent blockages,
but they are cut off from alternative pathways to incorporation or social
mobility, and often end up in marginal positions. Obviously, the drug
running activities do not go unnoticed. Drug runners in Rotterdam
comprise a highly visible problem to the police, which at least partly ex-
plains the high numbers of apprehensions of North African illegal im-
migrants. Despite these apprehensions, the problem of illegal drug run-
ners has proven to be largely insoluble within present lawful means and
methods. In Rotterdam, this results in the presence of a limited core of
‘criminal illegals’ who carry on with their illicit activities despite and
sometimes even because of their illegal status. The recurrent outcries of
the Amsterdam and Rotterdam police, and the findings of De Haan
(1993) can be interpreted in this light.70 How police officers deal with the




4 Internal surveillance in
practice: the police
Every analogy between the official policy and what happens in the street
is based on sheer coincidence.
(Former chief constable Hessing of Rotterdam)71
4.1 Internal surveillance
Illegal immigrants try to find their way into Dutch society despite the re-
strictions that are in part explicitly designed to stop them from doing so.
In the preceding chapters, it became clear that the strategies and prac-
tices of illegal immigrants directly and indirectly interact with the offi-
cial policies and regulations. After having focused on the immigrants,
our attention now shifts to actors in the receiving society. In chapter 1,
the decision was made to focus on implementation practices at the lower
level. In this respect, our attention goes to ‘street-level bureaucrats’ in
several crucial sectors (see also chapter 5). The present chapter looks into
the role of the police. The responsibility of the police in detecting and ex-
pelling illegal immigrants comprises an integral part of internal migra-
tion control.
In most European countries a central role of internal surveillance is
assigned to the police and immigration services (Garson 1999). So far,
enforcement practices in this field have attracted little systematic atten-
tion (see chapter 1).72 In the migration policy literature, the attention is
confined to alarming statements about the increasing role of the police
and warnings against harassment and discrimination (Den Boer 1995a,
Bigo 1996). Moreover, the involvement of the police is often said to con-
tribute to the link between crime and illegal residence. These risks have
to be taken seriously, considering the already strained relationship be-
tween the police and immigrants. But the lack of insight into how police
officers conduct their tasks, how they use these powers of discretion,
what judgements they make and why and to what extent their actions are
85
subject to controls, all make it problematic to draw conclusions regard-
ing the role and influence of the police.
A second body of literature where information can be gathered, is the
sociology of the police. In this literature, discretionary freedom with re-
spect to handling crimes and misdemeanours, and to a lesser the service-
oriented role of the police, have attracted most of the attention (see for
example Brown 1981a, Holdaway 1983, Wilson 1989, Punch 1979). Tasks
of police officers with regard to the surveillance of illegal immigrants are
not commonly dealt with, suggesting that they are not viewed as central
tasks. The surveillance of illegal immigrants is only one element of police
operations, and obviously – at least so far – not the one with the highest
priority. Moreover, the emphasis on internal migration control is a
rather recent phenomenon. In sum, it is often taken for granted that po-
lice officers are the ‘natural enemies’ of illegal immigrants. Yet, there is
very little knowledge on how the police actually deal with the issue of il-
legal residence.
Apart from this lack of knowledge, there are two other reasons to
study police practices with regard to illegal residence explicitly here.
First, we noted in chapter 1 that local-level practices can be decisive for
the opportunity structures that illegal immigrants face. Second, under-
standing enforcement practices can cast light on how police data are
shaped by interactions between immigrants and representatives of law
enforcement agencies (see chapter 3). The main questions dealt with
here are to what extent and how police officers encounter illegal immi-
grants in practice. Who do they apprehend and who do they expel? What
choices do they make in their day-to-day actions vis-a-vis illegal immi-
grants? Do they have discretionary freedom in this respect? And what di-
lemmas, if any, do they face?
In order to study practices of apprehension and expulsion, forty po-
lice officers in the four cities were interviewed (see appendix 3). The in-
terviews, with regular police officers (patrolmen) as well as officers
working for the Aliens Department, focused on the day-to-day experi-
ences with internal surveillance. In addition to the interviews, selective
use was made of apprehension data, as gathered in the same four cities.73
Before presenting the results, elements of the relevant literature will be
touched upon in paragraph 4.2. Paragraph 4.3 briefly introduces the po-
litical, organisational and legal context, in which the activities of police
officers take place.
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4.2 Police officers as street-level bureaucrats
The police is a well-known subject in both classical and contemporary
sociological studies (for example Punch 1979, Brown 1981a, Wilson 1989,
Holdaway 1983, Van der Torre 1999). Most studies agree on the fact that
police departments are ‘loosely coupled systems’ (Hasenfeld 1983) and
that police officers have a large professional autonomy or discretion. Po-
lice officers on the beat have to deal with very complex situations and
can not possibly enforce all laws and regulations. They are expected to
act selectively and choose instantly which infractions they will respond
to and which they will ignore (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984/1973,
Brown 1981b). These decisions often have to be made on the spot, within
seconds. In Lipsky’s terms, police officers are ‘street-level bureaucrats’
par excellence (cf. Van der Torre 1999). They share with other street-
level bureaucrats such as teachers and welfare workers a high level of dis-
cretion, as their work depends largely on complex, contingent and het-
erogeneous face-to-face contacts with their clients and can neither be
fully rationalised nor easily monitored. The extent of discretion and the
ways in which street-level bureaucrats wield their discretionary powers
can be explained by different factors in the organisational and environ-
mental context that interact with the routines and ‘belief systems’ of the
individuals concerned (Brown 1981b).
Whereas some studies on public policy making have concentrated on
bureaucratic pressures that are exerted on lower level workers (Lipsky
1980), others have focused on the organisational structure (Hasenfeld
1983, 1985). In fact, there is a large overlap between Hasenfeld’s ‘human
service organisations’ (see chapter 5) and Lipsky’s ‘street-level bureau-
cracies’. Both types of organisations have to deal directly with human
beings and both are mandated to supply certain services, with all the am-
biguities attached. Clients of street-level bureaucracies are often invol-
untary clients and the goals of what should be achieved are usually con-
flicting and ambiguous, because they are not easy to define and agree
upon. The fact that people are the ‘raw material’ implies complex and
ambiguous ‘technologies’ (Hasenfeld 1983). Furthermore, the work has
to be carried out with limited resources, as the demand for services tends
to increase to meet the supply (Lipsky 1980). Street-level bureaucrats are
generally plagued by a heavy caseload and their work is surrounded by
political conflict.
The literature has conveyed a number of variations on these general
themes (Ham and Hill 1984). Van der Veen (1990: 18) has distinguished
four key factors that influence lower level policy making and discretion
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within such organisations: (1) characteristics of the relevant rules and
regulations (2) characteristics of the organisational structure (3) charac-
teristics of the job, and (4) characteristics of the relation with clients. Be-
low, the characteristics of the job will be viewed as the outcome of the
three other dimensions. In order to provide a framework against which
the views and practices of the (Aliens) police can be understood, the
points will be first clarified in general terms. Specifically, the organisa-
tion of the Dutch police will be introduced in section 4.3.
Rules and regulations. A high level of discretion does not imply that
street-level bureaucrats are unconstrained by rules and regulations. In
contrast, their work is usually guided by legislation that is supposed to
guarantee a certain degree of standardisation and equality before the
law. Unlike business firms, public agencies are not in the first place ac-
countable to their clientele but to their political superiors and (indi-
rectly) to the general public (Hill 1997). Lipsky points out that in the area
of public policy, rules tend to be encyclopaedic and at the same time they
are constantly being changed (Lipsky 1980: 14). Moreover, policy goals
are often conflicting and ambiguous. For policemen in general this is al-
ready the case, but when they are supposed to deal with (illegal) immi-
grants, they also have to do with the Aliens legislation, a complex set of
rules and regulations. A complicating factor is the pace of changes in
regulation. In the 1990s a number of major changes took place in the
Aliens legislation; particularly the secondary legislation (such as ‘Aliens
circulars’) is changing on a regular basis. Police officers in general units
cannot be expected to have a complete overview at the top of their heads.
Furthermore, the aims with regard to the surveillance of illegal immi-
grants are conflicting. Police departments are supposed to curb illegal
residence, but not at the expense of basic democratic rights of citizens.
The Aliens Act, together with the relevant secondary legislation, sets the
conditions under which police officers have to carry out their duties. An
important article in this respect is section 19a (section 50 in the revised
Aliens Act), which specifies that a police officer can only apprehend a
person if there is sufficient cause to do so. This implies that checking a
person’s identity only because the person looks ‘foreign’ has become un-
lawful.74 There has to be genuine suspicion that the person is an illegal im-
migrant or that he or she is involved in criminal behaviour, just as a po-
liceman has to have reasonable cause to arrest someone for a crime. If
there is a genuine suspicion that an apprehended person might be stay-
ing in the country illegally, e.g. when their identity is questionable, this
person can be brought to the police station to try and establish his or her
88
identity. Possible valid grounds are tip-offs or information based on
professional experience or sources (e.g. information from tax authori-
ties).
Another law that sets the conditions for the police is the Wet op de
Identificatieplicht or ‘Identification Act’, which was implemented in
June 1994. Under the 1994 Act, every citizen from the age of twelve is
obliged to carry identification documents in specific circumstances such
as in the workplace, when using the Public transport system without a
valid ticket and when attending a football match. In many situations
documentation can be demanded (Beck and Broadhurst 1998). Em-
ployers, for example, are obliged to keep a record of the documents of
their personnel, and inspections in the workplace can be an important
tool when trying to curb illegal employment (see chapter 2). However,
police officers are not allowed to carry out random walk checks of ID
cards without special reason or genuine suspicion.
Organisational structure. Although bureaucracies are generally associ-
ated with strict hierarchy and highly structured staff-client relations,
lower-level workers within street-level bureaucracies have considerable
impact on the working process. This applies to police officers in particu-
lar, as they exercise their profession on the streets, physically separated
from their superiors. Control is only possible afterwards. The low visi-
bility of much of their actions implies that superiors must depend on in-
formation as laid down in reports. Police officers tend to anticipate these
controls and choose their words carefully in order to avoid potential
problems. A substantial part of their daily routines is therefore never
fully recorded. And as Davis (1969) has shown, it is particularly decisions
not to take action in a certain situation that tend to remain hidden (cf.
Aalberts 1990: 22, Van der Torre 1999).
Under such circumstances, the measurement of performances is ex-
tremely complex (Bakker and Van Waarden 1999: 22). Nonetheless, ad-
ministrators generally seek opportunities to control the policy process
(Brown 1981a). Possibilities for internal control partly depend on the or-
ganisational structure. A more centralised organisation is typically char-
acterised by clear hierarchical lines of communication and a large dis-
tance from the public. By contrast, decentralised organisations are much
closer to the public, but much more difficult to manage and to control. It
can be maintained that possibilities for control are substantially increas-
ing as a consequence of the ongoing introduction of computerised po-
lice systems (Stol 1996). This is the case with the surveillance of illegal
immigrants. Since 1995, a national computerised system for the registra-
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tion of foreigners (VAS) has been operational, which not only enables
co-ordination between local police forces but also facilitates control and
comparison of policy outcomes. Using crime data or apprehension data
for evaluation of efficacy, however, can be misleading. When, for exam-
ple, the number of registered bicycle thefts drops, this may mean that the
police neglect this specific type of offence. Conversely, it may also imply
that the police have been very successful in curtailing it. Moreover, some
performances are inherently difficult to measure. How should one, for
example, answer the question whether the official policy goal of ‘dis-
couraging illegal immigration’ is achieved? So, even when the technical
means are readily available, there will always remain some tension be-
tween attempts to monitor the work of policemen and their discretion-
ary freedom.75
Relation with clients. It falls to street-level bureaucrats in general to deal
with involuntary clients. In the case of the police it is somewhat ironic to
speak of ‘clients’, but in general we could say that the police can interact
with the public either as a suspect (involuntarily) or as a person asking
for help or providing information (usually voluntarily). On the whole, it
can be maintained that illegal immigrants have all the reasons not to at-
tract too much attention of the police. The impact on their lives can be
devastating if they are expelled. Also, many of them have little faith in
the police force as a result of experiences with police methods in their
home countries. This holds especially for people with a (formal or infor-
mal) refugee background.
Consequently, the police will in principle only meet illegal immi-
grants against their will, and these immigrants are typically in a very vul-
nerable position. Seen from the perspective of the police, it can also be
maintained that it is not easy to recognise people as being in the country
illegally. Although some officers claim they can trust their intuition on
this issue, they do not legally have the opportunity to check this ran-
domly. From the perspective of a policeman, illegal immigrants are not
only involuntary but also as extremely complex ‘clients’.
Characteristics of the job. From the above-mentioned characteristics of
the working environment it becomes clear that police officers have to
deal with ambiguous goals, involuntary clients and limited means. In
combination with a large discretionary autonomy, this reinforces the
need for ‘routines’. Policemen cannot handle every case as unique; they
constantly have to make choices when carrying out their day-to-day
work. Categorisation and stereotyping are inherent to their activities
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(Brown 1981b: 34, Wilson 1989). Especially policemen on the beat have to
rely on a set of highly uncertain indicators, partly derived from experi-
ence and partly ‘inherited’ from their particular environment. Through
these day-to day decisions on what is important and what can be ig-
nored, formal goals are translated into workable objectives. Formal
goals of the police are, among others, to enforce the law, to provide secu-
rity to citizens, to detect criminals and to bring them to justice. Research
conveys how policemen in the street translate these goals into opera-
tional objectives such as ‘coping with the situation’ or ‘remaining in
control’ (Wilson 1989, Brown 1981a, 1981b) and in doing so how they
tend to use the law pragmatically. This is very likely to enhance negative
stereotyping of behaviour of certain (groups of) people.
The extent to which categorisation and stereotyping lead to discrimi-
nation of immigrants is unknown. The Dutch Aliens Act and Identifica-
tion Act were explicitly designed to prevent discrimination of foreigners.
According to some authors this aim has succeeded (Aalberts 1990,
Junger-Tas 1997), while others doubt this (Den Boer 1995b). Based on
participant observation in the 1970s in the Warmoesstraat district, city
centre of Amsterdam, Punch gives a subtle depiction of the complex so-
cial processes that in the late seventies lead to the association between in-
ner-city street crime and the Surinamese group. Both parties appeared
to play their part and reinforce each other and Surinamese men in the
area clearly became ‘symbolic suspects’. According to Punch, this did
not affect the attitude of policemen toward Surinamese people in gen-
eral. The Surinamese men in the specific area, however, clearly ran a
high risk of being interrogated. Yet, they were also more likely to be car-
rying incriminating substances (Punch 1979). The focus on Surinamese
suspects in the specific area, therefore, can also be seen as ‘statistical dis-
crimination’. Punch carefully concludes that it is ‘extremely difficult to
distinguish between racial, and especially colour, discrimination and the
intrinsic craft orientation of the policeman to categorise and differenti-
ate’ (Punch 1979: 178). In a similar vein, Van der Torre argues recently
that the Rotterdam police do not react to a ‘foreign appearance’ alone
(Van der Torre 1999). There are many similarities between the observa-
tions made by Punch in the 1970s and Van der Torre in the 1990s, with
the notable difference that a process of ethnic succession appears to be
taking place. Moroccan and Antillean youngsters have replaced the
Surinamese as top symbolic suspects (see chapter 3). This can both point
to the social construction of criminal immigrants and to processes of
ethnic succession in crime. How the above-mentioned affects the sur-
veillance of illegal immigrants remains largely unknown. According to
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Aalberts (1989), police officers tend to use their discretion to refrain
from detecting illegal immigrants, which is at odds with the view of the
police as the main threat for illegal immigrants.
4.3 The organisational context
According to the Ministry of Justice, the ‘discouragement policy’ with
respect to illegal immigrants encompasses four central elements:
– The exclusion of illegal immigrants from public services.
– Stricter measures to combat illegal employment.
– Intensifying surveillance by the police and other departments.
– Encouraging the expulsion of apprehended illegal immigrants.
The first element – exclusion from public services – will be dealt with in
the next chapter. The three other elements are first and foremost tasks
imposed on the police, brought here under the label of ‘surveillance of il-
legal immigrants’. In the Netherlands, the two main forms of surveil-
lance, administrative and operational, are assigned to the Aliens police
and carried out under direction of the chief constable of the urban police
forces. Yet, when it comes to checking the legal status of immigrants who
are apprehended for crimes or misdemeanours, the police force as a
whole is responsible (Aalberts 1989, Clermonts 1994). In this respect, of-
ficers working for the Aliens department depend on the co-operation of
their colleagues working for regular police units. When they do not hand
over arrested illegal immigrants to the Aliens department, there is a high
probability that these will not be recognised as staying in the country il-
legally.
The Dutch police organisation has faced a major reorganisation
which more or less reached its completion in 1994. The ‘municipal po-
lice’ and the ‘state police’ were merged into one police force, which is di-
vided in 25 regional forces that are each responsible for their own area.
The new system is based on a ‘semi-decentralised’ model of policing
whereby the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior each
maintain their central control over law enforcement. At the regional
level, the head of the local government of the largest municipality in the
region, the chief public prosecutor (‘Officer of Justice’) and the chief
constable of the regional police force together negotiate issues with re-
gard to budgets and priorities on a regular basis. These regular meetings
of what is generically referred to as the ‘triangle’, is commonly seen as a
pragmatic way of diminishing conflicting interests over crime and safety
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(Tupman and Tupman 1999: 77). At the lower level, the forces are subdi-
vided into smaller territorial units, the ‘basic units’. The semi-decentral-
ised Dutch police organisation is commonly associated with a low level
of central command and control. Decentralised units administer their
own budgets and are relatively free in their choices, which they can adapt
to concrete local circumstances and the social climate within their work-
ing area (Van der Torre 1999).
As large cities with a high share of immigrants among their inhabit-
ants, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht have separate
Aliens departments within their regional police force. These depart-
ments specialise in all tasks relating to the immigrant population of the
cities. People working for the Aliens police or Aliens department can be
subdivided into those who are occupied with ‘administrative control’,
such as allocating residence permits, and those who are in charge of the
‘operational surveillance’ of illegal immigrants. The first branch co-op-
erates directly with the Immigration and Naturalisation Service of the
Ministry of Justice. The second branch carries out specific police investi-
gations – in collaboration with other agencies such as the Labour Inspec-
tion and Tax Authorities (see also chapter 2). Furthermore, they take
care of illegal immigrants who have been arrested by police officers
working in ‘basic units’.
Although their tasks are officially the same, the Aliens departments
are not uniformly organised in the four cities. At the time of this re-
search, the Rotterdam department was fully decentralised, while the de-
partments in the other cities were more or less centralised. In Amster-
dam, moreover, there was a separate unit in charge of expulsion of illegal
immigrants. Some police units in neighbourhoods with a high share of
immigrants – such as the Bijlmermeer and the city centre – have special
tasks in the surveillance of illegal immigrants. Since the early 1990s, the
Ministry of Justice has tried to encourage the enforcement of these mea-
sures by increasing budgetary allocations and enabling the relevant
agencies to attract more personnel. In 1995, the Aliens Departments of
Amsterdam and Rotterdam each employed the equivalent of almost 80
fulltime positions, while those in The Hague and Utrecht employed
about 50 and 40 positions respectively (Van der Leun et al. 1998: 56).
These officers were responsible for the operational surveillance of illegal
immigrants. Still, compared to the size of the immigrant populations,
capacity is relatively limited.
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79 full time positions
78 full time positions
50 full time positions
38 full time positions
Source: Van der Leun et al. 1998: 7
The previous section summarised the framework within which police
officers have to carry out their professional tasks. At least in principle, all
police officers play a part in the internal surveillance of illegal immi-
grants. Below, I will attempt to paint a picture based on the daily prac-
tices of police officers in the large cities. Section 4.4 focuses on appre-
hensions and 4.5 deals with expulsions.
4.4 Apprehension practices
Police officers typically work in a dynamic environment. In many cases,
this is one of the reasons why they chose to be police officers in the first
place. The political pressure on their organisation, however, also leads to
a less appreciated sort of ‘dynamic environment’: the endless flow of re-
organisations. This was obvious during the fieldwork we conducted in
1996 and 1997. All four departments were faced with reorganisations, re-
locations, conversions and the introduction of new computerised sys-
tems. In some cases this directly interfered with the performance of their
work. Beyond the fact that the police organisation as a whole is still expe-
riencing the aftermath of the general reorganisation, officers working
for the Aliens departments specifically associate these changes with the
rapidly changing perception of their work. According to them, the
Aliens departments have long been seen as rather insignificant wards
both by the public and within the organisation. From the late 1980s on,
however, the attention toward illegal migration increased and budgetary
allocations rose. The Aliens police not only grew in size, but also started
to be perceived more and more as central in combating illegality. Ac-
cording to some respondents this changed their work considerably:
It used to be a clique somewhere in a corner of the building, where not
much was to be made of. ( . . . ) I mean, if someone was not suitable for
his job anymore, somewhere else in the organisation, they could always
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put the Aliens police up with him. That has been the tendency for years.
But that’s all different now. Our team is highly motivated. We only have
people that are motivated to work here. (U01)
Despite the fact that many respondents feel that their work is now taken
more seriously than before, some still think there is a long way to go.
One of the problems is that illegal immigration only interests the natio-
nal government in the case of incidents. Some respondents still think
that the Aliens department is looked down upon:
Other departments still attach little importance to our work and give it a
low priority. (H03)
When presenting empirical evidence as to apprehension practices, the
attention will first go to the key question whether and, if so, how police
officers encounter illegal immigrants during their day-to-day work.
Next, this section will deal with active surveillance, with formal priori-
ties and local differences.
Encounters with illegal immigrants. Obviously, officers who work for the
Aliens police come into contact with illegal immigrants, as it is their core
activity. For those working for the basic units, this is less obvious. In
some neighbourhoods respondents say illegal immigrants are ‘omni-
present’, as becomes clear in the interviews with an officer in The Hague
who maintains that: ‘With every address check we hit home’ (H01). An-
other respondent claims that if they check an address they generally do
not find the person they are looking for, but usually several others. Still
others point to the fact that illegal residence is very locally concentrated
and that they rarely come across illegally residing suspects.
In contrast to the many professionals in other sectors (see chapter 5)
many of our respondents were not reluctant to discuss the scale of the is-
sue. They estimate the number of illegal immigrants in their cities be-
tween thousands to tens of thousands per city, but it has to be kept in
mind that they also have a certain interest in stressing the fact that illegal
residence is a substantial issue. Apart from estimates of total numbers,
most respondents have rather detailed ideas about the characteristics of
the illegal population in their area. There is a high level of agreement as
to the fact that illegal immigrants are mainly men between 20 and 40
years of age. The nationality groups that respondents mention differ per
city and appear to mirror the presence of legal immigrant groups in
these cities. When asked how they think illegal immigrants are able to
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survive and make a living, respondents distinguish between three groups
of illegal migrants. First, those who are dependent on family; second,
those who are working in the informal economy; third, those who are
engaged in criminal activities. More than in other cities, respondents in
Amsterdam mention the presence of marginalised and homeless illegal
immigrants.
The general opinion as expressed by the respondents is that they have
considerable freedom to use their powers of discretion as they see fit.
The highest level of discretion is not associated with the Aliens police,
but with basic units. The recurrent view is that police officers on the beat
tend to attach a low priority to the surveillance of undocumented immi-
grants. They are relatively free in their efforts, giving priority to the sur-
veillance of illegal immigrants: ‘It depends very much on the individual’
(A14), as a police officer in Amsterdam says. The respondent quoted
here puts in a great effort to attach priority to the surveillance of illegal
immigrants. He even speaks of it as his ‘hobby’. Still, he is well aware that
the situation is different in other units. This even leads to significant dif-
ferences in total numbers of apprehensions. The unit that he works for
apprehends hundreds of illegal immigrants more than the adjoining
unit on a yearly basis, although they fall under the same police force and
although the social make-up of the areas is comparable. The inclination
to specialise or to develop a certain ‘hobbyism’ is rather common among
policemen (Brown 1981b, Van der Torre 1999). Focusing on the Aliens
Act, however, does not seem to be popular among these hobbies. In par-
ticular general police officers have to pay attention to a wide range of is-
sues, and illegal residence is – with some exceptions – not seen as a major
issue. A police officer in Rotterdam puts it this way:
You are out in the street and the problems are flying you in the face. The
only thing you can do is act according to the circumstances. I am now
occupied with something that has a higher priority than detecting illegal
immigrants. ( . . . ) It is difficult enough to keep up with everything that is
happening, let alone when we start to do that on the side. Furthermore,
it is not exactly a police task in my opinion. They can hire other people to
fulfil these tasks. (R08)
As general ‘police sociology’ has profoundly conveyed over the years,
police officers tend to see themselves as crime fighters and safety keep-
ers. They tend to look down upon the bulk of service-oriented tasks and
they are often lenient regarding behaviour that they do not consider to
cause any harm. By just staying in the country illegally, to most police of-
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ficers illegal immigrants are not crossing the ‘thin blue line’. An officer in
Amsterdam (A05) puts it as follows: ‘An illegal immigrant, OK, we just
do not know him. But a criminal should not be walking around here.’
Several respondents stress that a certain level of de facto tolerance is im-
portant to keep the situation manageable. One high-ranking respondent
tells how he regularly visits a mosque to inform the immigrant commu-
nities about the Aliens Act and conditions for family reunification:
The first question that is usually posed is: ‘I am staying here illegally, can
you do something for me?’ And after I have answered this question, part
of the audience leaves. (A01)
The fact that illegal immigrants attend a meeting where a police officer
informs the public illustrates that they have a lot of trust in the police.
And although most illegal immigrants will presumably not take these
risks, because they prefer to stay unknown, they are in fact protected by
law from being apprehended without a reason. These experiences also
show that the Dutch police force is very much part of a tradition of at-
tempting to reach decisions by consulting all parties involved and by try-
ing to reach a compromise among them (Visser and Hemerijck 1997).
Most of our respondents showed very little faith in a harsher approach.
The more officers are involved in the daily life within multicultural
neighbourhoods, the more they express their doubts regarding the ac-
tive search for undocumented immigrants, fearing the perverse effects of
a more strict enforcement. In their view, rather than solving anything, it
would inflame relations with the more established ethnic communities
and would consequently deteriorate relations in the neighbourhoods:
The whole issue of foreigners is not so interesting to me. I am working in
a neighbourhood with large numbers of immigrants. If I start to take a
role as someone who chases illegal immigrants, I can shake it. (R08)
According to the respondents who work for the Aliens police, this is re-
inforced because general police officers lack sufficient and up-to-date
knowledge about the Aliens law. It is an ‘unpopular law’ to the average
police officer because of the rapid pace of changes, but also because ap-
prehensions of illegal immigrants require filling in too many forms. At
the same time, police officers working for the Aliens department are de-
pendent on these basic units, because they are the ones who work at the
beginning of the chain.
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Active surveillance. When asked about the practice of the operational
surveillance, most respondents immediately stress the fact that there is
no such thing as active detection of all illegal immigrants. Tracking
down people solely because they are staying in the country illegally is
seen by most of them as not their responsibility. Moreover, they stress
that it would not be lawful under the amended Aliens Act:
You need a genuine suspicion now. And I think that’s good. In the
society we are living in you cannot say: he looks non-Dutch. How could
you tell? (A04)
The recurrent view is that chasing people should be avoided. In this re-
spect, respondents often implicitly bear reference to the Second World
War, by using the term ‘razzia’ or by referring explicitly to roundups
during the war. Apart from humanitarian reasons they do not think
chasing people would do any good. Police officers often stress the fact
that they know perfectly well where to find illegal immigrants, but ac-
cording to many it would do more harm than good if they would go after
them. The situation would very soon harden and this would be in no
one’s interest.
Officers who work for the Aliens departments are more involved in
active surveillance. Illegal immigrants can be detected during spot
checks within firms or during ‘address checks’, which take place in the
case of rejected asylum seekers. But even then, the police need to have a
genuine suspicion. Information comes from linking up files of different
government agencies or from tip-offs by the public. When asked about
active control, most respondents put the emphasis on attempts to curb
illegal employment. They explain that the initiative for these actions is
usually taken by other regulatory bodies, such as the Labour Inspection
(which falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment). Checks are realised in sectors where illegal labour is to be
expected, and again, there has to be a concrete reason to do a check:
Just walking into a shoarma shop and checking whether everybody there
is illegal or legal, is not possible. (R09)
Still policemen claim to know well which sectors are relevant. For some
sectors, like the confection industry and the restaurant sector, special in-
terdisciplinary teams are established. Furthermore, horticultural green-
houses have a reputation for the use of illegal labour (Zandvliet and
Gravesteijn-Ligthelm 1994, Van der Leun and Kloosterman 1999). These
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are all labour-intensive sectors that face fierce competition and where
low-paid labour is an important input. As one of the respondents in The
Hague puts it:
The average hourly wage [of illegal immigrants, JvdL] is somewhere
between I 3,20 and 5,45 per hour, so there are only certain sectors that
are interesting. (H03)
Sectors most mentioned by police officers of the Aliens police are green-
houses, the restaurant business, bakeries, the garment industry and
prostitution. Some officers working for the Aliens police regularly co-
operate in checks. A typical procedure is described as follows:
For instance, we visit a garment sweatshop together with the Labour
Inspection. Fortunately, we have the new Identification Act. ( . . . ) And
everybody who is not able to identify himself has to come to the bureau.
And most of the time, they turn out to be illegal immigrants. (R03)
Several respondents highlight that the illegal immigrants they come
across during these actions are hard working people whom they tend to
see as victims of exploitation rather than as offenders. Hence, they some-
times have difficulties in arresting these people and would rather deal
with the employers. Some of them also think it is unfair that these immi-
grants run a particularly high risk of being expelled (see the next para-
graph). Moreover, many respondents stress the fact that they are reluc-
tant to bother employers. Particularly in Rotterdam and Amsterdam,
respondents stress the fact that these controls are not very intensive. And
although the Aliens police co-operate with other government branches
in doing spot checks in the workplace, some respondents have a rather
cynical opinion with regard to these actions:
Special checks are held in the workplace, but to my opinion this often
has a political character, for example with prostitution in the inner city;
a show is being made of it. Newspapers show up, the television. But if
you take a close look, maybe two illegal immigrants are arrested. (A13)
In this respect the reactions to tip-offs appear to vary considerably. All
Aliens department receive tip-offs from the public concerning illegal
residence or illegal labour. According to our respondents the complain-
ers are usually competitors or rivals of people who employ undocu-
mented immigrants or family members. In some cases police officers
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have the impression that family members who take care of illegal immi-
grants give these tip-offs because they are not able to cope anymore with
a (financially) dependent family member around. Some of our respon-
dents completely ignore these tip-offs, as they feel ‘used’ in conflicts that
they do not want to be involved in, whereas others take the tip-offs seri-
ously and see them as helpful tools. In this respect discretionary powers
are considerable. Many respondents use their intuition. If they feel
something is ‘wrong’ with the tip-off, they do not act on it. The same
counts for illegal immigrants who report themselves to the police. Some
officers refuse to expel them, because they fear this will attract people in-
terested in a free ticket home.
Most police officers express the view that the risk of attracting the at-
tention of the police depends strongly on the behaviour of the individual
immigrant. Most of them maintain that the majority of illegal immi-
grants never run this risk unless they commit crimes or cause disorder:
An illegal immigrant can survive in the Netherlands for years, as long as
he lives in accordance with the rules. If he does not commit offences, if
he buys a ticket in the tram ( . . . ) they do not harm society and the Aliens
police will never apprehend them, so they can stick it out for a long time.
(H01)
In short, the relevant dimension is usually not the illegal status of a per-
son, but the fact that this person causes disorder or is suspected of com-
mitting a crime, which influences the probability of being apprehended.
However, illegal immigrants can also simply be out of luck and run into
the hands of the police during checks of more general nature:
The strange thing is that a lot of people get into trouble in a stupid way.
For instance when they travel by public transport without having a
ticket. That is where you run into them. (A09)
In some cases, however, ‘municipal violations’ (violations of municipal
police ordinances) are used by the police as a method to circumvent the
legal restrictions. The VICTOR anti-drugs policy in certain Rotterdam
neighbourhoods, for example, provides the police with considerably
more powers to arrest individuals than in other parts of the city. This
strategy can be used to identify the legal status of immigrants, but even
then there is control by the courts on patterns of arrest.
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Apprehending a person is the first step. Handing the person over to the
Aliens police should normally be the next step. Our interviews suggest
that when police officers have reason to assume they are dealing with il-
legal immigrants, they usually take further action, such as looking the
person up in the computerised system and, if necessary, contacting the
Aliens police. They do have a considerable amount of discretionary free-
dom in this respect. There are roughly speaking three reasons to refrain
from handing over a person to the Aliens police. First, practical reasons.
When they are too busy or there is a shortage of available cells, they turn
a blind eye and pretend not to know that the person is in the country ille-
gally. Most of the respondents agree to the fact that they have much
better resources than some years ago. Especially the increase in available
cells is said to make a significant difference. A police officer working for
a basic unit in Amsterdam refers to the frustration that the lack of cells
could lead to before: ‘We were occupied with a foreigner for days and
when we finally got to the Aliens department, they said: just send him
away, there is no space.’ (A04) In contrast to what Clermonts (1994) de-
scribes with regard to the situation in Rotterdam and Amsterdam a few
years earlier, this lack of available cells or manpower does not play a ma-
jor role in the perception of our respondents anymore.
The second reason is frustration with the effect of their actions.
When police officers have experienced time and again that ‘nothing
happens’ with an apprehended illegal immigrant, it is not surprising that
they save their energy and choose not to apprehend them anymore.
Some respondents were very open about the fact that it is often useless to
take action. They choose to ignore people whom they expect to be diffi-
cult to expel. This happens mostly with illegal immigrants who are seen
as ‘incorrigible figures’: ‘They are not handed over anymore. It would be
a waste of time.’ (R03)
Thirdly, moral constraints play a part. An officer in The Hague gives
the example of a Surinamese grandmother of 103 years of age and says
they are not going after grandmothers or young children. Another ex-
ample that is given, is when an illegal immigrant is brought in as a vic-
tim:
This weekend, I had someone who told a rather confused story. He came
in as a victim. And I do not think we should put people in a cell who
come in as victims. And especially not if he is just illegal and we do not
know him for something else. This time I let him go. But next time it
may be different. It also depends on the amount of time you have. (A04)
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As is often the case, the discretion of the officers in particular allows for
the choice not to take action under certain circumstances.
Policy priorities. Officially, five priorities are laid down in a covenant be-
tween the Ministry of Justice and the police forces. These priorities are
meant in principle as national guidelines. The first priority is the search
for criminal illegal immigrants. Secondly, immigrants who cause public
disorders or otherwise cause a nuisance should be subject to surveil-
lance. Third priority is the expulsion and (forced) return of illegal immi-
grants who are not (or no longer) staying in the country legally. Fourth,
to combat people who take advantage of illegal immigrants, such as em-
ployers, landlords, smugglers and traffickers. Fifth, to check the legal
status of people arrested by the police in the course of other investiga-
tions or controls, known as ‘passive control’.
In 1995, the Ministry of Justice concluded that ‘a consistent and logi-
cal implementation of these formal priorities has not always been the
case’ (Ministerie van Justitie 1995: 29). Our interviews show that despite
the political rhetoric about intensifying controls, this assertion still
holds true. Remarkably, only a minority of the respondents were aware
of the formal priorities as established by the Ministry of Justice. Some
even maintained that there are no priorities and that there is no national
policy in this respect. These reactions show that there is not only a gap
between the policy and its outcomes: in this case the implementers are
not even aware of the official policy. Furthermore, respondents who are
aware of the priorities attach little significance to them. According to an
officer in The Hague:
This list of priorities is only formal. In the actual implementation it is
not complied with. (H03)
Another officer in The Hague argues that the police force in that city has
deliberately adopted different policy guidelines:
The fifth priority is passive control. But the chief constable has decided
this has to be number one. ( . . . ) We have been granted extra personnel
to intensify the surveillance, which includes passive surveillance, so that
is our priority. (H02)
The single priority, which the majority of the respondents could recall,
was the apprehension and expulsion of criminal illegal immigrants:
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You see, it is more important to expel a person with a serious criminal
background, than someone who is involved in shoplifting or incidental
fare dodging. (A06)
Yet, this is the most difficult goal to meet in practice, as will be shown in
section 4.5.
Local differences. Officially, the ‘discouragement policy’ is a national pol-
icy. The interviews, however, show that central guidelines bring about
local differences. Respondents in The Hague and Utrecht, for example,
claim that the first priority of arresting criminal illegal immigrants is of
no significance to them as they hardly ever come across criminal illegal
immigrants. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam, on the other hand, respon-
dents do emphasise the search for criminal illegal immigrants, even as
they stress the difficulties in achieving this goal. On the whole, the activi-
ties of the Aliens police appear to be largely a reflection of the local situa-
tion with regard to safety and criminality in general, which consequently
leads to local differences in implementation. In Rotterdam, and more
markedly in Amsterdam, criminal illegal immigrants have the highest
probability of getting apprehended, while other illegal immigrants in
fact hardly ever run this risk. In Rotterdam, apprehensions often pertain
to activities in the drug economy, which, according to police officers, is a
magnet for illegal immigrants. In Rotterdam, respondents feel that a mi-
nority of the illegal immigrants are apprehended during special checks,
although they suppose the share is rising because of the increasing atten-
tion for illegality. Still, in their opinion, the majority is brought in by
general police officers after being apprehended, typically when involved
in drug transactions:
You typically encounter illegal immigrants after tip-offs in view of the
VICTOR operation. People, mostly Moroccan youngsters, who guide
foreigners to drug premises. Then they are arrested by the regular police
or by the criminal investigation department and they turn out to be in
the country illegally. In these cases they are sent to us. (R10)
The situation in the somewhat smaller cities of Utrecht and The Hague
diverges from the picture in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In The Hague,
respondents maintain that the probability of being apprehended is the
highest for people who are working illegally or those that commit misde-
meanours:
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( . . . ) The ones that attract the attention of the police because of their
behaviour. I mean riding in the tram without a ticket, people who are
apprehended when they cause a nuisance, and people who are working
in a situation where a large number of people are employed. (H03)
Both in The Hague and in Utrecht, controls in the workplace seem to
constitute a more important part of surveillance than in Rotterdam and
Amsterdam. One of the reasons for concentrating on these checks is that
police officers working for the Aliens department rarely come into con-
tact with illegal immigrants who are involved in crime. To a large extent
this corresponds to what we find in Utrecht. Police officers there also
stress the importance of spot checks against illegal employment, and
they rarely refer to ‘criminal’ illegal immigrants. They do have the im-
pression that they are more targeted on curbing illegal prostitution than
the police forces in other cities:
If we come across women who are here as tourists, and who are working
here without a work permit, we withdraw the tourist visa and they have
to go back. But Rotterdam and The Hague tolerate prostitution. If the
police encounter ladies who are working with a tourist visa, no action
whatsoever is taken. (U02)
In sum, the formal priorities as laid down in covenants between the cit-
ies and the Ministry are not seen as equally relevant in the four cities. The
first priority of apprehending illegal immigrants who commit offences is
seen as more relevant in Rotterdam and Amsterdam than in The Hague
and Utrecht. Each apprehension of an illegal immigrant can in theory be
followed by an expulsion.
4.5 Expulsion practices
Return of ‘unwanted’ immigrants to their country of origin is supposed
to be the pièce de résistance of every national policy toward illegal immi-
grants. This section deals respectively with expulsions, differential out-
comes of the expulsion policy and attempts to encourage expulsion by
setting target numbers.
Types of expulsion. Under Dutch law, illegal residence is not a penal of-
fence. The main sanction consists of return, or expulsion as it is usually
called. To enable this expulsion, the immigrant concerned can be held in
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detention. Conditions for detention and expulsion are regulated in the
Aliens Act. Expulsions fall under the responsibility of the Aliens police.
When an apprehended illegal immigrant is handed over to or appre-
hended by the Aliens police, a decision has to be taken regarding the next
steps. There are, roughly speaking, three possibilities. The first is ‘effec-
tive expulsion’, which means that a person is actually brought back
(commonly by airplane) to the home country. To effectuate this type of
expulsion, the identity of the arrested person has to be known to the po-
lice and the immigrant should be in possession of a passport or a laissez
passer. When the immigrant does not have any documents and when the
identity cannot be established by the police, the person can be held in de-
tention, first in the police station and later in a detention centre. This de-
tention is normally not allowed to last longer than three to six months.
The second type of expulsion is sending a person away, which means in
practice that he or she is released. This may happen when effective ex-
pulsion is not possible, when there is a shortage of available cells or when
a judge decides that there is no prospect of a timely expulsion. A third
possibility is that under special circumstances an individual can be
handed over to a hospital, a health clinic or a mental home. When an il-
legal immigrant is caught crossing the border, expulsion is immediately
allowed. In all other cases an ‘expulsion order’ is required. This order
can be issued by the chief constable of the police, by the prosecutor or his
assistent.
The interviews with police officers indicate that the official policy
goal and the highest priority – apprehending and expelling criminal ille-
gal immigrants – is the most difficult to meet in practice. Respondents
stress that only a part of the illegal immigrants are expelled. They men-
tion several reasons to explain the large number of cases in which no-
body is expelled, among which technical, humanitarian and pragmatic
reasons. Technical reasons come into play when the country of origin
does not recognise the immigrant as its citizen. Difficult countries in this
respect are for instance Liberia, former Yugoslavia, Morocco, Angola,
Lebanon, Ethiopia, Sudan, China and more generally all countries that
are involved in armed conflicts. Humanitarian reasons play a part when
the illegal immigrant concerned applies for asylum or is suffering from
severe health problems. Pragmatic reasons include shortage of cells or of
manpower. Even though there are more cells available than in the past,
illegal immigrants are still released from time to time because no cells are
available. For instance in the case of female immigrants:
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In the whole country there are nine cells available for women. So if we
apprehend women we try to expel them within ten days, otherwise we let
them go. (U02)
Problems like these often give rise to pragmatic solutions. Police officers
prefer to use these scarce cells for women whom they expect to be ex-
pelled effectively, and if necessary release other women for that purpose:
This happened yesterday. We apprehended an illegal Surinamese
woman, with a high chance of being expelled. And fortunately, there is a
Chinese woman in detention. Well, Chinese people are hard to expel
and she has been detained for three months. ( . . . ) In these cases we try
to make an exchange. (U06)
Most respondents are relatively sceptical with regard to the effects of the
expulsion policy. First, it is often impossible to expel people, and sec-
ondly, it does not always present a solution. This becomes clear in the
statement of a police officer in Rotterdam:
Take a look at a Polish man who is expelled. He simply takes the train
back to the Schengen area and as long as he is not checked at the German
border, there is no problem at all. But even when he is checked, there is
not really a problem. He can show a passport – as long as he is not decla-
red a ‘undesirable alien’ he simply travels by train back to Rotterdam.
The next day he stands in front of our door again. (R04)
An analysis of apprehension data in the four cities (in 1995) underscores
the limitations of the expulsion practices, as noted by the respondents.
In the four cities together almost half of the apprehensions are followed
by an effective expulsion during the same year. Forty per cent are sent
away and twelve per cent are still in detention or sent somewhere else.
Table 4.2 Type of expulsion following the apprehension of illegal im-
migrants in four cities (N=6,831)









Source: Police data 1995
106
Differential outcomes. The figures presented above apply to all illegal im-
migrants apprehended in the four cities during one year. Further analy-
sis reveals that the type of expulsion correlates with the reason for appre-
hension. While the formal aim is to expel criminal illegal immigrants,
the outcomes of the expulsion policy are more ambiguous. Police data
show that, in practice, illegal immigrants who have infringed the Aliens
legislation run a higher risk of being effectively expelled than those who
are arrested for offences – with an exception for drug related offences.
Immigrants apprehended for misdemeanours and minor offences are
the least effectively expelled. The table below illustrates this.
Table 4.3 Type of expulsion by reason for arrest, four cities
(N=5,803)



























Source: Police data 1995
The lack of co-operation between some foreign authorities and the
Dutch government underpins these outcomes. Moreover, part of the il-
legal population is aware of the limitations of governmental power in
this respect and develops strategies to take advantage of it. In particular
North African immigrants have a reputation for hiding their identity
(see chapter 3). A police officer gives an example:
Someone maintains to come from Algeria. And the same person has
been arrested already 16 times. He is presented to the Algerian, Moroc-
can, and Tunisian consulates endlessly. But if nowhere his identity can
be established, he cannot be expelled. And we cannot take him into
detention either, because we know beforehand that he cannot be expel-
led. (. .) So he is kicked out on the streets. That can be frustrating someti-
mes. (R07)
According to our respondents these strategies are mainly used by immi-
grants who are involved in criminality. Or as an officer in The Hague
puts it:
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There is a category that is perfectly aware that they are living under and
above the law. (H01)
Some illegal immigrants apparently do not care about being detained.
They have a place to stay and they simply wait until they are released
again:
It costs them six to nine months, but then they are free. Some of the
Moroccans are prepared to sit it out. I wonder what’s wrong with them,
it is seven months of your life but maybe they have nothing left in their
own country. The underlying idea is to stay here. And those that are rele-
ased ( . . . ), they are out in the streets again and disappear into illegality
again so that they can manage a few more years. (U08)
Unidentifiable immigrants are constitutionally rather invulnerable to
expulsion. One respondent in Amsterdam even speaks of diplomatic
immunity. This points to the paradox of the current undocumented im-
migration policy: those immigrants who are the primary target of appre-
hension and expulsion measures are the most successful in preventing
their repatriation. Certain groups of undocumented immigrants, espe-
cially those who are involved in crime, are difficult to evict because they
are able to hide their identity successfully by ridding themselves of docu-
ments and pretending to come from countries unwilling to collaborate
with Dutch authorities.
Unanimously, the respondents maintain that illegal immigrants from
Turkey are the most easy to expel, except for Kurdish people who are of-
ten aware of the fact that they can start an asylum procedure. This is cor-
roborated by the analysis of police data. Also, the type of expulsion is
correlated with the nationality or country of origin of the apprehended
immigrants. More specifically, this works to the detriment of Turkish il-
legal immigrants, as they have the highest probability of being sent back
to their home country.
Police officers stress that it is relatively easy to recognise an immi-
grant from a Turkish background. Moreover, they present it as an ‘em-
pirical fact’ that Turkish immigrants often take a co-operative position.
In contrast to North African illegal immigrants, they often seem to opt
for expulsion rather than spend months in a detention centre.
The interviews make clear that there are many difficulties attached to
enforcement of the expulsion policy. Police officers particularly under-
score the problems with a core of illegal immigrants who know how to
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thwart their expulsion and keep coming back, the ‘revolving door’
immigrants76 (see chapter 3). One of the consequences is that police offi-
cers often send apprehended illegal immigrants back into the streets. Be-
fore, it was the custom to put illegal immigrants who were difficult to
evict on a train to Belgium, known as the ‘Roosendaal procedure’,
named after the last station before the Belgium border. The Belgium
government did the same in the other direction (Suárez-Orozco 1994).
In the meanwhile the national governments have officially agreed to
stop these symbolic practices. Now they simply release people. Some of-
ficers refer to this practice as sending people away ‘in southern direc-
tion’. Others call it the ‘front-door procedure’: ‘When the investigations
take too much time, we have to let them go.’ (H04) The obvious limita-
tions frustrate some of the officers. An officer in Rotterdam is personally
confronted with the failing effort:
I live around the corner in this street. And if I am at home at night or
when I walk home, I encounter people who I know have been arrested
and expelled before, and I see them just walking in front of my door.
(R04)
The actual outcomes of the policy in practice are largely outside the
sphere of influence of police officers. Still, they are the ones who are con-
fronted with, in some cases, intractable social problems. Some see this as
the core problem of the internal surveillance of illegal immigrants: ‘You
109
Table 4.4 Type of expulsion by country or region of origin, four cities
(N=6,014)








































Source: Police data 1995
can formulate a wonderful policy, but if in the end it is not finalised, you
undermine everything.’ (R09)
The limits of the current expulsion policy do not imply that these ille-
gal immigrants can never be expelled. In the long run it may be possible
to effectuate an expulsion. Even if they release an individual, the police
can start an investigation in order to establish the identity. If the same
person is arrested again, an expulsion order might already be waiting.
Furthermore, having the individual declared an ‘undesirable alien’ of-
fers more possibilities, since staying in the country as ‘unwanted for-
eigner’ is an offence under Dutch law. Yet, these procedures are very
time-consuming.
Encouraging expulsions. In recent years, there have been many attempts
to encourage the expulsion of (criminal) illegal immigrants. According
to many of our respondents this has led to explicit agreements between
the police forces and the Ministry of Justice about a certain number of
effective expulsions for each full time police officer working for the
Aliens police. The officers in The Hague are the most outspoken in this
respect. They mention a target of fifty expulsions per worker per year.
These target numbers are laid down in covenants and in semi-official
notes. Internal documents of the The Hague police force make clear that
the Aliens Department has to arrest 1,000 illegal immigrants in one year,
of whom 500 have to be expelled (Politie Haaglanden 1996).77 The inter-
views show how these target numbers produce adverse effects. When
they are forced to expel more people effectively, the officers look for easy
targets:
It is much easier to round up a Turkish man at the working place and
expel him to Turkey. It will cost me a day. Whereas when I would put my
energy into a Ghanaian who makes use of a forged passport and who has
robbed a bank, this would require much more time and it would deserve
priority. Yet it requires too much labour-intensive work. (H03)
The same respondent stresses the consequences of the use of target num-
bers:
Within the total supply of work, we pick out the best bits. So that we can
attain the official standard in the end. But by doing so, we forget that the
people who are ignored constitute an ever more rotten part of society.
(H03)
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These quotes indicate how complex it is to narrow the gap between offi-
cial policy and practices by exerting more administrative control.
4.6 Conclusions
The quote from former chief constable Hessing of Rotterdam, opening
this chapter, reflects a rather ironic view of the relationship between the
actions of police officers and formal policy. Without going as far as this,
sociological literature on the police commonly also ascribes consider-
able discretionary powers to police officers when they are dealing with
crime and deviant behaviour. To a large extent, they act according to de-
cisions made on the spot. The evidence presented here indicates that this
also applies to the police officers who, in principle, face a central task in
the surveillance of illegal immigrants in the major Dutch cities.
This chapter has provided a glimpse into the day-to-day decisions
and practices of police officers in the four largest Dutch cities: both regu-
lar officers who work for basic units, and their colleagues in the Aliens
Departments. The interviews show that contrary to the often expressed
fear, involvement of the police does not necessarily mean active and/or
massive roundups. Neither does it have to imply a strong ‘we against
them’ attitude. First of all, despite all the official policy changes, most
regular policemen do not see the surveillance of illegal immigrants as a
key responsibility. They see themselves as crime fighters in the first place
and do not accord a high priority to the surveillance of illegal immi-
grants. This is reinforced by the fact that they feel they are being saddled
with too many tasks. Even the officers who work for the Aliens depart-
ment do not put much emphasis on the detection of people who are in
the country illegally. Further, many of them express the feeling that the
current situation does not warrant draconian measures. Their approach
is selective and pragmatic. In particular, officers in basic units use their
discretion to refrain from going after illegal immigrants.
Secondly, the interviews point to substantial incongruities between
the official policy and the enforcement practices described by the re-
spondents. The Ministry of Justice has established five formal priorities
as a guideline for the urban Aliens departments. The interviews, how-
ever, show that most enforcers are not aware of these priorities. The only
priority most respondents are able to mention is the aim to expel crimi-
nal illegal immigrants, but they immediately stress that this priority is
the most difficult to achieve. In practice, instead of targeting all undocu-
mented immigrants, the police target only those who cause inconve-
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nience and display criminal behaviour. As a result of this priority, spe-
cific categories of undocumented immigrants rarely come into contact
with the immigration police or local police departments. In some re-
spects the outcomes of these practices are completely contradictory to
the official policy aims, in other respects they are much more lenient
than recent discussions on restrictive policies suggest. It is clear from the
interviews that – despite the official policy – lowel-level enforcers often
do not believe in a more active approach. They fear that this would inter-
fere with their usual work, as illegal immigrants would be criminalised
and marginalised. This in turn could easily inflame the already tension-
laden relationship with migrant communities.
At first sight, the apprehension practices may appear to be the result
of limited manpower. Even though many respondents refer to the fact
that budgets have risen in recent years, compared to the size of the im-
migrant populations the capacity of the Aliens police is still relatively
limited. Yet it also becomes clear that when budgets are increased and
when central control is strengthened, this does not necessarily translate
into a more active approach.
As to expulsions, the interviews and the apprehension figures both
show that the objective of effectively expelling illegal immigrants is not
met in practice. Less than half of the apprehensions of illegal immigrants
are followed by an effective expulsion. Paradoxically, suspected criminal
offenders have the lowest probability of being actively expelled. Diffi-
culties in co-operation with countries of origin in combination with
strategies adopted by certain groups of illegal immigrants limit the ex-
pulsion policy in practice. This also leads to frustration of police officers,
who sometimes choose not to apprehend illegal immigrants anymore.
Recently, there have been agreements between the Ministry of Justice
and the police force of The Hague to set target numbers. In practice,
these target numbers are translated into the ‘smart rule’ of focusing on
easy targets, which is not in line with the formal priorities.
On the whole, discretionary autonomy appears to be considerable,
leading to practices and priorities that differ between cities and between
units within cities. Enforcement practices are in the first place a function
of the actual problems of safety and crime in each city. Consequently,
Amsterdam and Rotterdam focus more on illegal immigrants who are
involved in crime, whereas The Hague and Utrecht do not consider this
very relevant and therefore focus more on illegal labour and ‘passive
control’.
The practices as described reflect the limits of political influence on
local enforcement practices at the ‘street level’. Police officers seem to
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have become to a certain extent immune to the continuous flow of new
ideas, new rules and new priorities they are confronted with. Institutions
in the sense of ‘practices’ turn out to be more persistent than official pol-
icy. This is clearly reinforced at the implementation level. In some cases
this leads to informal practices and practices which are contradictory to
official policy aims. The actual practices are the outcome of negotiations
between immigrants (both legal and illegal), police officers, police de-
partments, local politicians and, at a large distance, the national govern-
ment. These findings bring us to the subject of the next chapter: the
question of how other gatekeepers – who are at a much larger distance




5 Close encounters with the
welfare state: limits of the
Linking Act
Evaluation that is insensitive to the problems of transforming policyma-
kers’ ideas into implementers’ actions is obtuse; it leaves the best bits
behind unexamined.
(Pressman and Wildavsky 1984: 255).
5.1 Illegal immigrants and welfare state provisions
The need to avoid contact with state officials and public organisations is
a fact of life for illegal immigrants. After all, it is the state whose rules
they are bending, skirting or violating. Yet there are instances in which
even illegal immigrants may attempt to seek access to state provisions.
This can be the case when certain needs, like education, housing and
health care, cannot be served by immigrant networks or by employers.
Secondly, it may be the case when they do not expect to be recognised as
non-citizens. Welfare programmes are usually not explicitly designed
with reference to illegal immigrants (Wenzel and Bös 1997: 546) and in a
similar vein as police officers, gatekeepers of the welfare state may have
room to manoeuvre. This proposition has also stimulated policymakers
to focus on internal migration control and, in particular, to put more
energy into excluding illegal immigrants from public services. The
Linking Act is a case in point. The crux of this voluminous law, which
passed both Houses of Parliament in 1998, is that entitlement of immi-
grants to a whole range of public and semi-public provisions such as so-
cial benefits, health care, housing and education, is systematically made
conditional on their residence status.78 The Linking Act is often seen as a
centrepiece in internal migration control in the Netherlands.
The key issue that will be addressed in the present chapter is to what
extent the attempts to systematically exclude illegal immigrants from
welfare provisions are effectuated in practice and with which conse-
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quences. Empirically, the chapter is based on ninety interviews with
workers or professionals who are active in the sectors of social benefits,
housing, health care and education within an urban setting (see appen-
dix 4). The interviews were held roughly one year before and a little less
than one year after the introduction of the Linking Act (1996/1997 and
1998/1999). Central questions in this chapter are: what happens when
(semi-)professionals encounter illegal immigrants in practice? Are the
immigrants excluded from services? Does this lead to dilemmas for the
workers concerned? To what extent are decisions of policy implement-
ers influenced by the new formal rules? Are these rules legalistically ap-
plied or are they transformed? Do practices vary between the different
sectors or between individual workers and, if so, how can these differ-
ences be explained? The central findings will be presented in sections 5.5
(before the Linking Act) and 5.6 (after the Linking Act). Before turning
to these findings, section 5.2 summarises the existing findings with re-
gard to the use of welfare state provisions by illegal residents. Section 5.3
introduces the conceptual framework, which draws on Hasenfeld’s
typology of Human Service Organisations and more generally on the
implementation literature.
5.2 Close encounters with the welfare state
In principle, legally admitted minorities’ and immigrants’ eligibility for
social services is comparable to the eligibility of native citizens. A rela-
tively large share of the immigrants, furthermore, holds or obtains the
Dutch nationality and full citizen rights.79 As a rule, the debates that sur-
rounded the budgetary crisis of the Dutch welfare state did not severely
question the legitimacy of the equal treatment of legally residing immi-
grants and native citizens, nor were they intertwined with arguments
concerning the presence of illegal immigrants.80 By contrast, in disputes
on restrictive immigration policies the use (or abuse) of public services
by illegal immigrants is a recurrent element. Curtailing the access of ille-
gal immigrants to public services is high on the agenda of anti-immi-
grant policies in countries with comprehensive welfare systems
(Cornelius et al. 1994: 6-9, Faist 1996, Miller 1999, Bommes and Geddes
2000).81 The fear is that welfare systems serve as a magnet for prospective
(illegal) immigrants, and – maybe even more – as an obstacle when they
are considering returning to their home country (Chiswick 2000).
Health care seems to be the most likely public service to have this effect
(Jordan and Vogel 1997: 17-20).82
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There is little conclusive evidence for the effect of social services on il-
legal immigration. In a large-scale study on Mexican illegal immigrants
in the United States, for instance, Massey and Espinosa (1997) find that
the accessibility to social services does not serve as a powerful factor in
influencing migration decisions when compared to other factors
(Massey and Espinosa 1997: 963). Dutch studies on the allocation of so-
cial security benefits have consistently shown that the proportion of ille-
gal immigrants among the clients of social service organisations is negli-
gible (Havinga, Groenendijk and Clermonts 1991, Minderhoud 1993).
New applicants go through extensive administrative procedures, and the
probability that the illegal status of a person will be exposed, is high
(Clermonts, Van der Marck and Terweijden 1990: 35).
In sum, there is a strong contradiction between the widespread fear
of the effect of public services on illegal immigration and the empirical
findings as to actual use of these services. This contradiction may be
partly accounted for on the basis that Dutch studies have mainly focused
on social benefits. As figure 2.1 in chapter 2 has shown, the domain of re-
distribution by the state is precisely the most regulated and least accessi-
ble domain for illegal immigrants (cf. Van der Leun and Kloosterman
1999). The cited studies also suggest that checking residence statuses was
not equally common in other domains of the welfare state. Hospitals,
medical insurers and housing corporations appeared to pay less atten-
tion to these checks than welfare department and employment agencies.
Havinga, Groenendijk and Clermonts concluded in 1991 that across the
board, public and semi-public organisations in the Netherlands paid less
systematic attention to these checks than, for instance, comparable or-
ganisations in the United Kingdom (Havinga et al. 1991: 36-41).83 By con-
trast, Jordan and Vogel (1997) find that housing, health care and educa-
tion are better accessible to illegal immigrants in countries with strong
border controls (such as the UK) than more open countries such as Ger-
many (see also Layton-Henry 1994).84 Secondly, the apparent contradic-
tion points to the fact that the state is anything but one single actor. Mul-
tiple actors and institutional forms are endowed with responsibility for
the delivery of social services in the widest sense. Within this plethora of
public and semi-public bodies, local-level rule makers have their own
organisational and professional considerations, which influence deci-
sion-making processes. Implementation practices or rules of the game at
the lower levels can be seen as ‘semi-automous fields’ (Moore 1973),
which mitigate between the law and the outcomes of the law. What is
needed, therefore, is (a) a more differentiated perspective on welfare-
state provisions (cf. Engbersen and Gabriëls 1995) and (b) a focus on im-
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plementation practices. The mixed and sometimes downright contra-
dictory findings in existing studies give rise to the first assumption,
namely that implementation practices differ between different domains
of the welfare state.
The Unknown City project produced some relevant findings in this
respect (Burgers and Engbersen 1999, Engbersen et al. 1999). As regards
health care, a study was conducted roughly five years before the enact-
ment of the Linking Act, investigating the accessibility of health care for
illegal immigrants in Rotterdam (Liefhebber and Linders 1994, Burgers
and Ten Dam 1999). The authors concluded that illegal immigrants do
not put a heavy burden on public expenditures in this domain. First and
foremost this could be explained by the fact that illegal immigrants
(mostly young men) fall into a relatively healthy category and tend to
linger longer than the average patient before seeking medical help. They
often refrain from making use of health care provisions. Secondly, the
authors show that illegal patients make up a small proportion of the total
number of patients in the sizeable health care sector and therefore are
not seen as constituting a major problem.85 Thirdly, as long as they were
sufficiently insured – or used other people’s documents – they were usu-
ally not recognised as illegal immigrants. Finally, uninsured illegal pa-
tients were simply seen as falling into the (broader) category of unin-
sured persons. Most practitioners were willing to help these patients for
free or they charged them a reasonable and sometimes symbolic amount
of money in cash, while private organisations like the ‘Paulus Church’ in
Rotterdam provided supplementary care. When hospitals were faced
with uncovered costs, the Social Welfare department could render fi-
nancial backing86.
As to housing, Burgers concludes that most of the illegal immigrants
in Rotterdam do not rent housing independently, but rather stay with
their family members (Burgers 1998, 1999a). Whether this outcome de-
pends on the tendency of illegal immigrants to stay away from housing
corporations, or (also) on the extent of actual exclusion within the do-
main of public housing, remains unclear. More or less the same applies
to social benefits. A mere eleven out of 170 illegal immigrants made use
of social security or sickness benefits and all these cases pertained to ille-
gal workers with tax-paid jobs (Van der Leun and Kloosterman 1999). As
regards education, the study demonstrated that the motivation to learn
the Dutch language was strong among illegal immigrants. About thirty
per cent of the illegal immigrants had followed some language course in
the Netherlands, be it in state-subsidised institutes or not (Engbersen
1999a: 248), and eight respondents out of 170 had children who attended
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primary or secondary school in the Netherlands. The findings of the Un-
known City project suggest that informal opportunities outweigh the
significance of the use of formal welfare state provisions.87 But the study
also demonstrates that many illegal immigrants directly or indirectly
come into contact with some state-sponsored programs or services at
some point of time. So there is enough reason to study encounters with
the welfare state more systematically, beginning with experiences of
people who work within these organisations.
5.3 Human Service Organisations
The Linking Act is a typical example of ‘remote control’ (Zolberg 1999:
75). It aims at delegating responsibilities to the lower level of policy im-
plementation and to actors other than the traditional gatekeepers. As
such, the law embodies a fundamental shift in the locus of immigration
policy from specialised state agencies such as the Immigration Service
and the Aliens police to organisations which are first and foremost man-
dated to allocate social services: Human Service Organisations
(Hasenfeld 1983, Gastelaars 1997). The fact that (semi-)professionals
within these organisations have to implement the law in practice, sad-
dles them with the ‘dual task of being a judge and a server at the same
time’ (cf. Lipsky 1980: 74). The Linking Act is also an example of the in-
creasing fine-tuning of migration control. As the enforcement of the law
hinges on the availability of accurate information regarding the actual
residence status of foreigners, it has been accompanied by an extensive
administrative operation, whose effects should not be underestimated.
In a labour-intensive operation, which took place roughly between 1994
and 1997, the files of the separate Aliens Police departments were stream-
lined and linked up with the Municipal Population Registers.88 The Mu-
nicipal Population Register (GBA)89 now serves as the central source of
information for all organisations which have a responsibility in execut-
ing public tasks and this is updated with new information about resi-
dence statuses by the Administration of the (Aliens) police (VAS)90 on a
daily basis. This major undertaking has enabled a more efficient co-op-
eration between organisations that to a high degree used to steer their
own course until recently.91
The implementation of the Linking Act, however, requires more
then co-operation between bureaucratic branches or technological ad-
justments that enable a smooth exchange of data (Van der Leun 2000a).
It is not an utterly rational process whereby policymakers create the con-
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ditions, after which lower-level workers simply implement them in
practice. In rational-choice terms, it has the typical characteristics of a
principal-agent problem, in which the principal (the national govern-
ment) has to find ways of having the agents (the implementers) act in the
interest of the principal (see also chapter 1).
The present chapter focuses attention on implementation processes
within the specific type of organisation that Hasenfeld (1983) has dubbed
Human Service Organisations (HSOs). The label denotes two vital char-
acteristics of this type of organisation. Human refers to the fact that the
organisations work directly with people, while service refers to the fact
that they are mandated to protect and promote the welfare of the people
they serve (Hasenfeld 1983: 4). Providers of social benefits, health care,
housing and education all fall under this broad category, which overlaps
with Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracies discussed in chapter 4.92 Below,
the central characteristics of these Human Service Organisations will be
presented and the organisations in the different sectors under study will
be placed in this general framework.
Heterogeneous organisations such as colleges, hospitals, nursing
homes, police stations and housing corporations all come under
Hasenfeld’s label of Human Service Organisations. These organisations
(a) have considerable impact on people’s lives and (b) are not able to
readily and fully control their implementation processes. The latter is in-
fluenced by the fact that the day-to-day professional activities within
these organisations depend highly on face-to-face interactions between
clients and workers. Direct control within these organisations is bound
to be limited and the organisations often form ‘loosely coupled systems’,
which does not encourage direct monitoring (Hasenfeld 1983: 150). Con-
sidering that their working methods – or ‘technologies’ in Hasenfeld’s
terminology – are inevitably indeterminate and goals are often vague
and conflicting, street-level bureaucrats within these organisations tend
to conduct their work relatively autonomously from their superiors
(Lipsky 1980). Further, in their attempts to cope with a high degree of
uncertainty and complexity, workers tend to develop a set of standard
operating procedures or rules of thumb, which do not necessarily corre-
spond to the organisational goals.
When focusing on social benefits, health care, housing and education,
Hasenfeld’s model is helpful to identify differences in organisational cir-
cumstances between these sectors. The organisations are classified along
two dimensions. The first dimension concerns the type of services pro-
vided by the organisation and the technologies involved. The first type of
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technology is people processing, which boils down to classifying people
and conferring a label to them (cf. Prottas 1979). People sustaining stands
for maintaining and/or retarding the deterioration of the well-being of
clients (for example in homes for the elderly), whereas People changing
refers to improving the well-being of clients (in institutes such as schools
and hospitals). The second dimension points to the type of clients an or-
ganisation is mandated to serve. On the one end of the continuum lies
the ‘deviant’ or ‘malfunctioning’ type of client, on the other the ‘normal’
client.
Figure 5.1 A typology of Human Service Organisations
Technology
Type of client




























Adapted from: Hasenfeld 1983: 6
Each sector (1) employs different ‘technologies’ or working procedures
and (2) serves different categories of people (Hasenfeld 1983: 4). Subse-
quently, six types of organisations can be distinguished with their typical
dilemmas.93 Type-I organisations, for instance, must demonstrate that
they are able to identify suitable clients and at the same time assure the
public that they are not biased or make use of discriminatory technolo-
gies. Type-II organisations have to show that they are able to effectively
identify all of their potential clients. Type-III and Type-IV organisations
must demonstrate that clients are entitled to their care and sustenance.
They must apply inevitably arbitrary criteria in concrete cases. Type-V
and Type-VI organisations are also saddled with the task of distinguish-
ing between normal and malfunctioning clients, but they are specifically
mandated to bring about changes in people. In doing so, they have to
rely on ‘working technologies’, of which the effectiveness is anything but
clear-cut. Moreover, controversy typically surrounds the objectives of
these types of organisations.
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Hasenfeld has developed this typology to explain differences in the
relationship between organisations and their wider social environment.
Applying this general model to the case under study, illegal immigrants
can at first sight be mapped into this typology as ‘deviant’ or ‘malfunc-
tioning’ clients residing in the country without the legal permission to
do so. The classification of people as ‘illegal immigrant’ puts a label that
is supposed to evoke certain reactions from other organisations, in this
case excluding them from most public services, at least after the new law.
The most likely organisations to label someone an ‘illegal immigrant’ are
police officers working for the Aliens Departments that fall under Type-
II organisations. The ‘clients’, in this case illegal immigrants, are not
likely to report themselves. They have to be actively searched for. How
the (Aliens) police try to meet this mandate of internal surveillance
within the constraints of the Aliens Act has been the subject of chapter 4.
Under the new law, however, workers within other types of Human Ser-
vice Organisations are faced with the task of being gatekeepers, while the
organisations are first and foremost oriented toward people changing
(education and health care) and people sustaining (housing agencies and
social benefits). It can be assumed that people who work within these or-
ganisations have a professional repertoire or ideology, which is not in
the first place oriented toward a control function within the framework
of the Aliens Act. They might as well perceive illegal immigrants just as
any other patients or clients who fall under their primary mandate. This
underscores the first general assumption that practices will differ among
sectors.
On the basis of Hasenfeld’s typology it is possible to refine this as-
sumption, because he makes a connection between the type of organisa-
tion and the degree of professionalisation. Professional autonomy is a
matter of institutionalised ‘trust’ granted to a certain occupational
group by society at large. Strong professions are often associated with an
information monopoly. However, a certain amount of knowledge that
cannot be readily acquired and the fact that it takes long-term (if not
life-long) learning to become a ‘true professional’ contribute to the
strength of a profession (De Swaan 1978: 189). Freidson (1973: 20) has de-
fined professionalisation as the ‘process by which an organised occupa-
tion, usually but not always by virtue of making claims to special esoteric
competence and to concern for the quality of its work and its benefits to
society, obtains the exclusive right to perform particular kind of work,
control training for it and access to it, and control the right of determin-
ing and evaluating the way the work is performed.’
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It derives from this definition that the power of a profession ema-
nates both from the dependence of clients on the particular service and
from the rights and privileges granted to the profession by state and soci-
ety (Hasenfeld 1983: 162). Without going into all the details, it is clear
that the human-services occupations we are interested in here, vary in
their degree of professionalisation. Doctors unmistakably enjoy the
highest degree of professional power (De Swaan 1978, Gastelaars 1997),
followed by nurses, social workers and teachers, who can be classified as
semi-professionals. Eligibility workers in the housing sectors or in social
welfare departments are to a much lesser degree seen as a ‘profession’
and consequently will have less discretionary powers (Hasenfeld 1983).
The second assumption should therefore be that a high degree of
professionalisation goes together with a high degree of power to influ-
ence processes of implementation. This implies that it is to be expected
that implementation practices which are more or less in conflict with the
Linking Act will be found in the domains of health care and education.
Social benefits and housing are the most likely domains in which policy
changes will be accepted without much conflict.
While Hasenfeld’s typology is centred around the type of organisa-
tion, other authors are more sensitive to differences in individual ‘styles’
of rule application within the same organisational context (Lipsky 1980,
Engbersen 1990, Van der Veen 1990, Knegt 1986). Distinctions are made,
for instance, between ‘gatekeepers’ and ‘advocates’ or between ‘ritual-
ists’ and ‘retraitists’. Yet the individualistic and organisational ap-
proaches are not as opposed as they seem at first sight. After all, a high
degree of (professional) discretion within a certain type of organisation
allows for more individual differences in implementing general rules (cf.
Lipsky 1980, see chapter 4). Implementation processes are therefore seen
here as the outcome of both individual and organisational or contextual
factors (cf. Engbersen 1995). Moreover, on the basis of Hasenfeld’s
typology organisational factors are assumed to result in a dominant type
or style of reaction, without expecting that this will eliminate all individ-
ual differences.
5.4 The introduction of the Linking Act
Encouraging the exclusion of illegal immigrants from public services has
been one of the main policy objectives as recommended by the govern-
mental advisory committee in 1991 (Commissie Zeevalking 1991). Given
the limited use of social provisions by illegal immigrants, this direction
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appears to be dictated not so much by actual use of public services by il-
legal immigrants, but merely by the fear for future developments such as
‘medical shopping’ by asylum seekers.94 In response to the policy recom-
mendations of the advisory board, the national government presented
the Linking Act to Dutch Parliament in 1995. The enactment was post-
poned several times and eventually took place in the summer of 1998.95
The delay was in part caused by controversy. In its original form, it gen-
erated widespread protest coming from doctors, teachers, legal experts,
prominent politicians and representatives of a broad range of public and
(semi-)private organisations. Representatives of local governments also
campaigned against the new law and seemed to steer a course for non-
enforcement. The new law was claimed to be unnecessary, immoral and
unworkable.96
The controversy has resulted in a number of alterations of the law.
One of the major points of discussion was the fear by professionals of be-
ing forced to report illegal immigrants to the Aliens Department. In the
final version of the law, this obligation was dropped. Furthermore, re-
strictions concerning education for children were toned down. The age
limit was raised to 18 instead of 16 and children were allowed to finish an
education if started before the age of 18. In response to the strong con-
cerns voiced by medical practitioners, the law was also eased with regard
to health care provisions. Where initially illegal immigrants would only
be entitled to medical care in ‘acute and threatening situations’, this
phrasing was eventually replaced by the notion of ‘imperative medical
treatment’. The responsibility to draw the line was explicitly endowed to
medical professionals, and the Minister of Health said to rely on the pro-
fessional standards in order to draw the line unequivocally and equally.
Notably, there were scant protests concerning the exclusion from public
housing or income-related rent subsidies. Housing associations were al-
ready familiar with the routine of verifying people’s background in or-
der to see if they were eligible for certain provisions. Coupled with the
fact that access to public housing is not commonly seen as a basic right,
and that barring illegal immigrants from housing does not directly
threaten society as a whole, housing corporations did not make a strong
case for professional autonomy. Eventually, when the sharp edges were
more or less removed from the law, both Houses of Parliament accepted
it in 1998 by a majority of votes. To satisfy all parties, the Ministry of Jus-
tice ensured that the law would be closely assessed and reported on in the
years following its introduction.
Officially, the Linking Act serves two central aims. The first is to pre-
vent the continuation of unlawful residence, the second (and overlap-
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ping) objective is to hamper the build-up of a quasi-legal position. Both
aims emanate from the Aliens Act, which regulates that (a) an individual
who wants to stay in the country must ask permission beforehand and
(b) an individual who is not admitted must leave the country immedi-
ately (Bernini and Engbersen 1999). The major change is that the new
law systematically introduces an applicant’s valid residence status as a
prerequisite for eligibility for public services in the Aliens legislation
(Van der Leun and Botman 1999). The label of ‘Linking Act’97 refers to a
set of 26 amendments in the legislation. The first and most important
change consists of the 1998 amendment to the Aliens Act, which distin-
guishes between five categories of foreigners.98
– Those who are unconditionally admitted to the country.
– Those who are admitted to the country under specific conditions.
– Those who are awaiting a decision following their application for first
admission or an application for prolonged stay.
– Those who are in the country for a short stay, such as tourists.
– Those of whom the expulsion is blocked on grounds established in the
law (for example as a consequence of their state of health).99
Immigrants who do not fall into one of these categories are not consid-
ered to be staying in the country lawfully and consequently cannot claim
public services. By differentiating between five categories of immigrants,
the linking principle can be applied differentially to each type of service
provision.100 For illegal immigrants, the extent of exclusion is most far-
reaching. Still, they are not totally excluded. Three exceptions, which are
partly rooted in supranational agreements and international human
rights discourses (Hollifield 1992, Soysal 1994, Jacobson 1996), can be
made. These exceptions pertain to:
– Imperative medical care.
– Education for people under 18 years of age.
– Publicly financed legal assistance.
Besides the amendment of the Aliens Act, twenty-five other Acts, in
which the eligibility for public services is regulated, were changed. These
laws pertain to four essential domains of the welfare state, i.e. social ben-
efits, health care, housing and education (Van der Leun and Botman
1999). The exact limitations within each domain will be summarised
briefly below.
1. As regards social security benefits, eleven laws have been altered. A
crucial one is the National Assistance Act (ABW) which supplements
the income of people under the social minimum and provides people
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who do not have an income with a so-called welfare benefit (Bij-
stand).101 As regards welfare, the situation for illegal immigrants did
not change significantly, as they were already systematically ex-
cluded. On the other hand, in the debates that preceded the intro-
duction of the Linking Act ample reference was made to the fact that
illegal immigrants would be deprived of their income. It was at least
suggested that the whole ‘linking’ operation would bring to light a
certain degree of unauthorised use of welfare benefits. Welfare de-
partments were obliged to verify the immigration status of all clients.
In contrast to other sectors ‘existing cases’ were not to be spared.
2. As regards health care, three laws have been altered. The amend-
ments mainly pertain to funding of health services. The underlying
principle is that immigrants who reside in the country unlawfully are
responsible for themselves. This also implies that when they receive
medical treatment they will have to pay. Hence, public medical in-
surers (Ziekenfondsen) are obliged to refuse enrolment of individuals
without a valid residence permit. Private insurers, furthermore, are
not obliged to accept illegal immigrants anymore.102 In contrast to a
popular view, the Linking Act does not exclude illegal immigrants
from medical care per se. Treatment should be restricted to what
professionals regard as ‘medically imperative care’. Moreover, health
care workers are not obliged to check a patient’s residence status, but
they do have the duty to verify if the person is insured. In tandem
with enactment of the Linking Act, the Ministry of Public Health,
Welfare and Sports established a fund to which medical professionals
and health centres can apply for a reimbursement of expenses. They
can claim expenses if they can prove that they have provided impera-
tive medical care to illegal immigrants, provided that this places a
substantial burden on their budget. This ‘Linking Fund’ should – in
each city – be administered by ‘regional co-operation networks’ that
consist of representatives of the respective medical occupations. In
1999, the subsidy involved eleven million guilders. Hospitals do not
fall under the sphere of action of this fund and are supposed to write
off the costs under the already existing category of so-called dubious
debtors. This means that a certain percentage of their budget is re-
served for treatments that are normally not covered by insurance.
3. As regards social housing, two laws have been changed. As a result,
only prospective tenants with Dutch nationality or those who are un-
conditionally admitted to the country can be granted a housing-per-
mit and rent public housing. Income-related rent subsidies are only
allocated to foreigners who have applied for prolonged stay or those
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who already received the allowance before the new law. In the politi-
cal deliberations it was acknowledged that this does not imply that il-
legal immigrants are excluded from any housing. The exclusion
solely pertains to municipalities that have established a Housing Or-
dinance (Huisvestingsverordening) and within these municipalities
only to a part of the housing stock (under a certain level of the rent or
in the case of owned housing, the market price). Nonetheless, the
Linking Act was also applied in this sector in order to encourage a
just distribution of the scarce commodity of housing and relevant
subsidies. In addition, the Explanatory Memorandum or Memorie
van Toelichting makes mention of the fact that under the Criminal
Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht) it is forbidden to help supposedly ille-
gal immigrants out of pursuit of profit (Vos 1998: 34). Notably, in the
domain of housing, the Linking Act is only applicable to future ten-
ants. Housing corporations are not obliged to take measures against
illegal immigrants who are already residing in their property.
4. Regarding education, five laws have been amended. For minors and
students up to eighteen years of age the situation remains more or
less unchanged. They are still allowed to follow an education and
schools do not have to verify their residence status. The legal status of
new students over eighteen years has to be checked. Students who
pass the age of eighteen while following an education are allowed to
complete the education or training. The Linking Act explicitly states
that following a course or being registered as a student cannot result
in the right to stay in the country.
5.5 Practices prior to the Linking Act
While the Linking Act was still under construction and its adoption was
yet undecided, thirty preliminary interviews were held in order to gain
some provisional insight into the affinity of human service workers with
control-oriented tasks. The interviews primarily focused on the extent
of discretionary autonomy before the new legislation and the experi-
ences of organisations with illegal immigrants (Van der Leun 1998,
Engbersen et al. 1999: 88-120). Most of the people interviewed encoun-
tered illegal immigrants in practice, although on a relatively small scale.103
The interviews first and foremost indicate that the professionals and
semi-professionals had strong discretionary autonomy with regard to
checking a person’s residence status. This could be ascribed (a) to the
fact that most respondents were not aware that they had to be concerned
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with migration issues and (b) to the fact that the organisations did not
formulate any concrete guidelines or policies in this respect. A person’s
residence status turned out to be irrelevant to most professionals. Re-
spondents did not feel the urge to ask for papers or documents, and
emphasised that they did not want to act as police officers. A co-
ordinator of (publicly subsidised) adult language courses is very
straightforward about his degree of freedom in this respect:
I never distinguish between legal and illegal resident, or between Turkish
and Moroccan. These are all people who live in Rotterdam and therefore
they have the opportunity to follow lessons in our institute. This is a
purely personal standpoint. The organisations in this city do not have a
policy in this respect, it is more or less ignored. (inf. R4)
Similar accounts are found in other sectors. An eligibility worker who
works for a housing corporation, for example, was not aware of the need
to verify residence status of applicants:
I just looked it up in the current statute and it says we have to verify the
residence status when someone registers or when we grant permission
for a housing allowance. But we never do. (inf. U4)
Other respondents highlight the fact that checking residence permits is a
complex and specialised task, which they are not able to accomplish.
Some maintain that they are not even allowed to check residence sta-
tuses:
According to the Privacy Act, it is not permitted to check passports. We
are not a law-enforcement agency. (inf. R8)
Summarising, respondents either do not know or do not want to know
whether people are legal residents or not. Professional and personal ide-
ologies influence the decisions that these respondents make with regard
to their clients, and apparently the organisations they work for grant
them this discretion. Having discretionary powers, however, can lead to
active inclusion, active exclusion and everything in between. Many re-
spondents choose to support rather than to exclude clients, even when
they suspect that they might be residing in the country without the for-
mal permission to do so. Legitimising their leniency, many respondents
referred explicitly to their professional morale and to the fact that they
are ‘not policemen’.
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A second observation is that workers in each sector have their own
interests in this respect. For health care workers, insurance issues pre-
vail, people working for housing corporations want to let their dwelling
to ‘good tenants’, and for schools the age and/or motivations of students
are crucial. In other words: labelling someone as legal or illegal – a typi-
cal people processing task – is usually seen as secondary to questions that
are relevant to people changing and people sustaining. One of the respon-
dents who works for a housing corporation maintains that there are ad-
vantages in having illegal immigrants as tenants:104
They do not want to attract attention. So they adjust themselves quickly,
even as regards cultural customs. ( . . . ) They cause less trouble. The real
illegal immigrants who find a job and pay the rent, we do not notice
them. They are ideal citizens. (inf. R8)
Corporations that do not let housing to illegal immigrants do acknowl-
edge the fact that illegal immigrants can easily move in with legally ad-
mitted family members. Yet, as long as the inhabitants do not cause any
trouble, they feel it is none of their business:
I work for a housing corporation and I am aware of the fact that certain
people sub-rent. But they pay their rent and they do not cause trouble.
These people can stay, as far as I am concerned. If it is a decent family,
the children go to school and the man has got a job, why should we?
Maybe it is not right, but this is the way I think. (inf. A7)
Normally, housing associations only intervene when tenants cause seri-
ous trouble or inconvenience. And according to the respondents this
happens regardless of the residence status of the persons involved.
Health care workers want to provide care to people who need their help.
Again, the question of whether a client is a legal resident is of less impor-
tance, as is reflected in the words of a General Practitioner in Utrecht:
They arrive here when they are ill. Most of the institutes are organised in
such a manner that they primarily give priority to a request for help.
They [illegal immigrants] will always be treated. ( . . . ) Health care wor-
kers are there to treat people and not to see whether they are residing
legally in the country. That would exceed our profession and I do not
think you would get someone as far as to do so. (inf. U11)
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For all practical purposes, health care workers translate the question of
legality into a matter of insurance. If a patient is insured, most respon-
dents do not feel the need to ask any more questions:
There are also illegal immigrants who are in the possession of a medical
insurance. In that case, we do not see any problem. (inf. A3)
In the domain of education, age is the crucial criterion. If a student is un-
der 18 years of age, he or she is allowed to attend a school regardless of the
residence status. In practice, primary schools do not verify the residence
status of their students or of the parents, as the headmaster of a primary
school in Utrecht explains:
We do not ask for a residence status of the parents when they register
their child, but we do inquire after their nationality. We cannot deduce
the illegal status from the information provided by the parents. ( . . . ) It
is my responsibility that parents register their child. And as headmaster I
represent the interest of the child. I do not have to know if the child is
legally in the country. (inf. U8)
This lenient attitude is not confined to primary schools. Organisations
that provide language courses to adults do not seem to bother about the
residence status of their students either, as reflected in the words of a
staff member:
When someone turns to us for a course, we first have an interview and
ask them to bring their passport. When they refuse to bring it, we suspect
that they are illegal immigrants. Yet, we do nothing with this informa-
tion. We simply register them and do not report the fact that they are
illegal. (inf. U7)
These practices do not imply that helping illegal immigrants always goes
without problems. In some instances, professionals and semi-profes-
sionals face concrete dilemmas. For example, when an illegal patient
without valid medical insurance has to be referred to a specialist, or if a
child reaches the age of 18 and wants to continue schooling, they run into
a new set of constraints. The interviews demonstrate that in instances
like these, respondents often use informal strategies to extend the sup-
port for the immigrants in question. They often mobilise their personal
network. A family doctor gives the following example:
130
I know some people in hospitals. I can call them and say: ‘this child really
needs help, so and so is the matter and the child is not insured’. And
commonly you have an acquaintance you studied with or you have some
idea about who is willing to help without being paid. That is the way it is
dealt with in practice. (inf. A3)
When respondents know that they are dealing with an illegal client, they
often have their informal strategies to settle the matter. In most in-
stances, it concerns small numbers of illegal clients. The general impres-
sion is that illegal immigrants are very reserved when it comes to asking
for help. The willingness of ‘gatekeepers’ to help, furthermore, is likely
to be greater when people have built up personal ties with the immi-
grants in question. In this respect, a dual selection process appears to
take place. First, illegal immigrants turn to organisations or individual
professionals they trust. And secondly, if they are treated well, other ille-
gal immigrants are more likely to turn to the same organisations or pro-
fessionals. As a consequence, illegal children are concentrated in specific
schools and some doctors treat significantly more illegal patients than
others (cf. Burgers and Ten Dam 1999). The interviews suggest that these
processes of specialisation take place in other organisations as well. As
regards foreseeable implications of the pending Linking Act, most re-
spondents were relatively acquiescent. A respondent who works for a
housing corporation, reacts rather light-heartedly:
I expect close to nothing. What is illegal now, will still be illegal. And at a
certain point in time, you can link all kinds of computerised systems, but
I am sure ways will be found to deal with that. (inf. R8)
Most respondents shared this view. They relied heavily on their discre-
tionary autonomy and on their informal strategies to get around the
rules. The debates that surrounded the formulation of the Linking Act
may also have encouraged this idea, as many officials openly gave their
opinion about the impracticability and unfeasibility of the law and its in-
compatibility with their professional ethics. The situation under the
‘new regime’ will be discussed in the next section.
5.6 After the Linking Act: old and new dilemmas
The Linking Act came into force on the first of July 1998. Shortly after,
press reports about victims of the new legislation began to appear.105 Early
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reports on the consequences were mixed, however. For example, men-
tion was made of the fact that some municipalities – like Leiden and
Nijmegen – ignored the law and supported the immigrants in question
with their own resources.106 In order to study these issues more systemati-
cally, a follow-up study was conducted (Van der Leun and Botman
1999). Sixty people working in the relevant sectors were interviewed be-
tween several months and one year after enactment of the Linking Act
(see appendix 4). This time, the provision of social benefits was also in-
cluded. At first sight, the interviews after the enactment of the new law
are a bit of an anticlimax. Over half of the respondents were not, or only
vaguely, aware of the law’s contents. In particular, teachers in primary
schools often had no clue about the exact regulations. A school teacher
and headmaster in Rotterdam is not surprised by this observation:
There are more important things. Besides, the government never infor-
med me either. (Educ./R/36)
Other respondents confused the Linking Act with privacy regulations,
or with rules regarding the exchange of data in general, or they only had
some vague notions as to what the law amounted to. This lack of knowl-
edge can be attributed to a lack of interest by the respondents, but also to
a lack of information provided. Most respondents were not notified or
only sparsely informed by the relevant Ministries.107 Moreover, they com-
plained that they did not get satisfactory answers to the questions that
arose during the preparations for implementing the law, when they ap-
proached the Ministries or the Aliens departments. In general, the infor-
mation provided by the authorities was seen as unsatisfactory. An eligi-
bility worker who works for a housing corporation in The Hague and
who put a lot of effort in finding out details of the Linking Act some-
times even regrets the fact that she did:
We were ready when the Linking Act came into force. Sometimes I think
we had better not. We know too much, we check everything and it causes
us nothing but problems. (Housing/H/8)
Enforcement practices and processes of implementation, however, do
not exclusively depend on knowledge of the contents of the law. In prin-
ciple, it is also possible that professionals or semi-professionals have ef-
fected changes without being aware of the exact rules, or because there
are no major practical consequences. More important questions are
therefore whether and how the ‘rules of the game’ with respect to illegal
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immigrants have changed after the Linking Act came into effect. Below,
this will be studied for the four sectors successively.
Social benefits. Workers in the domain of social benefits were already fa-
miliar with the exclusion of illegal immigrants before the new law
(Clermonts et al. 1991). This is underscored by respondents who work
for the welfare departments in the four large cities:
Since 1990, the social welfare departments always have to check the
status of an immigrant before they proceed with granting a benefit.
Accordingly, a benefit for someone who is in all respects illegally in the
country was an exception, even before 1998. (Welfare/A/59)
Nonetheless, when the law was passed, all welfare departments were
obliged to check their files in order to withdraw clients who were no lon-
ger eligible. Their discretionary autonomy was limited:
The only thing we could do was cause some delay in the processing of
existing cases, but new applicants had to be checked from the start.
(Welfare/A/59)
The lack of a transitional arrangement for formerly lawful recipients was
generally seen as unjust. Representatives of the four welfare departments
wrote a letter of protest to the Parliament, which only resulted in a ‘tran-
sition period’. Eventually, all four departments completed the ‘filtering’
of clients during the first year. Drawing on the interviews with respon-
dents in the departments in the four largest cities, it can be estimated
that in the end 400 to 500 welfare benefits were cancelled in the four cit-
ies together during this first year.108 The immigrants concerned were
mostly involved in procedures concerning their residence status. It must
be noted that the majority of these applicants or former recipients were
(or would have been) entitled to welfare under the old regime. Less is
known about the impact of the Linking Act on social security provisions
such as disability pensions, sickness benefits, child allowances etc. The
National Institute for Social Insurance (LISV)109 reported 441 cases of ex-
clusion in 1999, which would make up about 0.3 per cent of the cases that
were checked. The Social Insurance Bank (SVB)110 reported 1,997 cases of
exclusions, mostly pertaining to child allowances.111
It is largely unknown how the people who are affected by this opera-
tion make a livelihood after their refusal. According to our respondents,
there are no indications that they have left the country and they are most
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likely to be looked after by family members, acquaintances or by charity.
The most tangible problems have arisen for the group of ‘white illegals’.
A psychiatrist who sees some of them is shocked by the consequences:
The Linking Act is the final blow, the definitive cut-off. I see families
( . . . ) with children who are socialised here, whose parents have been
working, who have no source of income whatsoever anymore. Where
tuition fees for school cannot be covered anymore, where there is no
bread on the table. (Health/A/30)
The general impression is that private organisations support part of this
population. In this sense, ‘shifting down’ also leads to privatisation or
‘shifting out’ of responsibilities. Yet it is obvious that (semi-)public bod-
ies also take measures. The municipality of Leiden, for example, at-
tracted attention when the city council decided to pay twenty-five bene-
fits out of its own budget.112 A local politician explains the background of
this remarkable decision as follows:
Under the Linking Act, two legislative systems collide. On the one hand
the restrictive admission policy of the national government and on the
other hand the municipal duty to take care of the inhabitants of the city.
( . . . ) We prefer that all the people who reside in Leiden can make use of
the available provisions, to prevent ending up in a situation that terrible
things happen to these people. Or that annoying situations will develop
in society. Diseases are of course the most obvious and easy examples,
but you can also see it in terms of criminality. (Politics/L/3)
The larger cities were somewhat more silent about their solutions, but
they have also established funds for ‘poignant cases’ and they also refer
to the incompatibility between their municipal duties and the national
policy. Local funds and networks can be seen as ‘bypasses’ (Etman and
Korpel 1999) which aim at reducing pressure on the wider society. It is
not surprising that these provisions originate at the local level, where the
ambiguities and limits of the legislation come directly to the surface. The
funds are mostly privatised or semi-privatised. Yet in many cases they
are at least partly and often indirectly subsidised by local authorities. In a
sense they comprise an alternative safety net for the extremely vulnera-
ble who cannot claim formal rights. According to a respondent who
works for a welfare department, this is one of the reasons that the natio-
nal government tolerates and, according to him, secretly favours these
bypasses:
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The government is tied to the principle of equal treatment ( . . . ) Whe-
reas private organisations can simply say: we support you, but we do not
support you. (Welfare/H/23)
Besides these bypasses, there have also been attempts to tone down the
impact of the law by judicial means. Not long after its enactment, sec-
tions of the law were challenged before court, and this case law has re-
sulted in some ‘repairs’ to the law (Minderhoud 2000). In October 1998,
for example, the Court in The Hague ruled that the Linking Act was
partly in contradiction with the European Treaty for Social and Medical
Assistance, which pertains to immigrants who are awaiting a final deci-
sion of the authorities. In practice, this meant that some of the decisions
had to be reversed (Pennings 1999).113 On the one hand, this was appreci-
ated by respondents, who felt it demonstrated the Act’s harshness. On
the other hand, it also reinforced doubts about the law’s legitimacy. As
legal procedures have not yet ended, it is still very much an open-ended
question to what extent other sections of the Linking Act will stand firm
in the long run. Yet, the finding that illegal immigrants hardly claim so-
cial benefits was confirmed, despite different prognoses. One respon-
dent in The Hague recalls:
With regard to welfare benefits, everybody thought it would pertain to
thousands of people. Actually, there are relatively few. ( . . . ) That has
been one of the main problems of the legislator of course, who could not
foresee how many people it would concern. (Welfare/H/23)
It must be noted that this was the only domain where the linking princi-
ple already applied before 1998. Although the consequences are very
harsh for some people, they mainly affect a small category of illegal im-
migrants who had obtained a quasi-legal position and who received so-
cial provisions. Keeping this in mind, it is not surprising that the domi-
nant attitude in the domain of social benefits is legalistic, and that the
‘rules of the game’ with respect to illegal immigrants have not under-
gone significant changes under the new law.
Health care. The Linking Act has widely caught the attention of profes-
sionals and semi-professionals in the domain of health care. This is also
reflected in the interviews. Seventeen out of twenty-four respondents
mention concrete dilemmas in their day-to-day work, which they asso-
ciate with the enactment.114 These dilemmas are related to issues of the
well-being of people and sometimes even to life and death issues. More-
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over, fifteen out of twenty-four respondents were acquainted with the
contents of the new law in great detail.
The central dilemma in the sphere of health care can be summarised
as ‘funding versus professional duty’.115 When a person is either insured or
able to pay, most respondents do not see a problem. Some illegal pa-
tients pay in cash, in some cases even for expensive operations. They are
often supported by family members, co-nationals or charity. Many hos-
pitals, furthermore, try to make financial arrangements with uninsured
patients. However, when illegal patients are not able to bear the costs of
their treatment, health care workers have to draw a line regarding care
that should be provided. The starting-point of the Linking Act is that no
one should be denied essential care. At the same time, it implies in prin-
ciple that non-imperative care should not be provided unless it is paid
for. Most respondents claim that it is inherently impossible to draw a
line between imperative and non-imperative care. A psychiatrist in Rot-
terdam also opposes the idea that imperative care should always pertain
to physical problems:
There is not a single doctor who can determine what imperative medical
care encompasses. When someone nearly dies? When there is a fifty per
cent chance that he will pass away? ( . . . ) Everything that can be treated
and could otherwise harm a person’s health is imperative. (Health/R/5)
For most respondents, the duty to help prevails. They show little interest
in whether a person is in the country legally or illegally:
We think it is not possible to ask health care workers to check whether
people are illegal immigrants or not. We think that regardless of resi-
dence status everybody should be helped. And afterwards this should be
paid, but that is really only the matter afterwards. We do not want situa-
tions like in the US where the emergency department asks for your
documents and when you do not have them, you can leave.
(Health/U/33)
Giving more or less ‘informal’ help – often for free – is not so problem-
atic as long as it is restricted to relatively plain treatment or care. Many
respondents, furthermore, have their ways of obtaining cheap medi-
cines. They use the free samples that they receive from the pharmaceuti-
cal industry or make a deal with the local pharmacy. In some instances
they turn a blind eye on the use of other people’s documents.116 However,
when a patient needs more specialised care or treatment, he is depend-
136
ent on the co-operation of specialists and hospitals. It is in these in-
stances that it becomes clear that the help a person gets depends on indi-
viduals and individual organisations.
One of the most puzzling outcomes of the interviews in the sphere of
health care, following the introduction of the new law, is the divergence
of respondents’ accounts. According to some respondents illegal immi-
grants get all the treatment they need, while others refer to tragic cases
when people are sent off when they were clearly in need of help. Accord-
ing to some respondents, everything runs smoothly, while others are
plagued by dilemmas and troubles in their day-to-day work and com-
plain about a lack of clarity and guidelines. The variation first points to
large discretionary autonomy. Both organisations and individuals
within these organisations have considerable room to manoeuvre. The
flip side of this discretion is an inherent arbitrariness. It sometimes de-
pends on an individual if a person is helped or sent off. A second obser-
vation this variation points to, is the uneven distribution of pressure on
organisations. Some hospitals and some professionals appear to bear the
brunt, because they feel obliged to help illegal immigrants. It may also be
the case that they are confronted with illegal immigrants more than oth-
ers due to their location or their specific tasks. A respondent who works
in a social welfare institution gives an example of how the organisation
gets ‘saddled’ with illegal immigrants and subsequently with unpaid
bills:
A man was brought in here literally with gunshot wounds. The police
attempted to expel him and something went wrong, so they brought him
back. They brought him to the health service and they brought him to
us. And we were saddled with him for a full year. We could pay for eve-
rything ourselves. And there are more organisations who have to deal
with these situations. (Health/R/10)
According to some respondents this leads to ‘pushing and shoving’ of il-
legal and sometimes uninsured patients. A social worker in a large hos-
pital mentions the problem with illegally residing AIDS patients in this
respect:
The therapy is terribly expensive. The treatment costs I 13,700 to 18,200.
And there is not a single organisation that says: we will handle the case.
(Health/A/41)
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Problems like these mainly arise in the case of patients who need com-
plex treatment. The most persistent problems occur when illegal immi-
grants are chronically ill or in need of expensive care. In particular, when
patients have to be referred to other institutions it may be problematic to
have them accepted. Some respondents spend hours or days on the
phone in order to arrange the admittance of an illegal patient to another
hospital or clinic. This requires careful negotiations about who covers
the costs for medication etc. Although they often find a solution, they do
not always succeed:
Right now I am making phone calls for a man. A Dutch man returned
from Brazil. He brought a friend with him, who is HIV-infected and
needs medication. And if I do not succeed quickly, he will die. And he is
not the only one. (Health/R/10)
Respondents give several examples of cases in which they cannot help.
At the same time, it is obvious that the most well organised ‘bypasses’ are
to be found in the domain of health care. The national government sub-
sidises regional networks where health care workers can charge their
declarations with the ‘Linking Fund’.117 These networks are private organi-
sations with a voluntary board. In fact, they are mostly based on infor-
mal ties between people who were involved in the support of illegal im-
migrants before the new law. Although many professionals complain
about the amount of red tape, the Linking Act has paradoxically resulted
in an amelioration of the situation regarding health care for illegal im-
migrants. Although these networks bring more clarity, there remains a
certain ambiguity in these arrangements. One respondent refers to the
contradiction:
On the one hand the government develops a policy, on the other hand
they subsidise illegality. Subsequently, they put an organisation in the
middle which more or less has to straighten things out. Everybody who
observes it knows there is something strange about it. But from a
humane and societal point of view, I think it is right that they create pro-
visions for these kinds of situations. (Health/H/1)
In many respects, the situation in health care after the Linking Act does
not appear to differ fundamentally from the situation before its enact-
ment. Two notes have to be made in this respect. First, according to sev-
eral respondents, the number of uninsured people is on the rise118:
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Before the Linking Act came into force, many illegal immigrants were
insured through all kinds of secret paths. And obviously, this is not pos-
sible anymore to the same extent. So the problem is on the rise that
people who need help simply cannot pay for it. That certainly is a
change. Before, the patient could send the bill to the insurance company
and nobody was hampered by a section of the Linking Act. So the indi-
rect effect of the Linking Act is that the situation becomes more difficult
because people cannot be insured anymore. (Health/H/1)
Secondly, again according to several respondents, the Linking Act has an
indirect effect on illegal immigrants. The fuss that surrounded the new
law and the suggestion of computerised files that are all linked together,
fuel fears among illegal immigrants. Although this may have been the
aim, it can have unintended consequences when this fear leads to further
avoidance of seeking help:
Illegal immigrants are extremely scared of filling in forms. In the
Netherlands we all know that doctors are bound by professional secrecy.
A doctor will never call the police when it comes to light that a person is
illegal. But illegal immigrants think that is exactly what will happen.
( . . . ) This means that people wait far too long because they are scared,
which is absolutely visible in the case of AIDS and HIV. (Health/A/41)
Obviously, this may have far-reaching consequences. Health care work-
ers who work for public health services point to the danger of HIV/AIDS
or tuberculosis outbreaks. Others point out the dangers for illegal immi-
grants who are in need of acute care. A teacher in Amsterdam refers to a
35-year old man who died because he did not dare to go to the hospital.
Other respondents refer to illegal mothers who are afraid to register the
birth of their children. Midwives often attempt to register the babies for
them, but sometimes the fear of being apprehended is so strong that this
is not done:
Non-registered babies are a pressing problem for our society. We are
creating problems and we are planting a sort of a time-bomb. (Health/
R/10)
According to some respondents, the confusion that surrounded en-
forcement of the law, has also influenced health care professionals nega-
tively:
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The linking Act has created a sort of smear campaign. ( . . . ) A mental
brainwash. Even doctors think that way. Someone is illegal, so there is
something wrong with helping him. But this is complete nonsense.
Every doctor has the duty to help anybody who turns to him. We took an
oath to that. (Health/L/2)
In reaction to the first indications of these consequences of the Linking
Act, the Minister of Health underlined in February 2000 that illegal im-
migrants are not to be refused by hospitals or health care workers.119 This
time, it was the Minister who tried to convince health care professionals
of the need to interpret the notion of ‘imperative medical care’ broadly.120
The ambivalence of the formal policy could not be better illustrated.
Summarising the findings regarding health care, the dominant attitude
is either pragmatic or moral-ethical, depending on respondents’ view on
informal strategies. Legalistic attitudes are an exception. A high level of
discretionary autonomy does go together with individual differences, as
health care workers are able to make a strong appeal for their profes-
sional autonomy. The extent of actual exclusion of illegal immigrants
appears therefore to be limited. However, a combination of fear on the
part of immigrants, some confusion on the part of health care workers
regarding the exact consequences of the law, and an uneven spreading of
the burden, does appear to constitute a risk. Across the board, the prac-
tice in health care is still very much one of muddling through. Locally,
the situation has sometimes even been ameliorated as a consequence of
the establishment of regional co-operation networks, which is a para-
doxical outcome of the new law.
Housing. The third sphere the Linking Act has bearing on is housing.
Notwithstanding a marked rise in private housing, the public housing
sector in the Netherlands is still extensive, particularly in the main cities.
Moreover, immigrants are often minimum-choice actors on the hous-
ing market and therefore depend either on public housing or on the
lower ranks of the private market. In recent years immigrants on average
move away from less-regulated private accommodation to better-qual-
ity social housing. Around 85 per cent of the legally admitted Turkish
and Moroccan immigrants, for example, is dependent on social hous-
ing, while 35 per cent receives a means-tested rent subsidy or housing al-
lowance (SCP 1998: 193, 195). The public housing sector is densely regu-
lated. Responsibility for the housing allocation in the main cities is to a
large extent decentralised to (semi-)private housing corporations. New
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applicants have to show several formal documents in order to prove
their identity, income and composition of the family. Under the Linking
Act housing associations are now explicitly required to check a prospec-
tive tenant’s residence status as well.
The interviews held after the Linking Act show how intake proce-
dures of corporations have actually been tightened up during the first
year under the Linking Act, despite the fact that this was not expected
beforehand. An eligibility worker who works for the same corporation
in Amsterdam that I visited in 1997 – while her former colleague was
convinced they would never check people’s residence documents – now
says that prospective tenants are told from the start that they need a valid
residence permit:
If prospective tenants come to the counter or contact the information
number, we already have a conversation about the criteria for enrol-
ment. One of the things that they need to show is a residence document.
Apparently, that is just the reason that many people never show up at
their first appointment. (Housing/A/22)
Although with some delay, many corporations appear to have switched
to procedures which involve a check of residence status. As a standard
procedure, they ask tenants for their documents. Subsequently, the in-
formation is sent to the municipal population register. When eligibility
workers have doubts about the reliability of the documents or the rights
attached, they sometimes contact the Aliens police to verify a document
or to inquire after the status of an individual. A public officer from the
Municipality of The Hague confirms that checks have been intensified
after the new law:
It has always been the case that they had to be in the country legally, but
it was not something we used to pay attention to. That has changed now.
(Housing/H/12)
Most of the respondents do not object to the tightening of intake proce-
dures in this respect. They point to the fact that a scarce good such as
public housing should not be allocated to people without a valid resi-
dence status. And now that they have the means to decide who is eligible
and who is not, it turns out to be not that difficult:
For us, the guidelines are much clearer now. In the past, it may have hap-
pened that we allocated housing to people who did not have the proper
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residence status. But since last year this has not happened anymore.
(Housing/H/6)
In line with the assumptions, the dominant attitude among eligibility
workers is legalistic. Seven out of ten respondents have detailed knowl-
edge about the Linking Act, and a majority of the respondents stress that
their discretion is limited and that they act according to the rules. Most
corporations have formulated formal guidelines on how to perform the
necessary checks and the policy changes seem to have overruled the dis-
cretionary freedom in this respect. At the same time, none of the respon-
dents is convinced that other corporations within their city also conduct
the necessary checks. Four claim to know this is not the case, while six
have their doubts. It is impossible to assess to what extent all the corpo-
rations abide by the Linking Act and it is probable that there are still ex-
ceptions. However, the rule seems to be that the residence status of pro-
spective tenants is checked beforehand.
Focusing more closely on implementation practices, it becomes clear
that the legalistic attitude that most respondents display is relatively su-
perficial. It does not have many consequences in practice, which implies
that they have to reject only a few prospective tenants:
It rarely happens, but last week it coincidentally happened to me three
times. These people had F-documents121 so we cannot grant them housing.
It is very hard to explain, though. They often have stable jobs and can
show work contracts. But without the proper status: no housing, no rent
subsidy. (Housing/H/6)
The above-mentioned refers to people with F-documents, who have
limited housing rights, but are residing legally. Corporations are also ap-
proached by illegal immigrants. Most of the time this does not concern
illegal immigrants who apply for independent housing, but rather fami-
lies in which the line of legality is drawn somewhere between family
members. A close inspection of the waiting list for public housing in
Amsterdam revealed that twenty per cent of the families included one or
more members without proper status122 (Housing/A/26,25). In practice,
this may mean that corporations are confronted with a family of six that
applies for housing, while only four family members are in the country
legally. Now that the residence status of future tenants has to be checked,
the illegal family members are left out of the evaluation when deciding
on the suitable size of accommodation. Respondents claim that in prac-
tice they are rarely sent off. What happens instead, is that (for example)
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accommodation is rented out to four people, while in practice six people
move in. This method is not considered illegitimate by our respondents.
They usually do not see it as their responsibility to check how many peo-
ple actually move in. It would be difficult to verify and they think it is ir-
relevant as long as the inhabitants are not expected to cause problems or
complaints:
We have 16,000 units to let, we cannot constantly check if the tenants are
still the ones who are residing there. As long as we receive the rent. ( . . . )
In my opinion, you cannot expect a corporation to check this. We have
become too large and it would be too complex. Furthermore, we are not
allowed to enter a house without reason to do so. (Housing/H/8)
The effect of these practices is that the Linking Act encourages rather
than curbs overcrowded housing. Some respondents acknowledge this
unintended consequence:
What we create indirectly, is that people are becoming more strategic in
dealing with the situation. ( . . . ) They figure out better who they register
as moving in with them. That is how you get sub-renting practices.
(Housing/H/7)
On the other hand, they have their own considerations:
I work for a housing corporation. I am here to let housing. Not to reject
people all the time. (Housing/H/9)
In this respect, some have the impression that the relatively easy accep-
tance of the Linking Act has more to do with the fact that there is a short-
age of available housing. Housing corporations simply do not need extra
clients. According to them, this might alter in the near future when a
surplus of less-attractive housing in the large cities might emerge as a
consequence of large-scale housing development. They also justify their
leniency as to ‘overcrowding’ or ‘sub-renting’, remarking that in other
regions of the country and in more expensive segments of the housing
market, regulations do not apply:
Moreover, the Linking Act does not apply to municipalities with a libe-
ralised housing regime, so we can ask ourselves if we have to be more
catholic than the pope. (Housing/H/12)
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Most respondents feel it is the national government that avoids harsh
measures by refusing to expel people from the country. They feel it is not
their task to make up for this lack of action.
The assumption that a relatively low level of professionalisation in
the housing sector coincides with limited discretionary autonomy and a
high acceptance of the Linking Act, is largely supported empirically.
However, the legalistic attitude most respondents display can be partly
explained by the fact that housing corporations are not obliged to check
the residence status of tenants who have moved into their house before
the Linking Act. Many eligibility workers stress that they do not mind
doing a more detailed check on future tenants but they would refuse to
evict people. It would interfere with their professional standards. This is
illustrated in the case of urban renewal programs. The standard proce-
dure with these programs is that tenants who live in the targeted neigh-
bourhoods are obliged to move out of their accommodation and are of-
fered alternative accommodation. In some cases, reported in all the
cities, the tenants turn out to be residing in the country illegally. This
presents a dilemma to eligibility workers. On one hand, they feel they
should grant alternative housing, on the other hand this possibility is
blocked by the Linking Act. In practice, nobody is prepared to deprive
people of housing:
Put very frankly, I flatly refuse to throw a family out on the streets. They
do not possess the papers they should, but if we had not demolished
these houses, nobody would have done anything. Not a single body
would have asked them about their documents. Nobody is taking any
responsibility for such a citizen, or rather, former citizen. (Housing/
H/7)
So far, these cases are solved informally by silently granting such immi-
grants temporary accommodation. According to the eligibility workers,
this is emblematic of the formal policy toward illegal immigrants. In
their opinion, concrete dilemmas are ignored by the authorities as long
as possible. A municipal housing officer carefully defends the fact that
decisions are not taken.123
If they [corporations, JvdL] let these people profit from the renovation
by offering them replacing accommodation there is a conflict with the
Linking Act. But maybe they just did not ask. Or maybe they did not
want to know. The question is how actively – as local government – you
want corporations to check these things. You can have an immense dis-
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cussion about, let us say, these two cases in The Hague, but do you want
to put all the energy into it? (Housing/R/24)
In sum, the dominant attitude as to social housing can be described as le-
galistic. Corporations often act according to the letter of the law and ex-
clude prospective tenants.124 This has meant a relatively abrupt change of
the prevailing rules of the game. At the same time, the legalistic attitude
is only skin deep. Respondents are not interested in sub-renting prac-
tices and are aware of the fact that they let housing to more people than
they formally should and that there are illegal immigrants among these
non-official tenants. As long as the official tenants pay their rent and do
not cause complaints, they do not feel obliged to ask any questions. The
Linking Act does not interfere with these ‘smart rules’. With the excep-
tion of sending away new applicants, nobody is forced to make unpopu-
lar decisions, and the parties involved all seem to be relatively satisfied.
The only matter of principle appears in case of urban renewal programs.
When illegal immigrants have to be allocated alternative accommoda-
tion this is usually arranged informally and inconspicuously, which by
some respondents is seen as symbolic of the ambiguous policy.
Education. The fourth sphere the Linking Act encompasses is education.
There is a difference between the position of illegal immigrants of eigh-
teen years and younger and of those over eighteen years of age who want
to begin an education. The Linking Act does not bar illegal children
from primary or secondary school.125 They are still allowed to attend
school and to commence an education until they are eighteen or until
they finish the education they have begun.126 Illegal adults, however, are
not entitled to public education of any form.
Regarding the position of minors, the Linking Act does not appear to
have any consequences for them, their parents or the schools they at-
tend. Although half of the respondents working in education claim to
know only vaguely what the Linking Act includes, most of them are rela-
tively satisfied with the outcomes of the debates that surrounded its in-
troduction. The most important thing from their professional point of
view, is that children will not be refused schooling. In practice, many
teachers and headmasters of primary schools do not know (or do not
want to know) which children lack legal residence status. Moreover,
even if they are aware of a child’s illegal status, this has no direct conse-
quences. Some headmasters have also made agreements in this respect
on the municipal level:
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We have agreed not to block access to our schools when children are ille-
gal. But that was the same before the Linking Act. (Educ./H/15)
Agreements like these are made in order to ensure that all schools follow
the same line of action.127 In this respect the Linking Act has not led to a
drastic change in practices. However, the interviews also show concrete
dilemmas and bottlenecks, which play a role in the day-to-day practice
of teachers and headmasters. The first is the fear that illegal children are
now identifiable in the (central) registration of pupils, because they do
not have a social-fiscal number. Although teachers and directors have
been reassured time and again that the information will not be used
against children or their parents, it makes them uneasy. A teacher who
feels heavily involved in the issue is convinced that illegal children can be
identified:
What I understand from the Central Pupil Administration, is that they
attach a special code now. The school asks the parents if they are illegal
residents and the administration recognises it as a special code. This
implies there is a check, although it is not lawful according to section 1b
of the Act. So there is some ambivalence in primary education.
(Educ./A/4)
The second point some schools are confronted with is that they do not
get any extra funding for illegal children.128
The point is the government cannot withhold education from illegal
children. However, they can say: ‘We are sorry, they are not entitled to
additional provisions.’ And that causes a lot of trouble. (Educ./A/45)
The third point is that the number of uninsured children is on the rise:
Another problem we run into, is when something happens to a child at
school, and we need a doctor. Well, that is simply not possible. These
children are not insured: no health service, no family doctor.
(Educ./A/45)
Most of the respondents identify these problems. Yet, they also make
clear that they have their formal or less formal ways of solving these is-
sues. Whereas most respondents in primary education show a rather re-
signed mood regarding these problems of a more practical nature, they
insist that children, regardless of legal status, should get their education.
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Some respondents are involved in informal networks that try to keep
track of illegal children and make sure they attend school. While it ap-
pears to have been prevented in most cases, some parents have removed
their children from school out of fear. As in the case of health care, the
fear of detection appears to dissuade some parents from sending their
children to school (cf. Morelli and Braat 1999).
For illegal immigrants who have passed the age of 18, the situation is dif-
ferent. They are allowed to finish the education they started but they
cannot begin a new one. In secondary education, the institutes do not
appear to be regularly confronted with large numbers of illegal immi-
grants. In most cases they have begun checking papers of new pupils,
which is seen by many professionals mainly as extra work. Some schools
take a lenient stance:
It happened to me recently that I was asked by a father: Do you also
accept illegal children? And I said: What is an illegal child? So, the man
understood the answer was yes. (Educ./A/49)
Respondents who work in secondary education mention two specific
problems when they have illegal immigrants among their students. The
first is that students who do not have a social-fiscal number cannot apply
for an apprenticeship.
When they have to do a work placement, they have to give notice of their
social-fiscal number. ( . . . ) And if they cannot give one, they are refused.
(Educ./A/50)
In these instances, teachers look for informal solutions such as offering
an internal apprenticeship or turning to employers whom they know
personally. A second problem is that parents cannot always cover the
high costs for books and school supplies. In some cases, private funds
pay the costs, in other children leave school. A principal in The Hague
has seen several examples of this:
So they start to look for a job. And we are in the lucky circumstances that
it is not too difficult to find illegal work in the greenhouses in the
neighbourhood, where they can make a decent living. But there is also
the possibility that they choose another route. And that is not always a
positive one. There is always the temptation. Personally, I know some
kids who have set out for criminality. (Educ./A/4)
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The third type of education the Linking Act pertains to is subsidised lan-
guage training for adults. Although these institutes have officially never
been open to illegal immigrants, they commonly did not check legal sta-
tus. This appears to have changed abruptly since the new law came into
force. In The Hague, two respondents who work for one of the institutes
that provide language courses started with selections after the summer
of 1998. Before, they never asked any questions about residence statuses.
Now they send off all applicants who cannot prove that they have the ap-
propriate status. To their surprise, they have to turn away a significant
proportion of the people who show up:
In the beginning it was fifty per cent, and now about thirty, the whole
year round. (Educ./H/28)
Although the respondents are surprised by the high proportion of appli-
cants who turn out not to be eligible, the director of the institute does
not see any problem: ‘We are a subsidised institute and we follow the
rules of the government.’ (Educ./H/27) She also stresses that the institute
has a waiting list for students. A teacher who has face-to-face contact
with the students within the same organisation, however, has much
more difficulties with the new rules:
As teachers we are emotionally involved. That is not so strange if you
have taught these people for years. There are these nasty cases in which
the child is allowed to attend a public school whereas the mother is not
allowed to learn the Dutch language. And we see how things go wrong. I
think it is understandable that we worry about these things.
(Educ./H/29)
Respondents who object to the new rules feel that they have very little
room to manoeuvre:
We are not doctors. If you refuse to see a doctor you can die, but that
does not happen when you do not learn the Dutch language.
(Educ./H/27)
They also point out that illegal immigrants can still learn the language,
albeit not in their institute:
It simply shifts to other circuits. Community centres have absorbed a
lot. Because, you know, there is an enormous demand. Illegal immi-
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grants are very eager to learn the language, so that they can work. There
certainly is a demand, and people simply look for alternative ways.
(Educ./A/54)
The above-mentioned changes have also had influence on the social per-
ception of illegal immigrants. For instance, teachers mention the fact
that ‘illegal’ has become a term of abuse in school and that parents have
become much more reticent in talking about their difficulties. These in-
direct effects of the Linking Act are illustrated by a teacher who gives lan-
guage courses to adults. He has long-term experience with illegal immi-
grants as students and feels that the meaning of the term illegal status has
changed over time:
We used to find it out when we had them in our classes. We found out
soon. But there was no reason to be secretive about it. And they thought:
it does not matter if my teacher knows I am in the country illegally. ( . . . )
Now people do not talk about it anymore. Once in a while someone
takes you aside to talk about it, but they never mention in the group any-
more that they are illegal residents. And when they want to talk about it,
it is because they are in trouble and they want you to help them.
(Educ./H/29)
In sum, the experiences in the domain of education are mixed. Discre-
tion is indeed high in primary education, as was expected. Children can
still go to school and teachers stress the importance of illegal children
finishing their education. The main problem faced here is the fact that
children are now more often uninsured than before. In practice, how-
ever, they seem to cope with this problem rather well. In secondary edu-
cation, we find more or less the same situation. Problems are finding an
apprenticeship without a social-fiscal number and covering the costs.
Both problems are predominantly solved through personal contacts,
sometimes with the help of informal networks. The degree of discretion-
ary freedom is very low, however, in institutes for adult education. This
goes together with a high level of actual exclusion and a significant
change in the rules of the game. Furthermore, parallel to the domain of
health care, respondents stress that the social climate is negatively af-
fected as a consequence of the new law. Some people seem to have kept
their children from school and people are much more closed about their
illegal status than before. This can be seen as the logical outcome of a
policy of ‘discouraging’ illegal immigrants. At the same time, it points to
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the drawbacks of such a policy. This brings us to the conclusions regard-
ing limits of the Linking Act.
5.7 Conclusions
Authors like Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) and Lipsky (1980) have ar-
gued that in order to understand policymaking, attention should not
only be paid to the formulation of policy, but also – and maybe even
more so – to processes of implementation at the local level. According to
these scholars, lower-level workers influence the outcomes of public
policies by enforcing the rules selectively and by transforming official
objectives into workable goals. These ideas have been applied in studies
on social services more than in the field of migration control. Studies on
migration policy tend to focus on formal documents and legislation, and
migration control is seen mainly as a responsibility of the central state.
At the same time, it is widely noticed that governments that want to curb
illegal residence are relying ever more on so-called internal migration
control or remote migration control. This directly implies a certain dele-
gation of responsibilities to the lower level, or in other words: shifting
down of responsibilities (Lahav 1998, Hollifield 2000, Guiraudon and
Lahav 2000). The Dutch Linking Act is an example of this policy trend.
On the one hand the law aims at diminishing discretionary freedom of
human service workers, while on the other hand, it shifts responsibilities
to the lower level, which may also imply an increasing reliance on the
discretion of implementers.
The key question of this chapter was to what extent the introduction
of the Linking Act – as a far-reaching and advanced instrument of inter-
nal migration control – has led to changes in the ‘rules of the game’ in
practice in several crucial sectors. Preliminary interviews have made it
clear that before the introduction of the Linking Act, human service
practitioners showed little affinity with internal migration control tasks.
A systematic exclusion of illegal immigrants did not take place. Check-
ing residence statuses was generally made subordinate to checks that
were considered relevant by the occupation or organisation. Many
lower-level workers emphasised that checking residence statuses was not
compatible with their professional morale or their professional consid-
erations.
The interviews held a little less than one year after the introduction of
the Linking Act make clear that the law does not represent as radical a
departure from the lenient policies of the recent past as was proclaimed.
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First, this can be accounted for by the amendments that were made to
the law during the political debate. In response to widespread objec-
tions, the restrictions were significantly eased. In the final version, pro-
fessionals do not have to report illegal immigrants to the police. Sec-
ondly, the interviews point out that many professionals still stretch their
discretionary powers in order to help undocumented immigrants after
the enactment. Considerations of a professional nature and standards of
‘human decency’ prevail. It could even be maintained that the welfare
state ideology has permeated practices to such an extent, that exclusion
only takes place when it is clear that illegal immigrants will not come
into serious trouble, i.e. when there is a substitute in the private sphere.
The assumption that practices differ between domains is largely con-
firmed. More specifically, people changing tasks and people sustaining
tasks tend to prevail over people processing tasks. It must be noted, how-
ever, that the enactment of the Linking Act has brought about stronger
differences between the four domains in this respect and has diminished
the discretionary freedom within certain sectors. This corresponds to
the second assumption: that a high degree of professionalisation would
go together with a high degree of discretionary autonomy when dealing
with the Linking Act. Since the law’s introduction health care workers
and primary school teachers, who have a strong professional autonomy,
have still found many ways to help and support illegal immigrants.
Hence, pragmatic and moral-ethical attitudes are dominant in these
spheres. As was foreseen, workers in the domains of social benefits and
housing have less professional autonomy and display more legalistic at-
titudes toward the newly imposed regulations. They accept the Linking
Act relatively easily and feel they have little room to manoeuvre. Proce-
dures in these domains have tightened up, sometimes with far-reaching
impact.
The Linking Act has resulted in the most severe exclusion in two do-
mains where little attention was paid to so far: adult education and social
housing. Housing corporations have tightened up their procedures
quickly, as have institutes for adult education. The interviews indicate
that the latter rejected relatively high shares of applicants. At the same
time, these exclusionary practices were counterbalanced by substitution
processes. Regarding language courses, illegal immigrants are either re-
ferred to community centres or to private organisations. As regards
housing, illegal family members move in with legal tenants or they sub-
rent. This leads to the paradoxical outcome that the Linking Act sup-
ports rather than hampers ‘overcrowding’ of public housing.
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The domain of social benefits – mainly welfare benefits – is a special
case. The dominant attitude is legalistic and discretionary autonomy is
limited. Yet, the practical impact of the new law is limited as well, as ille-
gal immigrants were already systematically excluded from welfare bene-
fits except for special cases (Burgers and Ten Dam 1999). The fact that
welfare departments were obliged to check their existing files suggests
that politicians had little faith in earlier procedures, or that symbolic
messages may have been more important than actual outcomes (cf.
Edelman 1971).
The overall conclusions are therefore ambivalent. There are tenden-
cies of severe exclusion as well as tendencies to soften the impacts of the
law. An important general implication is that the process of weighing up
the pros and cons has moved to lower levels. At these lower levels, the of-
ficial policy objective of systematically excluding illegal immigrants is
mitigated by professional, humanitarian and ethical standards as well as
by other policies that sometimes contradict the Linking Act. This points
to the limits of a far-reaching instrument such as the Linking Act. These
limits are clearer in some sectors than in others. Generally, the weaker
the profession within a certain domain, the lower the discretionary free-
dom is, and the stronger the tendency to apply the rules in a legalistic
manner. However, the present research also suggests that these forms of
exclusion lead to substitution rather than to the actual departure of ille-
gal immigrants. This puts pressure on localities and organisations that
are confronted with illegal immigrants.
The interviews show that the effects of the law have been softened or
counterbalanced by several local arrangements or ‘bypasses’. Profes-
sionals make use of their personal networks to bend the rules, private
funds support undocumented immigrants in trouble and regional net-
works of health care workers have been established. These bypasses are
often partly subsidised by the local or national authorities. Professionals
in the domain of health care even claim the situation has improved in
this respect since the new law.129 The first evaluation report concerning the
Linking Act trivialises the impact of these bypasses by stressing the fact
that they are limited in scope (Etman and Korpel 1999: 35), which may be
the case on a national scale.130 However, the interviews with local-level
workers demonstrate that within the cities under study, they are cru-
cially important. The bypasses, ranging from informal to more or less
formal arrangements, enable professionals to act according to the law
and at the same time make sure that inhumane and threatening situa-
tions do not occur. Some respondents put emphasis on the advantage of
these flexible solutions. Provisions can be tailored to individual needs
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and people who make the decisions about whom to help explicitly take
into account their specific circumstances. Others stress that ‘equality be-
fore the law’ more or less loses its meaning. Most respondents agree that
without these bypasses, the impact of the Linking Act would have been
much more problematic.
A second general implication is that the introduction of the Linking
Act has led to a hardening of the social climate. Many respondents are
not acquainted with the consequences of the Linking Act in great detail,
and this holds even more for illegal immigrants. Confusion on the side
of the professionals and fear on the side of illegal immigrants increases
the risk of marginalisation of illegal immigrants.131 Although it does not
seem to be the rule, the examples of children who no longer attend
school and mothers who do not register their babies, clearly point to this




6 Summary and conclusions.
Legal limits to incorporation,
social limits to internal
control
Formal order ( . . . ) is always and to some considerable degree parasitic
on informal processes, which the formal scheme does not recognize,
without which it could not exist, and which it alone cannot create.
(James C. Scott 1998: 310)
6.1 Incorporation and implementation
Newspaper delivery, office cleaning, fruit picking, dishwashing and
prostitution are only some of the tasks that illegal immigrants in ad-
vanced economies nowadays engage in. The fact that these less attractive
and labour-intensive economic activities are frequently taken up by ille-
gal or undocumented immigrants – of whom according to our estimate
at least 40,000 lived in the four largest Dutch cities in 1995 – illustrates
the limitations of restrictive systems of migration control. Immigration
has become much more fragmented and, concomitantly, more difficult
to capture with policy measures than in the relatively transparent and,
hence, surveyable guest worker era (Brubaker 1994, Böcker, Groenen-
dijk, Havinga and Minderhoud 1998). Immigration policy nowadays
largely coincides with keeping unwanted immigration in check. As bor-
der controls cannot possibly keep everyone out, policies focus ever more
on thwarting the normal daily lives of illegal immigrants who are already
present. The past two decades have produced an impressive body of laws
and regulations in this respect and ‘fortress Europe’ has become the
dominant metaphor. After almost two decades of more or less silently
incorporating ‘spontaneous migrants’, the Dutch national government
has been aiming at pursuing a systematic ‘discouragement policy’ with
respect to illegal immigrants since the beginning of the 1990s. A wide ar-
155
ray of legal and administrative measures aiming at systematic exclusion
has been introduced since then.
Time and again, however, migration scholars observe a wide gap be-
tween the ‘law in the books’ and the ‘law in practice’ (Cornelius et al.
1994, Jahn and Straubhaar 1999). In the Dutch case, this gap received at-
tention in a very sudden manner in 1992 after an El Al Boeing crashed
into two high-rise apartment buildings in the Amsterdam Bijlmermeer
neighbourhood, even though rumours about large numbers of illegal
immigrants who had allegedly resided in the afflicted apartments have
never been substantiated. The forces that have a supposedly weakening
effect on the powers of national states are a recurrent theme in the recent
literature on migration policies. In the two dominant lines of argumen-
tation, the gap between policy and implementation is either seen as the
result of pressure groups within the country, or viewed as stemming
from largely external pressures due to globalisation and the internation-
alisation of, for instance, human rights values (Sassen 1996, Jacobson
1996). In the Netherlands, furthermore, the gap between policy and
practices is often linked to the national tradition of ‘condoning’
(gedogen) deviant behaviour and is seen as a typically Dutch policy fea-
ture. In this concluding chapter, the main findings of the study will be
brought together and viewed within the wider framework of the current
theoretical debates on the ability and the willingness of governments to
check illegal immigration by internal migration control.
In the first chapter, it was maintained that it is a distortion to depict
national governments as single actors with a common goal. This is par-
ticularly the case now that national governments start to rely, more than
before, on a downward and outward delegation of powers when it comes
to controlling immigration. Secondly, an apparent contradiction was
observed between the fact that most authors observe a wide gap between
policy and implementation, and at the same time largely ignore pro-
cesses of implementation. Both the neglect and the wide generalisations
that are found in the literature reflect an underestimation of the influ-
ence of selective enforcement practices. Thirdly, it was argued that a lack
of connection exists between studies on immigrants and studies on mi-
gration control (cf. Guiraudon and Joppke 2001). This distance is even
larger when dealing with illegal immigrants (Burgers and Engbersen
1999). Due to the fact that illegal immigrants are mainly active in the
more shadowy parts of society, there is little systematic insight into the
position of illegal immigrants in relation to the formal barriers that are
thrown up. Illegal immigrants are often depicted either as constantly
chased after by the police or as tacitly tolerated, whereas in practice, ev-
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ery system of control has its loopholes that shape and provide opportu-
nities for illegal immigrants. These loopholes differ over time and place
and are likely to be affected by – and sometimes even shaped by – policy
measures. In order to explore the relationship between the position of il-
legal immigrants in Dutch society and the increasingly restrictive inter-
nal migration control, the dual focus of the present study has been on (a)
processes of incorporation of undocumented immigrants and (b)
lower-level implementation of rules and regulations. This has led to the
following key question of the study:
How and to what extent can illegal immigrants incorporate into Dutch
society and how are their opportunities related to the official ‘discourage-
ment policy’ as implemented in practice?
This twofold question has been addressed on the basis of empirical re-
search in the four large Dutch cities, where most of the illegal immi-
grants reside. First, it focused on attempts of illegal immigrants to incor-
porate both by informal employment and by criminal activities. Second,
the attention shifted to processes of implementation by representatives
of the welfare state, including the police, and professionals in the do-
mains of social benefits, health care, housing and education. Because of
the exploratory nature of the research and the complexity of the research
questions, useful theoretical insights from different angles were com-
bined. The study can be best placed within the triangle of fields of policy
analysis, migration studies and criminology. The wide scope of theories
used is the potential strength of the study, but also carries a risk in it be-
cause it is not possible to do justice to all these theoretical perspectives in
full detail. Therefore, the choice has been made to organise the study by
themes and deal with the more specific relevant theoretical literature in
the separate chapters. In methodological respect, this study does not stay
within the relatively strong boundaries to what is often referred to as
qualitative and quantitative research. It has combined both ‘extensive’
and ‘intensive’ research strategies (Schuyt 1986: 111-114) and it builds on a
range of data sources. Cross-checks were made wherever possible. The
research perspective can be summarised as bottom up; the experiences
of those who are vested with day-to-day responsibilities in policy imple-
mentation and those who are directly affected by enforcement practices
are put central (cf. Bogason 2000).
In this concluding chapter, the findings of the study will be presented
according to two main themes, which tie them together. The first theme
concerns ‘legal limits’ to incorporation of illegal immigrants in the
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Dutch setting. The main issue is to what extent policy measures actually
hinder illegal immigrants when trying to make a living through informal
economic activities in the widest sense of the term. The second theme re-
gards ‘social limits’ to internal migration control as developed in the
Netherlands over the last decade. The emphasis lies on social limits that
come to the fore during the implementation of the official policy at the
local levels. The combination of these themes leads to conclusions as to
unintended and intended consequences of the present policy stance.132
Section 6.4 subsequently deals with the policy implications of the pres-
ent study.
6.2 Legal limits to incorporation
The term incorporation is usually reserved for legal immigrants, who are
supposed to find their way into the receiving societies, both on their own
account and – in particular in strong welfare states – with the help of
state-sponsored policy measures. Full incorporation in the legal sense is
not an option for immigrants as long as they are residing illegally
(Engbersen 1999a). Yet, although they are officially to a large extent ex-
cluded, they can still try to incorporate stealthily, by making use of the
loopholes in the system of control. The demand for cheap and flexible
labour is often considered to be the main magnet drawing illegal immi-
grants to the receiving states, which implies that job opportunities are in
principle available. This holds even more for advanced urban economies
that are confronted with processes of economic restructuring. Sassen
(1991, 1999) attaches crucial importance to illegal immigrants in this re-
spect, as they comprise the flexible and less-demanding workforce that
restructuring economies have a need for. On the other hand, it is clear
that comprehensive welfare states like the Dutch have a strong incentive
for fencing off their labour markets since generous social benefits are
difficult to reconcile with open borders (cf. Faist 1997, Bommes and
Geddes 2000). The present study, therefore, has explicitly focused on
how opportunities for illegal immigrants in the Netherlands are depend-
ent on the existing rules and their enforcement in practice. As the re-
search project has been conducted between 1994 and 1998, while the re-
strictive policy was in a constant process of fine-tuning, it is possible to
depict some of the dynamics of policies and counter-action by illegal im-
migrants and by those who encounter them during their day-to-day
work.
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Incorporation is defined loosely in this study and refers firstly to the ex-
tent to which illegal immigrants are able to find their way into the receiv-
ing society through formal and informal channels. The first issue in this
regard was to what extent illegal immigrants in the city of Rotterdam,
where at least 11,000 illegal immigrants reside according to estimates, are
able to find employment and where it brings them in terms of mobility.
An analysis of interviews with 170 illegal immigrants shows that they in-
deed do the kind of jobs that indigenous workers have little interest in.
In this respect, Rotterdam is no exception to the rule. More specifically,
the research conducted in Rotterdam shows how the increasingly re-
strictive policy stance influences the opportunities for survival and for
mobility.
A first finding is that on the highly regulated Dutch labour market
openings for illegal labour are relatively scarce. Many respondents have
great difficulty in maintaining continuous employment. A central find-
ing in this respect is the high degree of unemployment among undocu-
mented immigrants in Rotterdam. There is a significant amount of un-
tapped labour among the undocumented immigrants. Moreover,
employment is often temporary. Respondents go from one assignment
to another with times of inactivity in between. They have great difficul-
ties in finding more permanent jobs. These findings differ from the pat-
terns that can be found in the literature in the United States and are at
odds with theories that attach primary importance to the pull factor of
the demand for cheap labour in high-wage countries. The impact of the
increasingly restrictive policy measures in this area can be observed in
the accounts of the illegal immigrants in Rotterdam. Those who entered
the Netherlands before November 1991 were commonly able to obtain
social-fiscal numbers, which provided access to officially sanctioned
work and a number of social provisions. Respondents entering the
country after this date are in a less favourable position.
A second relevant finding is that the illegal immigrants who do find
work are confined to relatively low-paid and unskilled labour. Almost
without an exception, they work below their level of qualifications. This
is not per se an indication that the informal economy in the Netherlands
is of limited extent, but rather that the access of undocumented immi-
grants to this part of the economy is quite limited. As was argued in
chapter 2, controls and enforcement of policies combating illegal immi-
gration are the strictest in the domain of the formal labour market. This
is not only the case as regards being employed by others. Self-employ-
ment does not offer an alternative to most undocumented immigrants
in Rotterdam. Only a few respondents have managed to ‘create their
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own work’, and this takes place more or less hidden within their ethnic
communities. Their experiences suggest that informal enterprises must
by their very nature remain small, otherwise they would soon attract the
attention of the authorities. Being employed by a legal immigrant who
owns a business is a much more viable way of making a living for illegal
immigrants (cf. Staring 2000).
A third finding is that the fencing off of the formal labour market has
created a legal ceiling beyond which undocumented workers have great
difficulty to rise even if they do possess considerable human capital. The
legal ceiling limits the upward opportunities for illegal immigrants and
enhances the risk that people will get caught in the trap of an illegal sta-
tus in the long run. An elementary question with regard to the incorpo-
ration of undocumented immigrants concerns their possibilities for up-
ward mobility over time. When we examine the ‘careers’ of the
respondents in retrospect, these possibilities seem to be severely lacking.
All respondents in Rotterdam who are employed, are active on the lower
rungs of the socio-economic ladder. This also holds for people who are
better off in terms of the common human capital variables such as edu-
cational level and language ability. Neither does the length of stay lead to
an improvement in their situation, which is clearly in contradiction to
most of the American literature on Mexican illegal immigrants (Massey
et al. 1993).
A fourth finding is that despite – and sometimes due to – regulatory
barriers, both employers within certain sectors and their illegal employ-
ees take action to circumvent inspections that are carried out and to
minimise the risk of detection. After all, two thirds of the research popu-
lation were working in one way or another at the time of the interview,
which indicates the fact that they are finding ways to bypass the obsta-
cles, for instance by adopting informal strategies such as the use of false
documents. This also indicates that difficulties finding job opportunities
cannot primarily be accounted for by a lack of demand for low-skilled
labour or, for instance, by the saturation of certain markets as the result
of ‘spillover migration’ (Light 2000).133 But the fact that illegal workers
face ever more barriers, does imply that the matching between demand
and supply requires more complicated strategies than before. By ‘bor-
rowing’, leasing, buying or forging social security numbers, they can
enter the world of quasi-official employment. This often means that
they are not employed directly by Dutch employers, like most ‘white
illegals’ are. Instead, the recruiting process is being ‘out-sourced’ to an
intermediary such as an employment agency or a labour subcontractor.
Inevitably, this pushes illegal labour further underground and makes it
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less visible. As these practices mostly take place within high-trust net-
works, this is likely to be more advantageous for illegal immigrants who
can fall back on resourceful networks. The Turkish community appears
to offer the best options in this regard (cf. Staring 2001). New groups of
illegal immigrants who cannot fall back on well-established communi-
ties are likely to face higher barriers.
In sum, there are certainly employment opportunities for undocu-
mented immigrants, but they are limited in scale and scope. Nonethe-
less, informal strategies enable undocumented migrants to make a living
and to survive. More far-reaching incorporation is hampered, though,
due to the fact that gaining access to ‘formal’ and stable jobs has become
more difficult, in particular after 1991. A crucial factor is that without a
legal status immigrants cannot formally obtain a social-fiscal number
anymore. As illegal labour shifts away from the formal economy to in-
formal activities in the sheltered spheres of immigrant businesses on the
one hand and the domestic or family sphere on the other, the distance to
the receiving society at large is enhanced.
Criminal activities may comprise an alternative for undocumented im-
migrants. Some of the 170 respondents in Rotterdam have indeed re-
sorted to drug-related activities or prostitution. Some have moved to the
criminal or semi-criminal economy after looking for opportunities in
the informal economy, some combine ‘regular’ jobs with unlawful activ-
ities from time to time. Yet, although there is a grey area between illegal
labour and some forms of (petty) crime, most illegal immigrants draw a
clear line between a law-abiding life and an existence that is based on
crime. They do not want to cause any harm to the receiving society and
they are afraid to attract the attention of the police. An exception has to
be made for the use of false of forged documents, which many illegal im-
migrants see merely as a way of avoiding the pitfalls of an illegal exis-
tence and not as something ‘criminal’. Making use of false identities
even enables them to participate in the (black) labour market, which in-
dicates the blurred line between criminal and informal economic activi-
ties. In fact, the use of criminal means (i.e. making use of false docu-
ments) prevents people from engaging in crime any further. As the
interviews only provide a first glimpse into the criminal involvement of
illegal immigrants, the relation between illegality and criminality has
been addressed more systematically on the basis of aggregate data in
chapter 3.
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Some criminologists presented crime as a ‘queer ladder of success’ for
disadvantaged groups (Bell 1953, O’Kane 1992). This view is directly re-
lated to the seminal work by Merton (1957) who has stressed that differ-
ent social groups face different means in their pursue of success. Mem-
bers of society who do not have access to legitimate means may be
channelled toward illegitimate ways. Particularly in a period in which
crime is ever more blamed on poor groups, among which immigrants
(Bauman 1995), it is often assumed that crime may offer a way out for il-
legal immigrants who face stronger barriers than their legal counterparts
do. In chapter 2, this view was referred to as the ‘marginalisation thesis’.
Quite on the contrary, the ‘deterrence thesis’ predicts that undocu-
mented immigrants are more likely than others to refrain from commit-
ting crimes for fear of being traced by the police or other controlling
agencies. Yet, even when we define success loosely in the case of illegal
immigrants and focus on the ability to make a living it becomes clear
that these pressures also differ significantly among groups of illegal im-
migrants, depending on their access to accepted and less-accepted
means.
To study criminal activities of illegal immigrants systematically, we
made use of police data on apprehensions. In the Netherlands, illegal
immigrants can either be apprehended and registered as illegal immi-
grants when there are concrete indications that they are illegally in the
country (the result of ‘active surveillance’) or because they are suspected
of committing a crime or a misdemeanour (the result of ‘passive surveil-
lance’). In both cases, they are as a rule registered in the files of the Aliens
police. Illegal workers who are handed over to the police to be expelled
are also included in these files. With all the caveats that are attached to
police data, they are still the most suitable data available.
The analysis of apprehensions of illegal immigrants in the four larg-
est cities first of all demonstrates that most illegal immigrants are appre-
hended for other than criminal activities. More than half of the regis-
tered illegal immigrants in Rotterdam had been apprehended for illegal
residence or misdemeanours. In descending order, the other reasons for
arrest were: minor offences, serious offences and drug-related offences.
Similar outcomes have been found in the other large cities (Amsterdam,
The Hague and Utrecht), although problems with criminal illegal immi-
grants are primarily confined to Amsterdam and Rotterdam. A closer
look at the reasons for apprehension of illegal immigrants who have
been arrested for offences, reveals that drug-related offences and differ-
ent categories of theft prevail. Taking into account that engaging in
criminal activities significantly enhances the likelihood of being stopped
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by the police, these figures indicate that the majority of illegal immi-
grants do not resort to criminal activities. The high proportion of arrests
for illegal residence (almost half the cases) can be explained by the fact
that this concerns people who are arrested during spot checks in the
workplace, during ‘general’ checks such as traffic controls or because of
rather vague reasons such as ‘displaying suspicious behaviour’.
Secondly, a comparison between the arrests of illegal immigrants and
those of legally residing suspects who had been apprehended for similar
offences brought to light that across the board, illegal immigrants are
less involved in minor and serious offences than a comparable sample of
legal residents. These findings underscore that the ‘deterrence thesis’ is
applicable to the majority of illegal immigrants in Rotterdam. On drug-
related crimes, however, illegal immigrants in Rotterdam score evi-
dently higher than legal suspects do. Both outcomes are largely in line
with what we concluded on the basis of interviews in Rotterdam. But it
also became clear that neither the position as an immigrant nor the resi-
dence status has a uniform influence on apprehension rates.
Thirdly, the analysis of police data conveyed that groups of illegal im-
migrants are differentially involved in crime (cf. Cloward and Ohlin
1960, Engbersen and Van der Leun 1998). Apprehension patterns vary
significantly by country or region of origin, and illegal immigrants from
specific countries are over-represented when it comes to arrests for cer-
tain offences. In short, we find that criminal activities appear to be most
common among illegal Moroccans, Algerians and Western Europeans
(predominantly ‘drug tourists’). Turkish illegal immigrants are less in-
volved in registered crime. These differences can be at least partly ex-
plained on the basis of differential access to the resources that immigrant
communities offer. Turkish illegal immigrants in Rotterdam have rela-
tively good access to the ‘ethnic economy’ and receive more support
from their family members and co-nationals in other respects (Staring
2001). At the other side of the spectrum, illegally residing Moroccan and
Algerian immigrants are much more left to their own devices. They have
more difficulties in finding jobs, housing and financial support and can
fall back to a lesser extent on family members.
Fourthly, focusing on drug-related activities of illegal North African
immigrants, we find that the access to criminal circuits is not simply a
‘fall back’ option when all else fails. Illegal immigrants also need certain
skills and contacts to gain access to the criminal sphere. The drug milieu
in Rotterdam caters to a large extent for international tourists who come
to Rotterdam over the weekend to buy heroin or cocaine. As these tour-
ists are often French, North African illegal immigrants who speak at least
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some French have a certain advantage. Illegal immigrants mostly work
as messenger boys or runners who carry out the most visible and there-
fore riskier parts of the drug trade. At first sight, a lack of a legal status
does not seem to make any difference for drug runners. But the inter-
views make clear that illegal immigrants in the drug milieu find them-
selves in the same unattractive and subordinate positions as those who
engage in informal labour. They find their jobs through contacts with
people higher up in the hierarchy, who are often from North African de-
scent as well. They have typically met them during their stay in or jour-
ney to the Netherlands. These legally residing dealers do introduce them
to the trade or, rather, employ them, but they do not offer other kinds of
support or access to other types of information. The interviews with ille-
gal drug runners emphasise that there is a remarkable lack of other sig-
nificant ties to the Moroccan community in Rotterdam. Some of the re-
spondents who are active in the drug trade do not have a place to stay
and regularly sleep at organisations for the homeless and most of them
live a rather marginal life. On the other hand, they are to some extent
‘untouchable’, because the police have difficulties in expelling them.
This brings us to the fifth finding: that the police encounter serious
problems when trying to combat crime among illegal immigrants. This
is primarily related to problems when trying to expel them. Police data
in Rotterdam show the paradoxical outcomes of the official policy. Ille-
gal immigrants who have come into contact with the police as suspects
of criminal offences are less likely to be effectively expelled than those
who have infringed the Aliens Act or employment laws. This outcome is
in strong contradiction to the official policy priorities. The finding that
many illegal immigrants have been apprehended more than once (up to
several times a year) underlines the ineffectiveness of the official sanc-
tion of expulsion. In Rotterdam, this has led to the presence of a small
core of illegal immigrants who are apprehended regularly and who man-
age to escape expulsion. In particular criminally active illegal immi-
grants have developed strategies to stay in the country, by getting rid of
their documents and by pretending they come from other countries. As
long as their identity is not established, they cannot be expelled. These
difficulties are reinforced when police officers become frustrated or no
longer bother to apprehend these illegal immigrants. These ineffective
enforcement practices – which are the result of limitations to the official
policy – lead to a prolonged stay of this specific group of unwanted, un-
documented migrants who are able to survive and to stay but not to im-
prove their position. It must be noted that the persistent problems with
these ‘revolving door illegal immigrants’ explain at least partly why the
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symbolic link between illegal immigrants and crime is fuelled unremit-
tingly.
Summarising the findings so far, it becomes obvious that many ille-
gal immigrants are creative in detecting and seizing all kinds of informal
opportunities. Despite legal obstacles that are put up by restrictive policy
measures, they find ways of making a living, albeit relatively low-profile.
The theoretical literature on migration and migration control tends to
underestimate this immigrant agency. It must be said, however, that the
increasingly restrictive policy measures do influence opportunities for
informal labour. They do so primarily by creating an upper limit for ille-
gal immigrants. Survival is possible, but incorporation is indeed ham-
pered. The tightening up of policies, in particular tying social-fiscal
numbers systematically to status, has made this more marked. More-
over, attempts to deal with the most problematic category of illegal im-
migrants, those who are engaged in criminal activities, are reaching their
limits. The next section will look into social limits to implementation.
6.3 Social limits to internal control
So far, we have seen that attempts to curb illegal labour seriously hamper
the incorporation of illegal immigrants. However, measures like em-
ployer sanctions, on-spot visits and co-ordinated administrative checks
of state agencies have not been able to wipe away illegal labour. In a re-
cent report for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the au-
thors maintain that illegal labour has (again) expanded in the last decade
(Visser and Van Zevenbergen 2001).134 In this estimate, domestic work,
non-monetary jobs and criminal activities are not taken into account.
Partly as a reaction to these limitations, national governments that at-
tempt to curtail illegal immigration are increasingly pinning their faith
on broader measures of internal migration control. The 1990s have been
the years of delegation of responsibilities in this respect, which implies
that other actors than the traditional controlling agencies have become
involved in migration control. This shift in the locus of control entails
upward, downward and outward delegation of control-based tasks
(Freeman 1998, Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). The Dutch Linking Act of
1998, which systematically ties immigrants’ rights to legal status, as was
shown in chapter 5, is a typical example of downward delegation
(Bernini and Engbersen 1999, Engbersen 1999b). The attention of social
scientists in the field of migration policy has primarily gone to the shift-
ing-up of powers to the supranational level (in particular to the realms
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of EU institutions), while significantly less is known about the delega-
tion of powers to the sub-national level and to private actors.
By contrast, the literature on public policy more in general has drawn
ample attention to the ways in which official policies are transformed on
the ground level through day-to-day decisions and working practices
(Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, Lipsky 1980). The high level of discretion
of typical street-level policymakers and the fact that their work cannot
be easily monitored, often leads to practices that diverge from – or even
contradict – the original policy aims. Although implementation studies
have been criticised for overlooking the multi-faceted nature of policy
goals and the often downright conflicting policy aims, it is clearly a ca-
veat that implementation practices have received little attention so far in
the case of migration control. After all, the inherent contradiction of ‘re-
mote migration control’ (Zolberg 1999) is that it relies on delegation to
the lower echelons of policy making and at the same time attempts to
limit lower-level discretion by bounding work processes to ever more
specific regulations.
In order to find out how professionals and semi-professionals who –
possibly – encounter illegal immigrants during their day-to-day work
grapple with their control tasks under the regime of the Linking Act, the
second part of the study has focused on implementation practices. This
part of the study focused on police officers, both in regular services and
in Aliens departments, and on professionals who work in public and
semi-public institutions in the domains of social benefits, health care,
housing and education in the four largest cities in the Netherlands.
These organisations are all concerned with providing services to people,
often in face-to-face interaction with their clients. Moreover, they all
have to be able to distinguish between those who are entitled to their ser-
vices and those who are not.
The police and the Aliens departments of the police play a central
role in internal migration control, because they are responsible for ‘in-
ternal surveillance’. It is not surprising, therefore, that police officers are
commonly seen as the (almost natural) antagonists of illegal immi-
grants. This holds even more now that security and the fight against
crime have become more central in migration policies at the EU level
(Den Boer 1995b, Bigo 1996). Nevertheless, knowledge about how police
officers actually conduct their tasks, how they use these powers of discre-
tion, what judgements they make and why and to what extent their ac-
tions are subject to controls remains scarce. In the Netherlands, respon-
sibility for the policy toward undocumented migrants is in hands of
both the Aliens departments and the general municipal police teams.
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Most police officers are responsible for ‘passive control’, which refers to
checking the legal status of suspects after they have been arrested. Fur-
thermore, police officers of the Aliens Departments are involved in ‘ac-
tive control’ in sectors of the economy that are associated with infringe-
ment of labour regulations or in other ‘high risk’ situations.
A first finding on the basis of research among police officers who are
in charge of day-to-day work in the four largest cities, is that surveillance
of illegal immigrants in general has low priority. Many police officers
claim that in practice there is not such a thing as an active search for un-
documented immigrants. They rarely ask immigrants for documents,
and seldom check their legal status. At first sight, this leniency can be as-
cribed to a lack of manpower. Even though many respondents refer to
the fact that budgets have risen in recent years, the capacity of the Aliens
police is still relatively limited when compared to the size of the immi-
grant population. However, there are also more structural reasons for
this reticence. First, most police officers do not perceive illegality per se
as an urgent problem. They feel they have to deal with ‘real crime’ or
threats to the public order first and illegal residence does not fall under
their definition of crime. A second reason is that it is in their interest to
keep good relations with the more established ethnic communities in
their area. Therefore, they fear that a more restrictive enforcement of the
Aliens Act would lead to a hardening of the situation and a corrosion of
valuable contacts. A third reason is that in their opinion, the (highly
complex) Aliens legislation limits them in their attempts to detect illegal
immigrants. These findings apply more to police officers with a general
task than to people working for the Aliens departments. Yet it must be
noted that the Aliens department is dependent on general police officers
in this respect, considering policemen in the street are commonly the
first in the chain.
Secondly, the interviews with police officers make clear that most re-
spondents are unaware of the formal priorities as defined by the Minis-
try of Justice. The only priority most respondents are able to recall was
the aim to expel criminal illegal immigrants. At the same time they
emphasise that this is also the most difficult goal to achieve. According
to lower-level officers, the fight against illegal immigration is subordi-
nate to the general aim of keeping public order. Consequently, enforce-
ment practices are primarily a function of the actual problems with re-
gard to safety and crime. This implies that, according to many police
officers, illegal immigrants who cause a nuisance or engage in criminal
conduct risk a relatively high chance of being caught, while most ‘ordi-
nary’ illegal immigrants do not have a high likelihood of being detected.
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A third finding in this respect is that although there is a national pol-
icy as to illegal immigrants, there are obviously local differences in the
ways in which the issue is dealt with in the four cities. In brief, police de-
partments in Amsterdam and Rotterdam focus more on illegal immi-
grants who are involved in crime, whereas The Hague and Utrecht focus
more on illegal labour and ‘passive control’. These differences can pri-
marily be explained by the fact that internal surveillance is made subor-
dinate to general police tasks and by the fact that the actual problems in
the cities differ. The local differences in enforcement indicate a high level
of discretion of urban police forces.
A fourth finding regards to difficulties with the supposed pièce the
résistance of the ‘discouragement policy’: the expulsion of detected ille-
gal immigrants. Where the analysis of police data primarily show the
outcomes of the expulsion policy, the interviews reveal how these out-
comes come about. On the one hand, they have to do with the lack of co-
operation from the part of the apprehended illegal immigrants and their
countries of origin. Police officers stress that illegal immigrants who are
detained are regularly sent back into the streets because they cannot be
expelled within a reasonable period of time. In turn, the limitations of
their interference also have repercussions on enforcement practices. Po-
lice officers do not even bother to arrest so-called hopeless cases, or they
simply send them away after registration. Euphemistically they say that
the person is ‘sent away in a southerly direction’. In other cases, illegal
immigrants are released from detention centres because judges decide it
is not realistic to expect an expulsion within a few months, or because
the cells are needed for other detainees. In reaction to the ineffectiveness
of the expulsion policy, the Ministry of Justice has set target numbers for
expulsions. In contrast, lower-level officers point to the fact that these
target numbers rather lead to focusing on easy targets than to attempts
to handle time-consuming and problematic cases of criminal illegal im-
migrants.
The practices described here reflect the social limits of the political
influence on local enforcement practices at the ‘street level’. Police offi-
cers seem to have become to a certain extent immune to the continuous
flow of new ideas, new rules and new priorities they are confronted with.
Moreover, the highly complicated Aliens Act is not something that is at
the top of their heads. Most police officers see themselves as crime fight-
ers or defendants of public order and are less interested in detecting peo-
ple who do very little harm. In this sense, the idea that the police tend to
chase illegal immigrants is somewhat overstated in much of the litera-
ture on migration policies (cf. Freeman 1995, 1998). The actual practices
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we find at the ground level are not so much defined by the official policy
of the Ministry of Justice, but rather by locally based ‘negotiations’ be-
tween immigrants (both legal and illegal), police officers, police depart-
ments and local politicians.
Migration control is not the sole responsibility of the police. Increas-
ingly, others besides the traditional parties are also being allotted gate-
keeping tasks. In this regard, chapter 5 has concentrated on professionals
and semi-professionals who work within human service organisations
(Hasenfeld 1983, Gastelaars 1997). Teachers, doctors, housing employees
and many others who work within these organisations are at a much
larger distance from the official policy of the Ministry of Justice than po-
lice officers.
Roughly before the 1990s, illegal immigrants in the Netherlands were
not eligible for social assistance and they hardly ever received these ben-
efits in practice.135 Yet in other crucial sectors – like education, housing
and health care – it was less common to check legal status systematically
(Clermonts et al. 1991). Interviews held before the introduction of the
Linking Act make clear that insofar as professionals checked the right of
foreigners to certain services, verification of legal status was made subor-
dinate to other – in the eyes of the implementers more relevant – checks.
Respondents in housing agencies, for example, were more interested in
reliable tenants, schools or language courses in motivated pupils and
medical professionals in whether their patients needed help and – to a
lesser extent – whether they were sufficiently insured. By and large, there
was a high level of discretionary autonomy and most of the professionals
and semi-professionals used this discretion to help illegal immigrants
rather than to bar them from services. It must be added that most of
them stressed that – as far as they were aware – they encountered illegal
immigrants in relatively limited numbers on average. The distribution
over organisations or over professionals, though, was highly uneven (cf.
Burgers and Ten Dam 1999).
In 1998, the Linking Act took effect. The aim was to tie public services
systematically to legal status. The extensive law – which concerns a sig-
nificant number of Dutch Ministries – can partly be seen as a response to
the rather specific problems with semi-incorporated illegal immigrants
from former guest worker countries (Commissie Zeevalking 1991).
Partially, it can also be seen as an attempt to make clear that the state was
in control of immigration. Although it is probably unique in its compre-
hensiveness, it fits into a larger policy trend in Western European coun-
tries that were confronted with rising asylum claims during the 1990s.
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Furthermore, it recalls policy measures like the notorious Proposition
187 of California and the French ‘Pasqua laws’ (Hollifield 2000,
Guiraudon 2001). Like these international counterparts, the Linking Act
was highly contested. During the political debates that preceded its en-
actment, the law as proposed was toned down in several ways (see chap-
ter 5). In its final form, it does not include the obligation to report illegal
immigrants to the police. Neither do professionals have the obligation
for human service workers to assist police officers when attempting to
detect or arrest illegal immigrants, which is a clear example of what
Joppke (1998) has called ‘self-limitation’ of the state. Still, with the ex-
ception of education for children, legal assistance and imperative medi-
cal care, the law in its final form aims at excluding illegal immigrants
from public services. It has been accompanied by a major administrative
operation, which makes it easier to check the legal status of clients.
Interviews held roughly one year after enactment, first and foremost
indicate that the Linking Act has not been the watershed that it was ex-
pected to be. Even despite the heated debates that preceded enactment,
many respondents had only vague notions about the contents and the
implications of the Linking Act. This points to the distance between the
official policy-making level and the level of implementation. Moreover,
many professionals were still able to find ways of not excluding illegal
immigrants. Considerations of a professional nature and standards of
‘human decency’ play a crucial role in this respect. As a rule, people
changing and people sustaining tasks prevail over people processing tasks.
The interviews show that a relatively high level of professionalisation,
such as in health care and primary education, goes together with a ten-
dency to stretch the rules. A lower level of professionalisation, on the
other hand, goes together with a higher level of exclusion and a tendency
to comply with the law more legalistically. In comparison with health
care professionals, workers in the domains of social assistance and hous-
ing, for instance, displayed a much more legalistic attitude toward the
newly imposed regulations. They appeared to have accepted the Linking
Act relatively easily.136 As a consequence, the Act has resulted in the most
severe exclusion in two domains where little attention was paid to in ad-
vance: adult education and social housing. Public and semi-public hous-
ing corporations have quickly tightened up their procedures and insti-
tutes for adult education have done the same. The interviews indicate
that they send away relatively high numbers of applicants.137 The domain
of social benefits – mainly welfare benefits – is a special case. In fact, the
practical impact of the Liking Act is very limited there as illegal immi-
grants were already systematically excluded from welfare benefits except
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for exceptional cases. The fact that the welfare departments were obliged
to check all the existing cases suggests either that politicians had little
faith in earlier procedures, or – more likely – that particularly with re-
gard to extensive provisions such as welfare benefits, the symbolic mes-
sage was considered important. The effects on public opinion may have
been more significant here than the actual outcome (cf. Edelman 1971).
At the same time, these exclusionary practices in certain sectors turn
out to be counterbalanced by processes of substitution or replacement
either by private parties or by sectors that do not fall under the Linking
Act. As regards language courses, for example, the illegal immigrants are
referred to community centres or to private organisations; as regards
housing, illegal family members move in with legal tenants or they sub-
rent. The latter even leads to the paradoxical outcome that the Linking
Act supports rather than hampers so-called ‘overcrowding’ of social
housing.
Secondly, the research shows that some of the negative consequences
of the Act have been softened or counterbalanced by locally organised
arrangements or ‘bypasses’. Some of these bypasses are formal, like the
Linking Fund in the domain of health care (which is funded by the Min-
istry of Health). According to some respondents, this may have even led
to an amelioration of the situation. Other bypasses are less formal, such
as networks that support illegal students who cannot pay their books
and fees or shelters for the homeless that take care of illegal immigrants
with health problems. Many of these bypasses are partly privately
funded and partly and often indirectly subsidised by the local or national
authorities. The arrangements enable professionals to act according to
the law and at the same time make sure that inhumane and threatening
situations do not occur. The latter also implies that the care for illegal
immigrants appears to be partly ‘privatised’ as well. In this sense, down-
ward delegation has also resulted in outward delegation. Some respon-
dents put emphasis on the advantage of these flexible solutions. Provi-
sions can be tailored to the individual needs and the people who make
the decisions about whom to help explicitly take into account the spe-
cific circumstances. Others, however, point to the erosion of the princi-
ple of ‘equality before the law’. Still most of them agree to the fact that
without these bypasses the impact of the Linking Act would have been
much more problematic.
A third finding concerns the indirect impact of the law. According to
many professionals, the introduction of the law and the debates that sur-
rounded it, have led to a hardening of the social climate. Some profes-
sionals have understood from the publicity surrounding the enactment
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of the Linking Act that they are supposed to send away illegal immi-
grants. Confusion, therefore, looms large. Furthermore, organisations
that aim at limiting their ‘dubious’ expenses try to saddle other organisa-
tions with illegal patients. But the law has also had influence on illegal
immigrants, who are even more convinced than before that they should
stay away from public organisations. This may be dangerous for them-
selves and, for instance in the case of diseases, also for the receiving soci-
ety. Respondents have mentioned several cases in which illegal immi-
grants do not make use of the few rights that they have. Examples of
children that no longer attend school (cf. Morelli and Braat 1999) and
mothers who do not register their babies, clearly point to this danger (cf.
Kraus 2000).
In sum, the conclusion that illegal immigrants do not make much use
of formal arrangements of the welfare state is still valid. The same goes
for the fact that illegal immigrants have at least some basic rights. Even
under the Linking Act it is not considered decent and humane, and it
could not be aligned with international treaties, to block these opportu-
nities. In broad lines, illegal immigrants are still able to make use of the
crucial rights. However, the Linking Act and earlier instruments of con-
trol have increased the likeliness of their being asked for formal docu-
ments, for example when looking for a job,138 when enrolling for a lan-
guage course and when trying to rent accommodation. The study as a
whole indicates that there is a difference between ‘detection’ and ‘exclu-
sion’ in this respect, the emphasis lying on the latter (cf. Engbersen
1999b).139 Yet both detection and exclusion are selective and run up against
social limits. There is a growing tension between the technical and legal
means designed to detect and exclude illegal immigrants and the willing-
ness of local actors to comply with the rules. When we summarise how
measures of internal migration control are implemented in practice and
what factors influence the compliance or non-compliance with restric-
tive rules, the following continuum arises:
In broad lines, the attitude towards internal migration control de-
pends on the professional morale, the degree of discretion and the level
of professionalisation within certain sectors. Teachers in primary educa-
tion and health care professional have a high level of autonomy in this
and they tend to use this autonomy to help rather than to exclude illegal
immigrants.140 On the other end of the spectrum we find employees of
housing corporations who have a much weaker profession and – at least
at the surface – apply the rules legalistically. Yet the analysis has also
shown that these factors cannot explain all variation. They are, for in-
stance, unable to account for intra-sector differences. The interviews
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give some clues as to other relevant factors. The tendency to be more le-
nient toward illegal immigrants appears to be correlated with a high de-
gree of face-to-face contacts with clients on a more personal basis. Pri-
mary education may serve as an example. In addition, illegal clients are
more likely not to be excluded when the selection of clients takes place at
the lower level and by the professionals themselves (GPs, regular police
officers). A third factor is the availability of reasonable market alterna-
tives. In the sectors of social housing and adult education, illegal immi-
grants can easily be referred to private landlords or to community cen-
tres. This means it is not too difficult for welfare state professionals to
send illegal immigrants away. A fourth factor may be the costs involved.
It is likely that higher (direct) costs encourage stricter enforcement. On
the whole, there have been limited sanctions or direct costs involved for
most Human Service Organisations so far. However, institutes for adult
education are not subsidised for illegal students, which clearly leads to a
high level of exclusion. In a similar way, managers of housing corpora-
tions fear to lose their authority over granting housing licenses when
they do not comply with the Linking Act. A fifth factor is the interaction
with other types of policies and policy aims. If police officers, for in-
stance, would go after illegal immigrants more rigorously, they would
pay less attention to their other tasks and responsibilities and they would
harm the legal immigrant population.141 The weighing of pros and cons of
emphasising one policy aim or another inevitably takes place at the local
level.
The main message that arises from this differentiated picture is that
in a strong welfare state like the Dutch, the implementation of internal
migration control measures hinges on a pluralistic and multi-layered
system of actors who have their own deliberations and professional con-
siderations. Therefore, it is not realistic to suggest that these actors can
simply be controlled from a distance.
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Figure 6.1 Dominant attitudes vis-a-vis illegal immigrants by sector
Dominant attitude
Lenient Strict
Regular police Aliens police
Primary Education Health care Housing Adult education Social assistance
The combined analysis of job opportunities, criminal activities and ac-
cess to public services has made clear that many illegal immigrants can
survive in the Netherlands. Opportunities for illegal labour – be it crimi-
nal or informal – partially exist because employers and employees make
use of loopholes in the system of control. Legal limits primarily block
mobility. When illegal immigrants want to climb up, they bump their
head against the legal ceiling. On the other hand, when they are in dan-
ger of falling too deep, they have the chance of being protected by a
safety net. Sometimes this takes place officially (when it concerns basic
rights), sometimes informally, because professionals are so deeply en-
trenched in a welfare state ideology that they bend the rules (cf. Burgers
1999a, De Swaan 1989). The practices as described here undoubtedly
have their distinctive (Dutch) features. It would require systematic com-
parative bottom-up research to know to what extent they are nationally
specific,142 but they are certainly not unique. All states that are currently
trying to cope with illegal immigration have to make compromises when
dealing with irregular migrants (Cornelius et al. 1994, Tapinos 1999,
Hollifield 2000).
The outcomes cast new light on discussions about why restrictive
policies are not implemented more effectively. Migration theories have
mostly focused on limits to policy-making stemming from decisions
and considerations at the national or supra-national level (Brubaker
1994). The present study indeed underscores how self-limitation of the
state (Joppke 1998) and a lack of bilateral co-ordination (in the case of
expulsions) mitigate restrictive tendencies. However, the study first and
foremost points to how the significance and scope of control and its out-
comes depend on the local social context and on local considerations.
The very reason that illegal immigrants can circumvent or bypass legal
limits, is that loopholes come into existence when local actors have – at
least partly – different considerations than proponents of full exclusion
or restriction. Pushing the restrictive policy further would in their opin-
ion lead to unacceptable situations and would run counter to their pro-
fessional or human standards. Parallel to what Van der Veen has shown
with regard to the allocation of social benefits more in general, social
limits at the level of implementation shape and limit the outcomes and
the consequences (Van der Veen 1990). In our case, fully effective exclu-
sion – which sounds plausible when formulated centrally – comes to a
halt at a certain point as a consequence of concrete local considerations
(cf. Tapinos 1999). On the other hand, a certain amount of leniency in
implementation does not imply that the Linking Act and its forerunners
have been without impact. According to many respondents who are in
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charge of implementing the restrictive and exclusionary policy at the lo-
cal level, the ever more far-reaching internal restrictiveness – in combi-
nation with a problematic policy of return – leads to unanticipated and
undesirable consequences not only for illegal immigrants, but also for
the receiving society. These consequences (or risks) and some policy al-
ternatives will be dealt with in the next section.
6.4 Policy implications and policy options
In 1985, Thomas Hammar concluded his book on European migration
policies by emphasising that integration policies for former guest work-
ers and other legal immigrants could only be successful if they went
hand in hand with a strict stance toward illegal immigration (Hammar
1985: 304). Yet, in the meantime, it has become clear that – for a number
of reasons – restrictive policies in democratic societies cannot effectively
curtail illegal immigration. In a world of economic imbalances, the push
for illegal immigrants to come to richer countries will never be fully
counterbalanced by the introduction of new laws and regulations. Nor
will illegal immigrants easily decide to return to their countries of origin,
because this involves high social and financial costs (Muus and Muller
1999, Burgers 1999a). The present study has pointed to some of the risks
of the present policy.
A first risk entails the creation of a layer of long-term socially ex-
cluded illegal residents (cf. Engbersen 1996, 1999b, Guiraudon and
Joppke 2001). Many now-legal immigrants started their residence in the
Netherlands illegally and subsequently obtained a legal status (Staring
2001: 183-206), which shows that a lack of legal status used to be a transi-
tory phenomenon in the recent past. The risk of the present policy is that
the boundary between illegal and legal residence is much harder to cross,
implying that people stay illegal immigrants for years. They may even be
unable to cross the line and become legal inhabitants. In some cases this
may even extend to a second generation of illegal immigrants: children
without a residence status who grow up without getting legalised, or
even worse: children whose birth is never registered (Kraus 2000). This
outcome runs counter to the view of, for instance, Soysal (1994) who has
claimed that illegal immigrants are increasingly granted amnesty, which
is the case in many Southern European countries, rather than in the
Northern countries.
A second risk – which is closely related to the first – is the crimi-
nalisation of life strategies of illegal immigrants (Engbersen 1999a). Al-
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though it was argued in chapter 3 that there is no automatic relationship
between illegality and criminality, it is not unlikely that – for lack of so-
cial buffers – newer groups of illegal immigrants will be pushed to crimi-
nal strategies. This holds in particular when they are not able to fall back
on well-established communities, because that makes them more de-
pendent on people who profit from illegal immigration, such as human
traffickers. The same may hold for economic activities, which are being
pushed underground and which are increasingly arranged by informal
subcontractors and other intermediaries.
A third risk, which is less often recognised, concerns a widening of
the gap between the official policy and local-level practices and, there-
fore, also the consequences for local actors. Many professionals and
semi-professionals in the fields of health care, housing and education,
point to the discrepancy between the fact that they are being allotted
gatekeeper tasks, while at the same time the official national policy – in
particular the expulsion policy – is largely ineffective. Hence, they feel
saddled with an unworkable situation, which is even more salient when
it is realised that the presence of illegal immigrants is highly concen-
trated within certain areas of the four main cities. In some instances, the
national government and urban or municipal authorities seem already
to be pulling in opposite directions. National politicians call for stricter
enforcement of the existing rules, while local authorities either plea for
acceptance of the fact that the rules cannot be fully enforced or look for
their own solutions. The pressure on certain organisations in these
neighbourhoods can be high.
It has been often argued that a double-edged migration policy can be
highly rational. It suggests a high level of restrictiveness and thereby re-
sponds to anti-immigrant sentiments; at the same time it tacitly allows
some loopholes, which can be advantageous to certain categories of em-
ployers and potentially also for the wider economy. Proponents of this
view tend to emphasise the ineffectiveness of restrictive measures. It
cannot be denied that there are symbolic elements in restrictive policies.
In fact, many policy measures depend on symbolic influence. Yet, the
present study has shown that – despite social limits to implementation –
the increasing restrictiveness and the growing emphasis on exclusion
have also had considerable impact on opportunities for illegal immi-
grants, in particular on those who stay longer. The study also suggests
that at the local level, the present policy leads to internal contradictions
and dilemmas that cannot be solved by going further down the road of
internal control or remote control. The findings raise the question as to
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alternative policy options. Building on the framework of the study, the
policy options presented below focus on more creative ways of address-
ing problems that arise when the restrictiveness reaches its limitations.
Such an approach can be rooted in the existing policy and does not have
to interfere with attempts to co-operate with other countries in order to
reduce illegal entries or more radical attempts to address ‘root-causes’ of
clandestine migration, which are not systematically dealt with here. In
the following, I will give some leads as to what a more creative approach
to problems of settlement and exclusion might encompass in the Dutch
case.
First, assuming for the time being that immigrants from Third World
countries will continue to try and make a living in advanced nations, it
should be attempted to lower the propensity that they become illegal im-
migrants. One of the ways in which this can be done is by widening the
opportunities for (legal) temporary labour by immigrants (cf. Collinson
1993, 1994, Doomernik, Penninx and Van Amersfoort 1997, Burgers and
Engbersen 1999). Recent German experiences – where extensive new la-
bour migration programs are carried out – can serve as an example.
Pushed in this direction by a booming economy and an increasing
shortage of labour, the Dutch policy seems to be slowly heading in this
direction.143 The number of work permits that are issued is on the rise, and
the possibilities for labour by asylum seekers are gradually – albeit slowly
– augmented. It is not clear if or to what extent a less defensive system of
admitting economic immigrants would really curb the number of illegal
immigrants trying to get in. But as unemployment rates have fallen dra-
matically and as the indigenous population is rapidly ageing, the task of
reassurance appears to become easier. In order to prevent that immi-
grants will still be pulled into the informal economy, this policy option
should be accompanied by controls on labour subcontractors and other
intermediaries, both in the informal economy (such as gangmasters and
employers who exploit illegal workers) and in the criminal sphere (such
as human smugglers).144
Second, more creative policy of return should be developed. Like
other European countries the Netherlands faces social, political, techni-
cal and financial difficulties when trying to encourage return of illegal
immigrants. In practice, the involvement of illegal immigrants in crime
in Rotterdam (and Amsterdam) appears to be combated primarily
within the larger framework of combating crime in general, which ap-
pears to be a sensible way of dealing with the issue. Problems arise, how-
ever, when (criminal) illegal immigrants have to be expelled. So far,
these problems have been mainly addressed by relying on the effect of
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detention. This has led to a growing population of detained immigrants
who take up space in prison and who often have to be released after a few
months because the prospect of effective expulsion is lacking. The expe-
riences so far indicate that detention is a costly and ineffective way of
dealing with the issue. Experiments with ways of return that leave room
for negotiation with the illegal immigrants concerned may offer a way
out in these cases. There are, for instance, assisted voluntary return pro-
grams implemented in co-operation with IOM (IOM 2000), which pro-
vide a framework for co-operation between sending, transit and receiv-
ing states in effecting direct returns. Another interesting example is a
recent experiment in the detention centre in the city of Tilburg where
North African illegal immigrants who had lost every sense of perspective
could follow a bricklaying course. Consequently, they were encouraged
to return to their home country and build up a new life with their newly
acquired skills. Experiments like these, geared to specific target groups,
deserve much more attention as alternatives to the insoluble problems
with expulsion of unidentifiable illegal immigrants.
Thirdly, it deserves consideration to develop a continuation of the
individual post hoc regularisation of illegal immigrants who manage to
incorporate despite all formal barriers (cf. Hammar 1994). In 1998, the
French paper La Libération phrased it as follows: ‘Au sud on regularise
par vague. Au nord, c’ est au cas par cas.’ (La Libération February 27
1998). In the past two decades, Southern European countries have in-
deed been much more generous in legalising illegal immigrants on the
basis of a general amnesty, whereas countries like the Netherlands have
been very reserved so far. After the regularisations of 1975 and 1979, there
has been no large-scale amnesty in the Netherlands. In the second half of
the 1990s, there has been a special programme for semi-integrated white
illegal immigrants, but so far only a few thousand people have success-
fully claimed a status under this programme (Dronkers 2000).
Compared to other European countries, the numbers are very limited
(Apap, De Bruycker, Schmitter, De Seze and Ray 2000).145 It is likely that
restraints will not be feasible in the long run. As every regularisation also
carries the risk of undermining the remainder of the restrictive policy as
a result of rising expectations, these amnesties can take place on an indi-
vidual basis. Experiences up till now suggest that leaving the decisions to
a small committee of members with a good local knowledge of the situa-
tion and a high level of discretionary autonomy is the most promising
approach (Dronkers 2000).
The fourth building block is based on the recognition of the impor-
tance of local networks and organisations and fits in best with the Dutch
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policy of ‘condoning’ or gedogen. It is obvious that the presence of illegal
immigrants is highly concentrated within certain urban localities. This
may become even more germane after the implementation of the Aliens
Act 2000 (enacted April 1st 2001), which focuses on speeding up asylum
procedures and on removing certain rights for appeal. As the policy of
return is highly problematic, one of the likely effects is that municipali-
ties will be again confronted with the presence of groups of illegal immi-
grants who have few formal rights, and who are not likely to return to
their home countries. Hence, changing the locus of control to the lower
policy levels should be accompanied by the recognition that local gov-
ernments and local organisations should be taken seriously. They should
not only be responsible for trying to keep out illegal immigrants, but also
for weighing the pros and cons of supporting or excluding people. Since
local networks and organisations that lend support to illegal immigrants
in trouble fulfil important tasks in preventing excesses, they should be
supported both financially and in terms of recognition. Until now, these
principles are confined to the domain of medical care, through the
Koppelingsfonds or Linking Fund. Similar funds could be established for
schools and for safety net organisations such as shelters for the homeless.
The importance of these arrangements is that they can guarantee basic
standards of human treatment to all people present in the country with-
out putting all the pressure on specific organisations or individuals. Like
in the case of the regional networks for health care arrangements, it is
preferable to have these provisions organised by local networks. This
also implies that it is crucial to be more active in protecting the few social
rights that illegal immigrants have by being clear and open about the fact
that illegal immigrants are entitled to medical care, to legal assistance
and to primary education.
The above-mentioned policy building blocks are not meant to offer a
quick fix to illegal immigration. Experiences in the four largest Dutch
cities have underlined that the presence of illegal immigrants is a com-
plex and multifaceted phenomenon that cannot be dealt with in isola-
tion. The most sensible answer, therefore, seems to be a cautious combi-
nation of the options described above whereby both the anticipated and
the unanticipated implications are taken into account and whereby lo-




1. Interviews with illegal immigrants in Rotterdam
For information on strategies and labour market position of illegal im-
migrants, data was collected within the framework of the Unknown City
project in Rotterdam (see Burgers and Engbersen 1999). Between 1993
and 1995, 169 interviews with illegal immigrants were held in Rotterdam,
of which the outcomes formed the backbone of the research project. We
used a wide variety of search channels and came into contact with people
from the traditional immigrant groups in the Netherlands (Turks, Mo-
roccans, Surinamese and Cape Verdeans) and with illegal immigrants
from other countries such as Pakistan and Ghana. About one quarter of
the research group was female. The interviews took between half an
hour and several hours. Some respondents were visited several times.
Most interviews were held in Dutch or English, some in the mother
tongue of the respondents. All conversations were typed out on the basis
of notes or tape recordings. Most respondents were between twenty and
forty years of age. The table below summarises some basic characteris-
tics. When citations are used throughout the text, the numbers refer to
the codes in the first column.
Code Nationality Sex Age Length of stay (years)
101 Moroccan male 27 4
102 Moroccan male 25 2
103 Moroccan male 31 2
104 Moroccan male 28 4
105 Moroccan male 28 2
106 Moroccan male 24 4
107 Moroccan male 25 3
108 Moroccan male 25 2
109 Moroccan male 33 3
110 Moroccan male 26 3
111 Moroccan male 41 3
112 Moroccan male 33 3
113 Algerian male 32 4
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Code Nationality Sex Age Length of stay (years)
114 Moroccan male 35 3
115 Moroccan male 28 4
116 Moroccan male 21 <1
117 Moroccan male 29 3
118 Moroccan male 35 <1
119 Moroccan male 30 2
120 Moroccan male 22 3
121 Moroccan male 33 3
122 Moroccan male 33 4
123 Moroccan male 29 2
124 Moroccan male 36 5
125 Moroccan male 36 5
126 Moroccan male 31 5
127 Algerian male 34 3
128 Moroccan male 26 3
129 Moroccan male 26 3
130 Moroccan male 24 2
131 Moroccan male 29 5
132 Algerian male 20 1
133 Moroccan male 30 1
134 Moroccan female 26 1
135 Moroccan male 29 2
136 Moroccan male 27 1
137 Moroccan male 28 2
138 Moroccan male 25 <1
139 Moroccan female 34 <1
140 Moroccan male 36 4
141 Moroccan male 33 3
142 Moroccan male 39 5
143 Moroccan male 24 2
144 Moroccan male 22 1
145 Moroccan male 28 5
146 Moroccan male 24 6
147 Moroccan male 23 3
148 Moroccan male 22 2
149 Moroccan male 23 5
150 Moroccan male 25 6
201 Turkish male 21 <1
202 Turkish male 23 <1
203 Turkish male 26 2
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Code Nationality Sex Age Length of stay (years)
204 Turkish male 29 1
205 Turkish male 28 5
206 Turkish male 35 3
207 Turkish female 31 3
208 Turkish male 17 2
209 Turkish male 33 1
210 Turkish female 42 2
211 Turkish male 19 3
212 Turkish female 31 2
213 Turkish male 43 4
214 Turkish male 28 1
215 Turkish male 21 2
216 Turkish male 41 7
217 Turkish male 25 1
218 Turkish male 23 2
219 Turkish male 43 3
220 Turkish male 34 1
221 Turkish male 26 2
222 Turkish male 28 2
223 Turkish male 23 1
224 Turkish male 38 10
225 Turkish male 44 <1
226 Turkish male 39 3
227 Turkish male 31 2
228 Turkish male 33 4
229 Turkish male 27 2
230 Turkish male 23 1
231 Turkish male 37 4
232 Turkish male 29 1
233 Turkish male 28 4
234 Turkish female 17 1
235 Turkish male 39 1
236 Turkish male 31 6
237 Turkish male 30 1
238 Turkish male 39 1
239 Turkish male 42 2
240 Turkish male 22 2
241 Turkish male 25 4
242 Turkish male 36 3
243 Turkish male 21 1
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Code Nationality Sex Age Length of stay (years)
244 Turkish male 32 5
245 Turkish female 11 3
246 Turkish female 9 3
247 Turkish male 44 3
301 Cape Verdean female 24 1
302 Cape Verdean male 41 20
303 Cape Verdean female 28 3
304 Cape Verdean female 29 3
305 Cape Verdean male 24 1
306 Cape Verdean male 29 3
307 Cape Verdean female 26 1
308 Cape Verdean male 27 1
309 Cape Verdean female 32 <1
310 Cape Verdean female 33 <1
311 Cape Verdean female 34 1
312 Cape Verdean female 40 4
313 Moroccan female 29 8
314 Cape Verdean female 18 1
315 Cape Verdean female 19 1
316 Cape Verdean female 25 1
317 Cape Verdean female 34 9
318 Cape Verdean male 58 23
401 Pakistani male 29 1
402 Pakistani male 28 7
403 Pakistani male 31 3
404 Pakistani male 24 3
405 Pakistani male 28 4
406 Pakistani male 31 4
407 Pakistani male 29 1
408 Pakistani male 42 6
501 Czechoslovakian female 22 <1
502 Yugoslavian male 22 <1
503 Polish female 26 4
504 Romanian female 37 4
505 Romanian male 19 1
506 Polish female 30 1
507 Romanian male 26 3
508 Romanian female 26 4
509 Romanian male 25 1
510 Polish female 25 5
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Code Nationality Sex Age Length of stay (years)
511 Russian male 36 3
512 Russian female 35 3
513 Polish male 26 <1
514 Polish male 21 <1
515 Croatian female 24 1
601 Palestinian male 26 <1
602 Surinamese male 49 2
603 Surinamese female 28 2
604 Surinamese male 33 1
605 Togolese male 30 3
606 Jamaican male 24 2
607 Bengali male 42 <1
608 Surinamese male 31 2
609 Cameroonian female 24 <1
610 Georgian female 19 1
611 Georgian male 20 1
612 Surinamese male 26 2
613 Surinamese male 19 2
614 Cameroonian female 25 1
615 Cameroonian female 22 2
616 Cameroonian female 34 2
617 Cameroonian female 28 1
618 Moldavian female 37 2
619 Czechoslovakian male 30 3
620 Czechoslovakian male 32 4
621 Cameroonian male 29 3
622 Cameroonian male 25 2
623 Czechoslovakian male 32 1
624 Georgian female 57 3
625 Surinamese male 26 2
626 Cameroonian male 24 1
627 Nigerian male 29 1
628 Ghanaian female 22 1
629 Surinamese male 26 3
630 Czechoslovakian female 18 <1
631 Surinamese male 23 1
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2. Police files
For the analysis of criminal activities, we made use of files of the Rotter-
dam-Rijnmond Police. The Ministry of Justice gave permission to use
the data for this purpose.
Samples
The central sample has been taken from the files of the Aliens Depart-
ment in Rotterdam (1989-1994). It is based on the VRS (Vreemdelingen
Registratie Systeem), which has in the meantime been replaced by a new
(national) system. The file contains information on apprehensions of
328 illegal immigrants. The sample fraction was 1:25. The central sample
can be compared with two other samples, which contain data on legal
foreigners who have been registered and apprehended in Rotterdam.
These files were taken from (a) registration of legal aliens in VRS (sam-
ple fraction 1:150) and (b) registration of legally residing criminal sus-
pects in HKS (Herkenningssysteem), sample fraction 1:40. A follow-up
study was conducted in the four large cities in 1995. This study was based
on a file of all apprehensions of illegal immigrants in the four largest
cities in one year amounting to a total of nearly 7,000 apprehensions
(Van der Leun et al. 1998).
Categorisation
The reasons for apprehension have been re-coded in order to differenti-
ate between different types of criminal activities on the one hand and il-
legal residence or work on the other. When more reasons were men-
tioned, the decisive factor was the most severe reason for apprehension
as registered in the police files. The Dutch legal system distinguishes be-
tween misdemeanours (overtredingen) and more severe offences (mis-
drijven). Offences were further classified into minor offences, serious of-
fences and drug-related offences. Our five categories are based on this
distinction, on the maximum sanction and on the type of legislation that
is violated (see also Engbersen, Van der Leun and Willems 1995). In all
instances, we had to rely on police reports. With the term ‘criminal ac-
tivities’ we do not refer to the categories of illegal residence and misde-
meanours. It must be noted that the data concern reasons for apprehen-
sions, not convictions.
– Illegal residence (maximum sanction: expulsion). An immigrant who
resides in the Netherlands has to fulfil the conditions of the Aliens leg-
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islation. Illegal residence means that an individual resides in the Neth-
erlands without having a valid residence permit or that he or she
attempts to enter the country illegally. People who are involved in an
asylum procedure are not illegally in the country. When the applica-
tion is rejected, however, the person can become illegal. Illegal work is
commonly not registered separately, which implies that people who
have been apprehended for illegal labour mostly fall under the cate-
gory of illegal residence.
– (Other) Misdemeanours (maximum punishment of 1 year imprison-
ment). In this category we find fair dodging in public transport, pub-
lic disorder, minor traffic offences and municipal violations.
– Minor offences (maximum punishment 4 years imprisonment). With
minor offences we refer to shoplifting, theft from cars, burglary and
other non-aggravated crimes against property. Moreover, vandalism,
public order offences and the possession of false documents fall under
this category.
– Serious offences (maximum punishment 20 years of imprisonment).
This category comprises offences such as aggravated theft, the use of
violence, intimidation, assault and battery, murder and manslaugh-
ter, and the possession of firearms.
– Drug-related offences (maximum punishment 12 years of imprison-
ment). The category of drug-related offences refers to the possession
or trafficking of hard drugs. These violations of the Opium Act differ
in severity and vary from possession of small quantities for personal
use to large-scale drug trafficking. In most instances, the Aliens police
do not register quantities of the drugs found on illegal immigrants.
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3. Interviews with police officers
To gain insight into police practices, interviews were held with 41 police
officers who worked for aliens departments and basic units in the four
largest cities in 1996 and 1997. We aimed at interviewing police officers,
detectives (AP) (who usually work for the aliens departments), immi-
gration officers (AP) and members of staff. The emphasis was on people
who come into contact with illegal immigrants directly. In some in-
stances we were able to contact people directly when doing the quantita-
tive research, in other instances, the management arranged appoint-
ments. Nobody refused to co-operate and most respondents were open
about their working experiences. All interviews were held with the per-
mission of the relevant Ministries and the heads of the departments.
They took between 1 and 2 hours and were usually held in police stations
and were recorded and typed out verbatim.
Number Code City Details
1 A01 Amsterdam Staff officer (AP)
2 A02 Amsterdam Detective (AP)
3 A03 Amsterdam Officer basic unit
4 A04 Amsterdam Officer basic unit
5 A05 Amsterdam Staff officer
6 A06 Amsterdam Staff officer
7 A07 Amsterdam Detective (AP)
8 A08 Amsterdam Detective (AP)
9 A09 Amsterdam Immigration officer (AP)
10 A10 Amsterdam Officer basic unit
11 A11 Amsterdam Officer basic unit
12 A12 Amsterdam Immigration officer (AP)
13 A13 Amsterdam Immigration officer (AP)
14 A14 Amsterdam 2 Officers basic units
15 R01 Rotterdam Officer basic unit
16 R02 Rotterdam Immigration officer (AP)
17 R03 Rotterdam Detective (AP)
18 R04 Rotterdam Detective (AP)
19 R05 Rotterdam Detective (AP)
20 R06 Rotterdam Staff officer
21 R07 Rotterdam Staff officer
22 R08 Rotterdam Officer basic unit
23 R09 Rotterdam Staff officer
24 R10 Rotterdam Detective (AP)
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Number Code City Details
25 R11 Rotterdam Detective (AP)
26 H01 Rotterdam Detective (AP)
27 H02 The Hague Immigration officer (AP)
28 H03 The Hague Detective (AP)
29 H04 The Hague Detective (AP)
30 H05 The Hague Detective (AP)
31 H06 The Hague Detective (AP)
32 H07 The Hague Staff officer
33 U01 Utrecht Staff officer
34 U02 Utrecht Detective (AP)
35 U03 Utrecht Detective (AP)
36 U04 Utrecht Immigration officer (AP)
37 U05 Utrecht Officer basic unit
38 U06 Utrecht Detective (AP)
39 U07 Utrecht Detective (AP)
40 U08 Utrecht Detective (AP)
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4. Interviews in other sectors
All respondents noted in chapter 5 have been interviewed on a face-to-
face basis. Organisations in the relevant sectors in the four cities were se-
lected by making use of the national telephone directory, local directo-
ries and personal contacts. Respondents were initially contacted by tele-
phone, with the question whether they were willing to co-operate with
research on the policy toward illegal immigrants in general and the
Linking Act in particular. It was emphasised that they did not necessarily
have to be aware of the contents of the legislation to be able to co-oper-
ate. Although the interviews focused on sensitive information such as
informal practices, we did not encounter difficulties when we ap-
proached institutions and respondents. Neither did we have the impres-
sion that respondents were withholding relevant information. Only a
few respondents refused to co-operate. The first round of interviews was
held in 1996 and 1997 in three of the four cities, the second round in 1999
in all four cities. The first round was largely exploratory. The second
round focused more systematically on the sectors housing, healthcare,
education and social benefits. Part of the interviews in the first round
and all interviews in the second round were recorded and typed out ver-
batim.
Before the Linking Act, 1996-1997
Number Code City Sector
1 Inf. R1 Rotterdam Police
2 inf. R2 Rotterdam Adult education
3 inf. R3 Rotterdam Adult education
4 inf. R4 Rotterdam Community work
5 inf. R5 Rotterdam Police
6 inf. R6 Rotterdam Local anti-drug project
7 inf. R7 Rotterdam Psychiatric Centre
8 inf. R8 Rotterdam Housing corporation
9 inf. R9 Rotterdam Primary school
10 inf. R10 Rotterdam GP
11 inf. R11 Rotterdam Police
12 inf. A1 Amsterdam Church
13 inf. A2 Amsterdam Housing corporation
14 inf. A3 Amsterdam Health Service
15 inf. A4 Amsterdam Primary school
16 inf. A5 Amsterdam Primary school
17 inf. A6 Amsterdam GP
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Number Code City Sector
18 inf. A7 Amsterdam Housing corporation
19 inf. A8 Amsterdam Housing corporation
20 inf. A9 Amsterdam Police
21 inf. A10 Amsterdam Police
22 Inf. U1 Utrecht Community centre
23 Inf. U2 Utrecht Police
24 Inf. U3 Utrecht Community centre
25 Inf. U4 Utrecht Housing
26 Inf. U5 Utrecht Police
27 Inf. U6 Utrecht Housing
28 Inf. U7 Utrecht Education
29 Inf. U8 Utrecht Education
30 Inf. U9 Utrecht Education
31 Inf. U10 Utrecht Community centre
32 Inf. U11 Utrecht Health service
After the Linking Act, 1998-1999
Number/Code Sector City Details
1 Healthcare The Hague Policymaker
2 Healthcare Leiden Doctor
3 Other (politics) Leiden Alderman
4 Education Amsterdam Teacher
5 Healthcare Rotterdam Psychiatrist
6 Housing The Hague Eligibility worker
7 Housing The Hague Policymaker
8 Housing The Hague Policymaker
9 Housing The Hague Eligibility worker
10 Healthcare/ Social work Rotterdam Staff member
11 Education The Hague Policymaker
12 Housing The Hague Policymaker
13 Housing The Hague Policymaker
14 Social benefits Amsterdam Union worker
15 Education The Hague Headmaster
16 Social benefits Rotterdam Legal worker
17 Healthcare Rotterdam Policymaker
18 Healthcare Rotterdam Doctor
19 Healthcare Rotterdam Physiotherapist
20 Healthcare Rotterdam Physiotherapist
21 Education The Hague Teacher
22 Housing Amsterdam Eligibility worker
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Number/Code Sector City Details
23 Social benefits The Hague Policy
24 Housing Rotterdam Policy
25 Housing Amsterdam Eligibility worker
26 Housing Amsterdam Policy
27 Education The Hague Headmaster
28 Education The Hague Teacher
29 Education The Hague Teacher
30 Healthcare Amsterdam Psychiatrist
31 Education Utrecht Union worker
32 Healthcare Amsterdam Doctor/GP
33 Healthcare Utrecht Legal worker
34 Education Rotterdam Teacher
35 Healthcare Amsterdam Insurance company
36 Education Rotterdam School director
37 Healthcare Utrecht Doctor
38 Healthcare Amsterdam Nurse
39 Healthcare Amsterdam Nurse
40 Healthcare Amsterdam Administrator
41 Healthcare Amsterdam Social worker
42 Healthcare Amsterdam Insurance
43 Healthcare Utrecht Psychiatrist
44 Healthcare Amsterdam Midwife
45 Education Amsterdam Director
46 Education Utrecht Administrator
47 Education Utrecht Student Counsellor
48 Education Amsterdam Teacher
49 Education Amsterdam Administrator
50 Education Amsterdam Administrator
51 Education Amsterdam Teacher
52 Education Amsterdam Teacher
53 Education Amsterdam Teacher
54 Education Amsterdam Administrator
55 Healthcare Amsterdam Doctor
56 Healthcare Amsterdam Administrator
57 Healthcare Amsterdam Nurse
58 Social benefits Amsterdam Policymaker
59 Social benefits Amsterdam Policymaker
60 Education Amsterdam Staff member
61 Social benefits Utrecht Policymaker
62 Healthcare Utrecht Doctor/Administrator
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Notes
1. Throughout the study I use the term ‘undocumented’ or ‘illegal’ immi-
grant – the first being a more neutral term, the latter being more com-
monly used. Instead of the legal terms foreigner or alien, I prefer to speak
about immigrants. The term immigrants here refers to foreign-born per-
sons and their offspring, irrespective of their nationality. In Dutch policy
documents the terms ‘ethnic minorities’ and ‘allochtonous’ are frequently
used (see for example WRR 1979, Muus 1999: 25-26, SCP 1998: chapter 9).
These terms are in principle reserved for groups that are specifically tar-
geted by minority policies and are therefore directly dependent on the pol-
icy framework in a certain period of time.
2. The term ‘white illegals’ has been tagged to people who came to the Neth-
erlands before 1991 and who are in the possession of a social-fiscal num-
ber. They have usually worked in the Netherlands, paid premiums and
taxes and many of them claim a residence status by legal means. So far, a
few thousand immigrants have received a special amnesty. Many of those
who were refused still strive for recognition (Dronkers 2000).
3. For an explanation of the term beleid, see for example Blankenburg and
Bruinsma (1994) and Favell (2000), who both maintain that the Dutch
word beleid has a more specific meaning than the English word policy. Be-
leid stands for a deeply rooted tradition of formulating encompassing and
structured sets of rationally based measures to combat (social) problems.
4. Act of March 26th 1998, Staatsblad 1998, 203. The Ministry of Justice trans-
lates the name of the Act as ‘Residence Benefit Act’, but a more common
designation is ‘Linking Act’ (cf. Minderhoud 2000).
5. Until recently, most European decisions in the field of immigration have
been dealt with within the so-called third pillar (Justice and Home affairs).
By now, the question of immigration has moved to the centre of the Euro-
pean policy agenda (Lahav 1998, Favell 2000).
6. This eclectic approach is both the potential strength and the potential
weakness of the present study. On the one hand it tries to build bridges be-
tween separate fields of literature, on the other hand it cannot do justice to
all these theoretical perspectives in full detail.
7. Tables like these are to some extent distorting, because immigrants from
advanced economies are excluded from the definition.
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8. Some years ago, a discussion in this respect took place in the Journal Mi-
grantenstudies, see Böcker and Groenendijk (1995, 1996) and Burgers
(1996a). See also Burgers 1995, Van der Leun et al. 1998.
9. Larson and Sullivan (1987: 1475) maintain that ‘Conventional numbers in
immigration statistics are those round figures that become reified in jour-
nalistic and other popular uses. Conventional numbers provide an order
of magnitude rather than a count, but they are important because of their
potential political impact’.
10. Earlier, Burgers (1995) combined police data with information taken from
interviews and estimated the undocumented population in Rotterdam to
amount to approximately 11,000 illegal immigrants.
11. The estimate is based on the capture-recapture method, as developed by
Peter van der Heijden, Statistical Department of Utrecht University (Van
der Heijden 1994, Smit et al. 1994). Currently, a method to calculate a con-
fidence interval for this estimate is not available.
12. This also holds for general measures, such as the introduction of health
care numbers, educational numbers etc. According to one Dutch newspa-
per, the average Dutch person is now registered in 900 places (de Volks-
krant September 15th 2000: ‘Mensen steeds vaker een nummer’ [People
increasingly a number]).
13. Compare Gächter et al. 2000: 12, who distinguishes nine categories, some
of which are not relevant here (i.e. commuters and fully legal immigrants).
14. Rules for admission are laid down in the Aliens Act. The basic definition
adopted here implies that immigrants who are allowed to stay in the coun-
try when awaiting the outcome of a legal procedure are not defined as ille-
gal immigrants, whereas those who are supposed to do so in the country of
origin are. Both categories fall under the label of gedoogden or ‘tolerated
immigrants’ (Commissie Zeevalking 1991: 14-17). See also Van der Leun et
al. 1998, 16-17.
15. Obviously, though, Western European immigrants are not the main re-
search objects. In the qualitative research, therefore, they are left out.
16. Informal economic activities have to take place in frameworks of trust.
This trust can be generated by social networks, which enable the informal
provision of labour, capital and products. As Portes and Sensenbrenner
(1993) have argued, immigrants show a heightened sense of community –
due to their ‘foreignness’ and the specific circumstances created by the
processes of migration and settlement. They are, hence, most likely to gen-
erate this kind of social capital (Kloosterman, Van der Leun and Rath
1998).
17. Of which one of the unintended consequences is that a high level of (for-
mal) inactivity is encouraged as well (Kloosterman et al. 1998).
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18. Sarah Mahler (1995), who puts most emphasis on the dead-end position of
illegal immigrants, concludes that their social mobility is thwarted by the
combination of a lack of fluency in English, a skills mismatch, the unfa-
vourable position within immigrant networks and the lack of a legal sta-
tus.
19. The question whether or to what extent illegal immigrants feel being part
of the receiving society (see for example Chavez 1994) is therefore left aside
here.
20. The Turkish ‘community’ in Rotterdam, however, comes closest to an
ethnic enclave, see Kloosterman and Van der Leun 1999 and Staring 2001.
21. There is a direct relation between internal migration controls on the one
hand and immigration controls on the other. As Walzer (1983) has shown,
societies can only be open if the borders are at least to a certain extent
closed. Conversely, porous borders may very well encourage internal con-
trols, see Hammar 1985: 10.
22. Joppke has recently qualified the debate as ‘nation state bashing’ versus
‘nation state defending’ (Joppke 1998). Others, such as Faist (1997) try to
stir a middle course by focusing on the relationship between migration
policies and types of welfare states in the tradition of Esping-Andersen
(1990). Faist maintains that highly regulated welfare states like the Federal
Republic of Germany (and mutatis mutandis the Netherlands) are much
more oriented towards excluding illegal immigrants from the labour mar-
ket and the extensive public provisions than liberal welfare states. Yet, he
also overlooks contradictory practices when he pictures Germany as ut-
terly restrictive toward illegal labour and illegal residence (cf. Wilpert
1997, Alt 1999). It becomes clear, however, from the work by Faist and oth-
ers in this field, that simply concluding that there is a gap between laws
and practices does not suffice.
23. Another relevant sector might be legal assistance. Under the present laws,
illegal immigrants are not excluded from legal support.
24. Exceptions are for example Leman 1995, 1997, Jordan and Vogel 1997,
Wilpert 1997, Alt 1999. See also Böcker 1994, Eichenhofer 1999, Çinar,
Gächter and Waldrauch 2000.
25. The main topics of the interviews were migration history, labour market
history, housing situation, health and health care, encounters with formal
institutions and the role of ethnic communities. For the ethnographic ac-
count see Staring 2001.
26. A second reason to dedicate a chapter to crime is that illegal immigrants’
involvement in crime may be one of the unintended consequences of re-
strictive legislation.
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27. The estimate is based on a combination of methods using data on ‘elec-
tricity input’ and ‘currency demand’. It concerns all unreported transac-
tions that would normally be taxable.
28. Illegal labour is understood as employment, which is in conflict with the
Law on Employment of Foreigners (WAV). In principle it can encompass
both tax-paid (commonly called ‘white’) and non-tax-paid (so-called
‘black’) labour, depending on the degree of tax evasion and tax avoidance.
Illegal labour is not confined to people who stay in the country illegally,
nor do illegal immigrants always work illegally (see chapter 1, section 1.3).
29. There are some examples, however. Asylum seekers are by now allowed to
work a certain number of weeks every year during the fruit harvest and
other preventive measures encompass the (relatively unsuccessful) at-
tempts to stimulate long-term unemployed Dutch citizens to accept tem-
porary jobs in the asparagus culture. Both sectors have a reputation for re-
lying on illegal employment.
30. Paradoxically, this has not been the case anymore since the enactment of
the Linking Act, see chapter 5.
31. The National Government Audit analysed a sample of 100 randomly se-
lected actions. During these actions, 263 illegal immigrants were appre-
hended, of whom 43 per cent were expelled (Algemene Rekenkamer 1999).
32. The team raided 141 out of a total of 2,800 employers in the sector. They
encountered 99 employees without a valid working permit, of whom 65
were illegal immigrants (Westland Interventie Team 2000).
33. For an elaboration of legalisation strategies of Turkish ‘tourists’, see
Staring 2001.
34. Some respondents pay a certain percentage of their income to the owner
of the social-fiscal number, which may cause tax problems for the owner.
35. The same probably holds for the Chinese community (cf. Rijkschroeff
1998).
36. The other side of the coin is that illegal immigrants often complain about
the low financial rewards and the unequal treatment they receive, see
Staring 2001.
37. There are parts of the city where vans or minibuses openly pick up immi-
grant workers, who are transported to greenhouses or other places to
work, early in the morning. This practice is increasing since the rules for
starting an employment agency have been eased and is often associated
with illegal employment.
38. Both the prevailing terminology and the registration practices differ
across countries. In the Netherlands, nationality identifiers are available in
some police statistics.
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39. This is not necessarily the result of criminal involvement, since illegal im-
migrants are often detained pending expulsion.
40. As to organised crime, the findings are considerably different (Bovenkerk
1996).
41. In some countries the debate has become heavily focused on one particu-
lar group, such as the Albanians in Greece and in Italy, while in other
countries it concerns more diffuse fears of ‘criminal aliens’.
42. An estimated seven billion dollars are earned world-wide in the trafficking
industry per year (IOM, 1998, The Economist, October 16th 1999). Illegal
immigrants are both victims and ‘clients’ of these smuggling practices and
there seems to be a growing dependence on these illicit services (Koser
1998). The vulnerability of the immigrants in question was dramatically
made clear in the ‘Dover tragedy’ in which 58 Chinese illegal immigrants
who were being smuggled into the UK suffocated in a truck on a hot sum-
mer day in June 2000.
43. Probably the least is known about illegal immigrants as victims of crime,
as they are unlikely to seek protection of the law. In February 2001, the
Chinese community in Rotterdam protested openly against the high level
of crime in their neighbourhood. Among other things, they claimed that
many victims did not report robberies to the police, because they were in
the country illegally and they feared being expelled.
44. The criminal activities formed an implicit topic of the interviews. They
came about when discussing sources of income, for example, or when
speaking about their experiences with the police. In some instances people
were interviewed during their activities or after the police had appre-
hended them. In these cases it made no sense to deny their source of in-
come.
45. A follow-up study was made for the four largest cities (Van der Leun, Van
der Heijden and Engbersen 1998). In table 3.4, I also refer to these data.
46. Asylum seekers and people who were in the meantime legally residing
were left out.
47. The results of these cross-checks indicate that the illegal status of immi-
grants is not always noticed. This may be because police officers do not al-
ways (adequately) check the immigration status, or because the immigra-
tion status has changed after the registration. On the other hand, our
research suggests that in most cases the lack of status is recognised by the
police, contrary to what is sometimes shown to demonstrate that we seri-
ously underestimate the criminal involvement of illegal immigrants (cf.
VRIS 1999).
48. Sixteen immigrants who turned out to be illegally in the country were left
out.
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49. The Dutch police record the country of birth and the nationality of a sus-
pect in this section of HKS. This implies that it is possible to identify first-
generation immigrants. Second-generation immigrants who are born in
the Netherlands can only be identified as long as they are not naturalised.
Illegal immigrants cannot have the Dutch nationality, so in their case na-
tionality criteria do not create any problems. Antilleans are Dutch citizens
by birth and cannot be illegal residents.
50. The figures refer to apprehensions, not to the number of individuals in-
volved.
51. According to official data, the total number of immigrants in the city of
Rotterdam lies between 163,000 and 253,000 depending on the definitions
used (COS 1999).
52. In 1995, there were the equivalent of 78 full-timers involved in the surveil-
lance of illegal immigrants in Rotterdam (Van der Leun et al. 1998: 60).
The number of posts is comparable to Amsterdam, see chapter 4.
53. The VRS (Foreigner Registration System) was one of the (local) forerun-
ners of the national VAS (Foreigner Administration System).
54. This also holds for the time between 1996 and 1998 (Politie Rotterdam
Rijnmond, unpublished data).
55. A third possibility is that they stay in another country. Of the 169 respon-
dents in Rotterdam, 13 had applied for asylum in an earlier stage.
56. Whether they have left the country in between remains unknown.
57. About one third of the files in Rotterdam contain an address. This is either
the address where the person is apprehended or the address where the per-
son claims to be living. A third option is that it is an address that is found
in the possession of the apprehended immigrants.
58. These data pertain to all apprehensions of illegal immigrants in Rotterdam
in 1995 (Van der Leun et al. 1998).
59. Under the Dutch Aliens Act, illegal residence is not a criminal offence. The
main sanction is expulsion. Illegal labour, furthermore, is a violation of la-
bour regulations and employment laws and is – under the present legisla-
tion – comparable to a misdemeanour.
60. As a consequence, the data provide very little information on activities in
prostitution. Only five out of 328 people were explicitly registered as pros-
titutes (four women and one man).
61. This attitude can, of course, also be interpreted as a ‘neutralising strategy’
(cf. Sykes and Matza 1957).
62. The follow-up study in the four largest cities (based on all apprehensions
during 1995) showed important parallels to what we concluded on the
basis of the sample in Rotterdam.
63. See for more details Engbersen and Van der Leun 1998.
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64. It must be noted that Western European ‘tourists’ show similar patterns of
arrest.
65. In 1997 there were an estimated 120 drug outlets in the western part of the
city (unpublished data Drugsoverlast Delfshaven).
66. Presumably, most of them come from Morocco, but it cannot be ruled out
that some also come from Algeria.
67. The data were collected between 1992 and 1994 within the framework of
the VICTOR anti-drug operation (Helsdinge 1994).
68. Of the 254 apprehended drug runners, 37 were illegal immigrants, 27 could
not be found in the registration of the police and for 16 people the infor-
mation was lacking. The police suggest that among the people with an un-
known status, there are also illegal immigrants (VRIS 1999: 24).
69. Officially they can only be expelled when they are suspected of serious of-
fences. In practice, they are often treated as illegal immigrants although
the legal conditions are not met.
70. The findings in this chapter are restricted to the situation in Rotterdam.
There are indications that the findings are also relevant for Amsterdam,
although illegal immigrants appear to be more active in opportunistic
street crime there (Van der Leun et al. 1998, VRIS 1999). In the cities of The
Hague and Utrecht, the issue does not seem to play a prominent role,
which points to the danger of easy generalisations.
71. ‘Politie Rotterdam vrijgevochten bende’ [Rotterdam police undisciplined
lot]. NRC Handelsblad April 29th 1997.
72. Exceptions in the Netherlands are Aalberts (1989, 1990) and Clermonts
(1994).
73. Controls at the border, which are partly carried out by the Royal Nether-
lands Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee) and have partly
shifted to the Schengen borders, are not dealt with in this study. The idea
behind this choice is that border controls are only able to curb – up to a
certain extent – immigration that is illegal from the start. Many illegal im-
migrants, however, enter the country, or the Schengen territory, legally
and lose their legal status in some later phase, for example when their visa
expires or when they are rejected as asylum seekers.
74. Before 1994, police officers had to have ‘reasonable suspicion’. In 1994 this
was narrowed down to ‘concrete indications’. In section 50 of the revised
Aliens Act, after a political debate, this was reformulated as follows: ‘facts
and circumstances that, according to objective standards, constitute a rea-
sonable suspicion’.
75. See the political struggle for ‘more blue out on the streets’. So far it has re-
mained unclear to what extent the Police departments have spent the extra
money on more personnel or rather on new computers, etc.
199
76. Seven per cent of all illegal immigrants apprehended in Rotterdam during
1995 were apprehended more than once within one year (Van der Leun et
al. 1998).
77. We can also read here that the State Secretary of Justice aimed at 50,000 re-
turns of illegal immigrants in 1997. The regional forces were expected to
help achieve this aim as far as possible (Politie Haaglanden 1996: 5). It
must be noted that this target number not only concerns effective expul-
sions (Van der Leun et al. 1998).
78. The (unofficial) name of the law is often associated with the linkage of
computerised files of public agencies. Actually, it refers to ‘linking up’
public services with residence status.
79. This holds for most of the people coming from Surinam, for all people
from the Antilles and Aruba, for children born in the Netherlands of par-
ents with the Dutch nationality and for third generation foreigners. In ad-
dition, many people from countries such as Morocco and Turkey are
naturalised and have both the Dutch nationality and their original nation-
ality.
80. With the debates on child allowances for children of legal immigrants as
an exception.
81. Cornelius et al. also refer to sub-national attempts to exclude illegal immi-
grants from social services (1994: 6). The present study shows exactly the
opposite: sub-national attempts that mitigate national attempts to ex-
clude people.
82. At least, this is what Jordan and Vogel hypothesise on the basis of a small-
scale comparative case study of undocumented Brazilian immigrants in
Germany and the United Kingdom.
83. A crucial reason for this reservation is the fear of institutionalised discrim-
ination.
84. Faist (1996) argues that in Germany it is not so much the policy directed
towards immigrants, which seems to block access, but rather the general
level of internal (labour market) regulation (see chapter 1). In this respect,
the Netherlands fits more into the German example. However, the Neth-
erlands also has a tradition of pragmatism when it comes to enforcing
contested types of regulation in order to keep the situation ‘manageable’
(Blankenburg 1999; Chorus, Gerver, Hondius and Koekoek 1999; Engber-
sen and Van der Leun 1999).
85. Liefhebber and Linders conducted a survey among General Practitioners
in Rotterdam, which was responded by 141 of them (a response of 55 per
cent). The survey reveals that while almost three-quarters of the respon-
dents claimed to see an uninsured patient less than once a week, there are
four respondents who have dozens of uninsured patients every week.
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Most of the uninsured patients are illegal immigrants (Burgers and Ten
Dam 1999: 163).
86. In 1997, this facility in the Welfare legislation was withdrawn. According
to Burgers and Ten Dam, the costs involved mounted up to a mere 0.5 per
cent of the total budget for social welfare in Rotterdam in 1993.
87. This is not to suggest that formal and informal arrangements can be fully
separated. With respect to housing, Burgers (1998) has shown how formal
arrangements shape their informal counterparts.
88. In the process, thousands of mismatches between the separate databases
were sorted out and the infrastructure to enable exchange of data had to be
developed.
89. GBA stands for Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie (Municipal Population
Administration).
90. VAS stands for Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem (Foreigner Adminis-
tration System).
91. Before 1991, Municipal Population Registers did not systematically check
the residence status of people who wanted to register themselves. Before
the introduction of VAS, each police department kept its own files of ap-
prehended illegal immigrants.
92. It must be noted, however, that since the 1980s many of the ‘traditional’
centralised bureaucracies have been transformed into more decentralised
organisations.
93. Hasenfeld’s typology is an ideal-typical simplification. In practice, differ-
ent technologies often exist alongside within one single organisation. A
hospital usually has an admission procedure, during which the patient has
to identify himself and show proof of an insurance contract. The selection
is not always directed to finding out who is residing in the country legally
or illegally, but the admission stage can be crucial for illegal immigrants.
94. In January 2000, a Somalian woman suffering from AIDS was rejected as
an asylum seeker. The case was seen by lawyers as a test case in light of con-
cerns about so-called medical tourism. They claimed that in similar cases
in the past, the Ministry of Justice has usually granted permits on humani-
tarian grounds (NRC Handelsblad, January 8th, 2000).
95. The original proposal of the law dates back to June 26th 1995. The formal
decision was published in the official governmental journal Staatsblad
1998 (34), April 2nd 1998.
96. In 1998 (during the deliberations of the Upper House on the 24th of
March), the State Secretary of Justice Ms. Schmitz admitted that: ‘In all
honesty, there are certainly laws whose defence is more satisfying than this
Linking Act.’
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97. The official title can be translated as: Act as to the amendment of the
Aliens Act and some other laws in order to link the eligibility of foreigners
toward administrative bodies to services, provisions, benefits, exemptions
and allowances, with the lawful residence of the foreigner in the Nether-
lands. Throughout this study I use the label ‘Linking Act’, which seems to
be the most appropriate translation.
98. The categories are free translations of the text of the law.
99. These five categories summarise ten codes of the Municipal Population
Register (GBA) and as much as 270 different titles in the Foreigner Ad-
ministration System (VAS).
100. These changes in legislation do not apply to asylum seekers. However, re-
jected asylum seekers whose appeals are exhausted and who have received
official notice to leave the country, fall outside the regulations governing
the asylum procedure and, hence, are subject to the Linking Act. The
Aliens Act 2000 limits rights to appeal.
101. The Linking Act also pertains to disability pensions, sickness benefits,
child allowances and unemployment benefits.
102. In practice, they almost always refuse them (Etman and Korpel 1999: 37,
Van der Leun and Botman 1999).
103. Workers who conduct their professional duties in urban areas with high
shares of (registered) immigrants are often conscious of the fact that they
encounter illegal immigrants in their day-to-day activities, although in in-
dividual cases they do not always know for sure who is legally residing and
who is not.
104. Because this housing corporation was one of the few organisations to re-
fuse co-operating with the second round of interviewing, it remains un-
known to what extent they changed their procedures after 1998.
105. These reports mainly referred to ‘white illegals’ from Turkey and Mo-
rocco.
106. See for example: ‘Steden steunen gedupeerden Koppelingswet’ [Cities
support victims of the Linking Act]. In: de Volkskrant July 1st 1998. Ac-
cording to a spokesman of the Ministry of Justice these bypasses are not
unlawful, but they do ‘run counter to the spirit of the Linking Act’ (de
Volkskrant September 15th, 1998).
107. The Ministries involved are: the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Educa-
tion, Culture and Sciences, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employ-
ment, The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports and the Ministry of
Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment.
108. In a formal evaluation report, the Social Affairs and Employment esti-
mates the number to be 300 (Etman and Korpel 1999: 34).
109. Landelijk Instituut voor Sociale Verzekeringen.
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110. Sociale Verzekeringsbank.
111. According to Etman and Korpel (1999), this would encompass 15 per cent
of the checked cases. Again, most of these cases pertain to illegal immi-
grants who have or have had tax-paid jobs and who have paid premiums
for these provisions. Legally, the questions surrounding the legitimacy of
these exclusions are not yet clear.
112. Although the research project focused on the four largest cities, I con-
ducted two interviews in the medium-sized city of Leiden. Leiden is an in-
teresting case because politicians including one of the local aldermen
openly promoted a (local) policy that diverged from the national policy.
113. These judgements are in line with the thesis of ‘transnationalisation of mi-
gration policy’ (Sassen 1991). It must be noted, however, that it only per-
tains to a small category of immigrants, and certainly not to illegal immi-
grants.
114. By dilemmas, I refer solely to situation in which people have to take diffi-
cult decisions, often with a moral component. Practical difficulties or
technical problems are left aside.
115. This duty is rooted in the Criminal Code and in several professional codes.
116. This strategy entails serious risks, as the medical information of two peo-
ple can easily be confused.
117. In 1999, the national government allotted I 5 million to this fund. In 1999
and 2000, only a small part of the budget was actually used. It is unclear yet
to what extent this stems from unfamiliarity with the arrangements or
from discontent with the bureaucratic procedures. Another reason may
be that the pressure on health care provisions is less than was expected or
that health care workers prefer their own informal arrangements.
118. See also Reijneveld and Van Herten 2000.
119. ‘Illegaal heeft recht op alle zorg’ (Illegal entitled to all care). In: NRC
Handelsblad Feb. 12th, 2000.
120. When a member of the liberal (coalition) party VVD promoted a more
strict practice, and even maintained that doctors should be obliged to no-
tify illegal patients to the police, the Minister of Health reacted by saying:
‘A doctor is not a law-enforcement agent.’ ‘VVD tegen ‘veel te ruime
medische zorg voor illegalen’ (Liberal Party against far too generous med-
ical care for illegals). In: NRC Handelsblad March 16th 2000.
121. An F-document is a conditional status for people who are not recognised
as refugees, but cannot (as yet) return to their home country for reasons of
safety. The corporation concerned does not have suitable housing for this
category of applicants.
122. These are often family members who are either awaiting formal permis-
sion for family reunification or never applied for it.
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123. The lack of clarity in the respect also produced rumours. Several respon-
dents in the other cities maintained that Amsterdam had reserved a sepa-
rate high-rise building for illegal immigrants who were ‘victims’ of urban
renewal, which turned out to be a myth.
124. According to several respondents, illegal immigrants cannot be refused
when registering with a housing corporation, whereas they have to be re-
fused as tenants.
125. In the Netherlands, children go to primary school until they reach the age
of 11 or 12. Full-time education is compulsory until the age of 16.
126. The total number of children without a residence status in the Nether-
lands remains a matter of conjecture. Most respondents think it involves
fairly limited numbers. It is likely that many children have come to the
Netherlands for unofficial family reunification. Teachers emphasise that
many of these children often attend school for some years and then either
move or return to their home country. Sometimes they are expelled to-
gether with their parents. Some respondents regularly come into contact
with single undocumented mothers whose children are born in the Neth-
erlands. Midwives in Amsterdam, for example, reported the birth of 120
undocumented children in 1994 (cf. Van der Leun et al. 1998: 24, Morelli
and Braat 1999: 36).
127. In the sphere of education, most respondents (15 out of 21) are convinced
that their ‘colleagues’ in other institutes take (or would take) the same de-
cisions as they do. In the other spheres, respondents show more doubts in
this respect.
128. Primary schools normally receive extra funding for pupils with an immi-
grant background.
129. This view is supported by the fact that the Witte Jas, a private practice for
illegal immigrants in Amsterdam, was disbanded in 2001. One of the rea-
sons given by a spokesperson of the organisation is that the regional net-
works and the Linking Fund have taken over their tasks.
130. Not because the attitude of professionals is assumed to be different, but
because illegal immigrants appear to be mainly concentrated within the
largest cities. In fact, a difference in this respect can already be observed
between Amsterdam and Rotterdam on the one hand and Utrecht and
The Hague on the other (see Van der Leun et al. 1998).
131. The effect on the social climate for legal immigrants is another serious
risk, but this falls outside the scope of the present study.
132. On the basis of the literature dealt with in chapter 1, the choice has been
made to deal with these central aspects of the social embeddedness of ille-
gal immigrants. This implied that the role of, for instance, mosques,
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churches, political committees, charity, neighbourhood organisations
and immigrant communities had to be left out.
133. Light speaks of ‘spillover migration’ when migration networks expand
immigration beyond the level that the original demand can support (Light
2000: 271).
134. Their analysis of the files of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
indicates that almost three quarters of the arrested illegal workers are ille-
gal immigrants (Visser and Van Zevenbergen 2001: 86).
135. This does not apply to insurance-based sickness benefits or disability pen-
sions, for which illegal workers often used to pay premiums and taxes.
136. A complicating factor is that the regulations also apply differently to these
domains.
137. Part of the applicants are illegal immigrants, others are still involved in le-
gal procedures concerning their residence status.
138. In the course of the year 2000, there were several cases of football players
who played for respectable teams, and were suddenly labelled ‘illegal im-
migrants’ after they were found not to have the proper documents or the
official permission to stay in the Netherlands. The players and their clubs
also found their way into false documents circuits.
139. Engbersen (1999b) has maintained that ‘Panopticum Europe’ does not ac-
tively detect and expel most of the illegal immigrants, but is much more ef-
ficient in excluding them from welfare state services and better segments
of the labour market.
140. There is a certain tautological element in the discussion because the sec-
tors on the left of the continuum are granted more room to manoeuvre by
the national state than the sectors on the right.
141. See Hollifield (2000) who argues that civil society protests have thwarted
far-reaching internal migration control measures in France and the
United States because citizens felt that the state should not intrude too far
into private lives.
142. There is an inevitable trade-off between the wider reach of internationally
comparative studies and the more in-depth character of case studies,
which are mostly confined to a national setting.
143. Policies always lag behind several years. It is somewhat ironic, however,
that the more restrictive remote control policy that was designed in a time
of high unemployment has eventually come in to full force in a time in
which the demand for immigrant labour appears to be on the rise again.
144. In countries like Israel and Italy, it has been documented that it is advanta-
geous for some immigrants to leave their formal jobs and engage in illegal
labour (cf. Ruspini 2000, Gächter et al 2000).
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145. During the 1970s almost 17,000 illegal immigrants were legalised, while in
the 1990s another 2,000 illegal immigrants received a legal status via the
official channels. In the same period of time France legalised more than
270,000 people, while the United Kingdom legalised less than 2,300 people
(Apap et al. 2000).
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